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ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation presents a multi-faceted and nuanced study of the multi-level 
governance of the Euro-Atlantic arena, or the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization and the European Union.  Using various methods of qualitative data 
collection and analysis, including documentary analysis and extensive fieldwork, the 
research is presented in three empirical essays and offered as a contribution to 
understandings of the state and governance in political geography and its cognate 
disciplines of international relations and anthropology.  The first essay examines the 
practices of governance in the European Union’s process of security and defense 
integration.  The second essay investigates how the security-identity nexus is central to 
the Euro-Atlantic accession process in an analysis of the multi-scalar geopolitical 
discourses mobilized by Croatian political elites.  The third and final empirical essay 
analyzes the linkages between multiple ‘levels’ of European governance in an 
investigation of the process of EUropean subject formation.  The three pieces of research 
together document how the reproduction of the state and processes of governance rely 
profoundly on spatially-informed articulations of power, scale, and subjectivity.  
Moreover, the ‘levels’ of multi-level governance are much more fluid and ephemeral than 
political-economy and legal frameworks of analysis have indicated.  The dissertation 
concludes with discussion of future avenues for research that would build on the findings 
presented herein. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 How relevant is Euro-Atlanticism today?  Some may be tempted to ask this 
question as, at the time of writing (mid-2013), NATO’s post-Cold War rationale remains 
a matter of debate, the European Union’s leadership finds itself navigating one banking 
system crisis after another, and American college students are increasingly incentivized 
to learn Arabic, Farsi, or Mandarin rather than French, German or even Bosnian.  And 
yet, the realm of European Union studies continues to grow as scholars seek ever more 
sophisticated ways of theorizing and systematically studying Europeanization, 
supranationalism, and collective security.  The EU and the transatlantic arena are 
believed to constitute unique geopolitical phenomena as well as an opportunity to glean 
general understandings about governance, ‘new’ state spaces, and the relationship 
between globalization and territoriality (Moisio, et al., 2013). 
 Political geography provides an obvious intellectual arena within which these 
themes may be subject to thorough investigation.  And indeed, the breadth and depth of 
political geographic scholarship on the spatialities of Europeanization has already 
produced extensive treatment of, inter alia, European spatial policies (Luukkonen, 2011; 
Moisio, 2011), EUropean geopolitical discourses (Kuus, 2007a; Bachmann and Sidaway, 
2009), and the identity politics emerging from the interactions between regionalism, 
nationalism, and supranational cosmopolitanism (Popescu, 2008; Beck, 2009; 
Bialasiewicz, 2009; Jones, 2011; Western, 2012).  Additional political geographic work 
has joined international relations in conceptualizing the EU as a ‘multi-level’ form of 
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governance, producing new scalar politics and networks, while also contending with a 
persistent metageography of Westphalian nation-state territoriality (Murphy, 2008; 
Mamadouh and van der Wusten, 2008).   
Multi-level governance has been defined as “a political concept that interprets 
contemporary political relationships within the EU, Europe as consisting of overlapping 
authorities and competing competencies at the supranational, national, and subnational 
levels” (Scott, 2009: 649).  In a poststructural understanding of scale, a better framing of 
the concept would be that these diverse policy actors and bodies of authority construct 
new scales of governance through their relations and activities.  But the particular 
manifestations of the practices of multi-level governance, and the further refinement of 
scale, the state, and other pertinent theoretical concepts, are matters to be taken up in 
additional research, with fresh empirical applications.  It is just such an intervention that 
this dissertation aims to make in the fields of political geography and EU studies.  In 
particular, surveying the various political geographic contributions to the study of 
Europeanization, Moisio, et al. (2013: 10) call for deeper engagement with “the 
actualization of ‘EU’rope in national public policy discourses” and EUropean space-
making in the context of broader, capitalist processes of globalization.   
 
Research Problem 
The present work seeks to accomplish this goal, but with a multi-faceted approach 
to the multi-level governance of the Euro-Atlantic arena.  With an eye toward the 
empirical foci of security, identity, and the Western Balkans, the project has materialized 
under the assumption that EU studies must maintain a substantial concern with the 
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‘Atlantic’ half of Euro-Atlanticism.  Hence, NATO and its relationship to the EU figures 
prominently in parts of the dissertation, particularly Chapter Four.  A second assumption 
under which the project has unfolded is that multi-level governance can be more 
fruitfully explored and analyzed through critical geographic engagement with power, 
scale, and subjectivity.  Each empirical essay engages with these concepts in its 
examination of the broader theoretical issues of the state, society, and governance.  The 
goal is not simply to document and analyze what is happening at particular, fixed levels 
of governance (e.g., the EU level, the national level, and the sub-national level).  Rather, 
the research has endeavored to understand how diverse practices of governance, located 
in multiple centers of power, emphasize different scalar constructions and mobilize 
different spatial assumptions in order to bring about particular policy outcomes. 
The nucleus of theoretical inspiration for this work hails not from political 
geography primarily, but rather from the very heart of integration theory in international 
relations.  The need to consider governance and security as a key component of 
integration has roots in the very beginning of integration studies. Wæver (1995: 391-2) 
identifies a conceptual triangle which encapsulates the fundamental dynamics of concern 
to scholars of integration studies, specifically EU studies.  The so-called security-
identity-integration triangle underscores the centrality of security and identity to the 
process of integration, and provides a framework within which to explore the basis for 
political communities and the relationships between states, societies, and inter- or supra-
national bodies.  On the vanguard of constructivist international relations, the early 
integration theorists made a significant contribution by taking security and identity, 
4 
 
which up to that time had been treated axiomatically, and viewing them as malleable 
phenomena, as dynamic variables that shape the integration process. 
Understandably, the preoccupation with security in the integration process from 
the 1960s until the 1980s revolved mainly around the economic, and later, political 
integration of Europe as a mode of preventing another world war (Keukeleire and 
McNaughton, 2008).  Throughout the 1990s and onward, the focus has gradually shifted 
to the EU as a security actor in its own right, and to the enlargement process itself as a 
guarantor of security as the EU expands to absorb instabilities on its periphery (Duke, 
2009; Gordon, 2009).  Alongside these empirical considerations, theoretical innovations 
on security were advanced by the Copenhagen Research Group in the 1990s.  Their 
concept of securitization addresses how issues are dramatized as existential imperatives, 
an advancement which took security studies well beyond the realm of military concerns 
(Wæver, 1995a).  This theoretical shift has since prompted exploration of myriad 
seemingly non-security issues which have been framed as matters of survival, warranting 
extraordinary measures, usually to be taken up by the state.  In short, the cultural 
production of social insecurities became the object of analysis (Weldes, et al., 1999). 
While in the last decade and a half, as security studies has been rediscovering 
culture, another key development adding nuance to the security-identity-integration 
triangle has been renewed focus on the co-constitution of insecurity and identity 
(Campbell, 1998; Neumann, 1999; Sharp, 2000; Kuus, 2007a).  I refer to this 
phenomenon throughout the dissertation as the security-identity nexus.  And finally, as 
these developments took place in security studies and identity studies, anthropology, 
political geography, and political sociology have revisited the state with constructivist 
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and ethnographic approaches (Mitchell, 1991; Jessop, 2001; Mountz, 2004; Megoran, 
2006; Sharma and Gupta, 2006; Kuus and Agnew, 2008).   
All of these advances in theorizing the state, governance, security, identity, and 
integration will be reviewed and analyzed in detail in the next chapter.  I mention them 
briefly here in order to locate the present work within the multiple intellectual veins that 
have inspired it.  In order to thoroughly examine the understudied relationship between 
multi-level governance and emergent identity politics and the impact of this relationship 
on Euro-Atlantic space as a meaningful socio-political unit, (Murphy, 2008; Mamadouh 
and van der Wusten, 2008) the main part of the dissertation comprises three distinct 
research projects presented in three empirical essays.  Each essay examines a different 
aspect and a particular ‘level’ of multi-level governance.  However, the suite of essays as 
a whole eschews the notion of discrete scales or ‘levels’ of governance.  Rather, the 
emphasis is on governance as a process that is profoundly intertwined with the political 
construction of scale, an idea that will be elaborated upon in the concluding discussion 
(Chapter 6).  In building toward that discussion, the individual empirical investigations 
bring thorough theoretical reflections on power, scale, and subjectivity to bear on the 
security-identity-integration relationship. 
 
Organization of Dissertation 
 The dissertation is organized into six chapters:  the present, introductory chapter; 
Chapter Two, which provides an overview of the various bodies of literature that have 
inspired this project; three empirical chapters structured as stand-alone empirical essays 
(Chapters Three through Five); and Chapter Six, which reviews the findings of the 
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empirical essays, discusses the implications for multi-level governance, and offers a 
sketch of subsequent questions to be taken up in future research. 
The first empirical essay, Chapter Three, presents research on the process of 
securitization of the European Union, or the deepening of European integration in the 
realm of security and defense policy and capabilities.  The essay begins from the premise 
that the EU’s particular brand of security governance must be reconceptualized with 
spatial understandings of geoeconomics and sensitivity to the contingent nature of 
securitization.  In the existing literature, recent assessments of the EU’s prospects for 
further security and defense integration have focused more on the member states’ 
willingness to find political consensus and cede sovereignty on sensitive security and 
defense matters to the supranational level.  Chapter Three departs from such assessments 
and looks instead to the ways in which the construction of will and ability are deeply 
intertwined in the security and defense integration process.  The essay uses a textual 
analysis of EU security and defense documents in order to explore the question of 
whether a distinctly EU brand of security governance is emerging via the forging of a 
European defense industrial base.   
At the heart of securitization, I contend, is the inseparability of ‘hard’ (e.g. 
military) and ‘soft’ (e.g. economic) power, despite both theoretical and practical attempts 
to decouple these forms of power in discussions of the EU as a security actor.  The 
assemblages of interests, imperatives, and relations at the supranational level and fluidity 
of the boundary between the ‘supranational’ and ‘member state’ levels of governance are 
the focus of the analysis.  The emergence of a supranational security arena is located 
within the broader process of neoliberal globalization.  Thus, this research responds to the 
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dearth of analyses of how policymakers and state elites are negotiating the relationship 
between Europeanization and globalization (Moisio, et al., 2013).   
Chapter Four incorporates an explicit use of scale theory in its analysis of the 
discursive strategies of Croatian state elites who, from 2007 to 2012, created the 
dominant self-representations of Croatian government in the Euro-Atlantic integration 
process.  The texts analyzed demonstrate how agents of geopolitical representation 
operate within a metageography
1
 of nested scales that compel them to package particular 
representations for audiences at particular ‘levels’—hence the term ‘multi-scalar 
geopolitics’ in the chapter title.  The sense of hierarchical scale is altered and reified by 
the integration process, which provokes multiple imaginings of the ‘regional,’ the 
‘international,’ and their relationship to the ‘national.’  In the Croatian case, this has 
meant a careful deployment of Balkanism as a discursive strategy, with different uses of 
Balkan identity targeted to audiences ostensibly located at different scales.  Here, again, 
attention is paid to geoeconomic logics that connect the integration process with broader 
processes of neoliberal globalization. The crucial interplay between security and identity 
is uncovered here, with consideration of how perceptions of security and identity 
importantly construct the Euro-Atlantic as a scale of governance for actors both within, 
and on the margins of, Euro-Atlantic ‘membership.’   
The third and final empirical essay, presented in Chapter Five, combines 
documentary analysis with fieldwork in order to provide a more contextualized 
examination of the implications of identity politics for multi-level governance.  The 
                                                 
1
 Metageography is defined as the “spatial structures through which people order their knowledge of the 
world,” Lewis and Wigen, 1997: ix. 
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research aims to document and analyze Croatia’s process of becoming an accession 
society.  This occurs through the construction of what I term the ‘EUro-aspirant subject.’  
The project constitutes an ethnography of the state, but distinguishes itself from previous 
ethnographies of the state in political geography (notably Mountz, 2003, 2004 and 2007) 
by deploying an inclusive definition of the state (both governmental and non-
governmental actors) in the empirical investigation.  Hence, this work seeks to illuminate 
the how of multi-level governance by uncovering the relations and linkages between EU 
representatives, higher-level Croatian political actors, and the rank-and-file members of 
Croatian governmental bureaucracy and civil society groups.  The focus of the analysis is 
the production of knowledge, however strategic and partial, that aims to inform and 
persuade citizens about European integration.  The process of negotiating this knowledge 
is largely mediated by the historical legacies and national traditions that profoundly shape 
sense of self in relation to the metageography of ‘higher’ scales of authority and 
belonging. 
The three empirical essays outlined above are each based on distinct research 
projects and therefore will each elaborate upon their own theoretical framings and 
methodological approaches.  Therefore, before moving on to the empirical section of the 
dissertation, the chapter immediately following this one will explore the various bodies of 
knowledge on which this work rests.  While the complex subject of multi-level 
governance was best explored in a series of discrete investigations, there are certainly 
common intellectual threads tying these projects together, and the dissertation as a whole 
is offered as an intervention into the debates on governance and reproduction of the state 
through the security-identity nexus.  In the next chapter, a broad survey of the literatures 
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on these overarching themes will serve as the entry point into the finer analyses of power, 
scale, and subjectivity taken up in the three empirical essays.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
CONCEPTUAL BUILDING BLOCKS FOR THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHIC 
STUDY OF MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE 
 
 
 This chapter reviews several bodies of literature that are foundational to the 
themes explored in this dissertation, providing a synthesis of the various veins of 
scholarship to which the present work aims to make a contribution.  As noted in the 
introduction, the empirical part of the dissertation constitutes a suite of stand-alone 
essays, each of which contains its own theoretical framework and review of the most 
pertinent literature.  Therefore, this chapter is not intended to be a comprehensive review 
of every work drawn upon in the empirical essays, but rather a broad conceptual sketch 
linking together the multiple bodies of work that have inspired the empirical explorations 
that follow. 
 
Introduction 
 This dissertation is, at its core, a study of the reproduction of the state in the 
context of multi-level governance.  This chapter sets up the conceptual and disciplinary 
milieu for the task by reviewing several bodies of scholarship from which the research 
foci have emerged.  A few starting assumptions guided the choice of literatures within 
which I have situated this work.  One is that the state is kept viable by the perceptions of 
identity and threat which pervade nearly every corner of social and political life, whether 
we are aware of them or not.  Another is that identity and (in)security are not, and have 
never been, solely within the purview of the state proper (read: government bureaucracy), 
but rather underpin—and are shaped by—the vast array of state and nonstate actors and 
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practices collectively referred to as ‘governance.’  Finally, given the increasing attention 
in the social sciences to new kinds of state spaces, including the supranational state space 
of the European Union, the empirical essays seek to explore shifting roles and 
perceptions of the state in the context of a transnationalizing and globalizing process, that 
of Euro-Atlantic integration.   
The dissertation constitutes a political geography study oriented toward the 
cognate disciplines of anthropology and constructivist international relations; hence, this 
chapter connects literatures covering several key concepts and multiple fields of study.  
The two major objectives are: firstly, to explore the ways in which these fields have 
contributed to the evolution of the key concepts employed in the analysis; and secondly; 
to identify the remaining lacunae in existing approaches, unresolved theoretical debates, 
and unexploited opportunities for synthesis and dialogue between several concepts and 
strands of inquiry.  The chapter unfolds in five sections.  The first section provides a brief 
review of the last several decades of theorization of the state.  The second and third 
sections review the literatures on the concepts of security governance and the security-
identity nexus, noting the intersections between these concepts and contemporary thought 
on the state.  The fourth section reviews what may only loosely be referred to as a body 
of work, a collection of literature that has examined security and identity in the process of 
Europe’s Eastern enlargement.  A brief concluding section recaps the remaining gaps and 
tensions in these literatures, suggesting some ways forward that will be taken up in the 
empirical section. 
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Theorizing the State in Political Geography: Influences and Recent Trends 
Recent theorizing on the state, both within and beyond the subdiscipline of 
political geography, has left this fundamental concept in a rather weakened position.  
Where it was once, in its incarnation as the nation-state, the unquestioned unit of analysis 
for all manners of political geographic research—political economic analyses, studies of 
war, peace, and resistance, and so on—the latest infusions of postfoundational social 
theory have made it impossible to think of the state’s operation in these social-political 
phenomena in a taken-for-granted or straightforward way.  This development has vast 
consequences for explorations of security and security governance – phenomena which 
quite clearly implicate the state, but also conjure complex questions of how the state is 
positioned within such processes from the outset.  Much of the political geographic work 
on securitization and militarization has avoided explicit engagement with the state; and 
understandably so, because such engagement comes with complications that have the 
potential to co-opt the focus of the entire study.  The result has often been under-
theorized and lopsided accounts of how marginalized groups are pushed and pulled by 
the machinations of the security apparatus, at the hand of some monolithic power center.  
Presumably this alludes to the state in most cases, but many current inquiries neglect to 
fully unearth the ‘other side(s)’ of these scenarios.   
This section will examine contemporary theories of the state, and their heritages, 
and say a bit about what they seem to imply for notions of security.  It will also briefly 
identify the key tensions lingering today, and how they beg the need for richer 
understandings of the positioning of the state within the practices and relations of security 
governance.   
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Contemporary Theories of the State 
 After waves of theorizing in political geography which saw views of the state 
generally grouped into Marxist, society-centered conceptions (Harvey, 1976; Poulantzas, 
1980; Johnston, 1982) and state-centered conceptions which maintain that the state holds 
power autonomously from the economy and civil society more broadly (Mann, 1984; 
Clark and Dear, 1984), there has been a general push away from these theorizations.  The 
strength of state- and society-centered theories of the state lay in their attempts to unearth 
the causal mechanisms giving rise to the multiple forms and functions states may assume.  
However, post-foundational political and social theory fundamentally questioned the 
possibility of identifying precise borders between the state and society, or the state and 
capital.  Both state-centered and society-centered views made claims to this practice of 
demarcation.   
Alongside post-foundational approaches, neo-Marxist thought on the state has 
continued in political geography under the guise of the regulation approach throughout 
the 1990s (Tickell and Peck, 1995; Peck and Tickell, 1994; Jessop, 1998), as well as 
more recent theoretical concerns with the ways in which state power and governance are 
being reorganized upward to the global scale, downward to the local, and ‘outward’ to the 
private sphere/capital (Brenner, 1997, 1998; Brenner, et. al, 2003; Swyngedouw, 1996, 
2000; Glassman, 1999; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999).  In addition to the problems 
inherent in ‘bounding’ state and society, neo-Marxist approaches to the state, taken to 
their logical conclusion, may equate state security and market security, reducing what are 
actually diverse and complex security concerns and objectives to simply (or, at least, 
ultimately) economic ones (Varro, 2010). 
14 
 
 In part against these more structural
2
 conceptualizations of the state, another wave 
of theorizing including Foucauldian, feminist, and ‘stateless’ state theories, which 
actually saw its roots in the late 1970s and early 1980s, has fomented with several 
different aims.  These literatures warrant more detailed discussion, as their legacy largely 
shapes conceptions of the state predominant in political geography today.  Foucauldian 
approaches to the state, countering earlier theoretical concerns with state form and 
apparatus, eschew ascribing any pre-given or inherent characteristics to the state, striving 
instead to disrupt the traditional dialectics of government/governed and the binary of 
sovereignty/obedience (Huxley, 2007; Coleman and Agnew, 2007; Burchill, et al., 1991).  
In contrast, others, particularly Hardt and Negri (2000), have interpreted Foucault’s 
thinking on the state to insist that his theorizations actually require us to conceive of 
overlapping constellations of spatialities of power, rather than temporalized shifts from 
centered power to diffuse power.  Perhaps the most crucial conceptions of ‘state power’ 
that political geographers have gleaned from Foucault’s work have been his ideas of 
governmentality (the micropractices of surveillance and discipline deployed within 
society) and biopolitics (the more diffuse disciplinary techniques resulting from the 
formation of ideal subjects) (Scott, 1998; Hannah, 2000; Huxley, 2007).   
 These insights compel reconsideration of security in relation to the state, if 
indirectly.  One way to reexamine this relationship is to trace it back to biopolitics, with 
the security of the state/society deriving from the constraint of the very norms governing 
                                                 
2
 Although I identify the works cited in the previous paragraph as still more or less structural in their 
orientation, it is important to point out that they have been produced with poststructuralist pretenses, 
intending to break with structural Marxism. 
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what it is to be human (Dillon and Reed, 2001; Corbridge, 2008; Crampton and Elden, 
2007; see also Hannah, 2000 and Häkli, 2001, for discussion of the construction of 
society via cartographic and statistical knowledge in state-centered discourses).  A second 
vein of thought seems to derive understandings of security from the concept of 
governmentality and the surveillance of some humans by other humans.  This approach 
accounts for how the logic of panopticism rests upon strategies of politics, the military, 
technology, and science, which construct as ‘other’ those who are to be surveyed in order 
to reduce the uncertainties and complexities of everyday life down to the most simplified 
truisms (De Certeau, 1984). 
 Early feminist approaches to the state attempted to synthesize Marxist thought 
with feminist theory, as in Cynthia Cockburn’s work (1977) investigating gender, race, 
and class in the workings of the local state.  This effort was later mostly abandoned as 
feminists began to see better prospects for unearthing the effects of patriarchy by 
exploring relations outside of those of labor and capital (Marston, 2004).  A smaller 
group of liberal feminist theorists such as Bryson (1992) theorized the state at this time as 
a neutral institution which held the potential to equalize gender relations in society.  
Today, as Chouinard (2004) notes, feminists looking at the state have started to back 
away from Foucault’s legacy, which, they maintain, neglects the material implications of 
race, class, and gender.  Further, the dismantling of a government/governed dichotomy, 
which gives way to a wholly participatory conception of the state and state power, for 
many feminist scholars fails to explain the interventions of state violence and oppression 
in everyday life.  It might be argued that the Foucauldian conception of security, outlined 
above, explains how a particular kind of stability and security are achieved within 
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society, but is silent on the question of why, exactly, some human beings are 
overwhelmingly the targets of ‘panopticism’ while others are on the side of surveillance.  
Feminist geographers, such as Hyndman (2004, 2007) and Mountz (2003, 2004, 2007) 
have sought solutions to insecurity beyond that of the nation-state’s physical-territorial-
military understandings of it, though there is crucial disagreement over whether more 
human-centered concerns should be considered under the rubric of security at all (Krause 
and Williams, 1996; Kuus, 2007a; Kuus and Agnew, 2008). 
 Finally, ‘stateless’ state theories, owing much to the political sociology 
conceptions of the late 1980s and early 1990s, completely eschew any ontology of the 
state—realist/foundational or otherwise—in favor of conceiving of a ‘state effect’ or 
‘state idea’ (Abrams, 1988; Mitchell, 1991).  This, they insist, is the only way to 
completely overcome the problematic state/society binary which continues, both 
explicitly and implicitly, to undergird analyses of the political that rely upon a concept of 
state for explanatory power.  The stateless notion of the state explicates power as deriving 
from the ability of particular groups’ and individuals’ practices to maintain popular belief 
in separate spheres of state and society, as well as in a view of the state as imbued with 
subjectivity, intents, goals, plans, and decision-making capacities (Mitchell, 1991 and 
1999; Painter, 2005; Painter, 2006).   
The notion of state security here, too, seems to derive from the ability of these 
coteries of actors and assemblages of practices and representations to continuously 
reproduce a robust ‘state idea,’ which may remain fairly stable over time, buttressed by 
the performance of security (and other) discourses (Krause and Williams, 1996; Migdal, 
2001; Sharp, et. al, 2007; Bialasiewicz et.al, 2007; Dalby, 2008a).  Importantly, in the 
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post-structural state literature, theorists vary in their acceptance of the materiality of the 
state.  For example, Abrams remains more amenable to a sense of materiality to the state, 
embodied in the institutions which comprise the ‘state system,’ while Mitchell denies 
even the utility of a ‘state system’ concept.  Painter (2006) has been the most enthusiastic 
proponent of Mitchell’s conception of the state in political geography, drawing upon a 
Bakhtinian notion of prosaics in order to explore how society is ‘statizized’ in the most 
mundane aspects of life.  However, the very notion of ‘statization’ seems to be predicated 
upon an assumption of separate spheres, with the society sphere becoming increasingly 
integrated into (or co-opted by) the state sphere.  Painter’s study is arguably illustrative of 
the supreme difficulty of fully committing to a stateless conception of the state in 
empirical investigations. 
 The tensions in the literature over materiality versus ontology and the difficulty, 
in practice, of destabilizing the state/society binary, have given way to increased calls for 
anthropological approaches to studying the state and implications of state power 
(Megoran, 2006; Gupta, 2006; Sharma and Gupta, 2006; Mountz, 2007; MacLeavy and 
Harrison, 2010; Kuus, 2011).  These recent works emphasize the importance of gathering 
ethnographic accounts of everyday individuals’ encounters with institutions and agents of 
the state who profoundly shape countless aspects of daily life.  Alongside this 
development, a growing focus has emerged upon governance, rather than government, as 
a fruitful approach to ‘knowing’ the state without reifying it in a structuralist, 
foundational, or Westphalian sense (Jessop, 2001; Brenner, et. al, 2003; Bialasiewicz, 
2008).  As the next section will detail, scholarly and practical understandings of 
governance have evolved to emphasize the multiplicity of actors who embody ‘state’ 
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power.  Further, the concept of governance, particularly in the context of supranational 
processes of securitization, has been fused with understandings of security in order to 
account for emergent modes of identifying and managing security issues in contemporary 
political and social life.   
 
States, Societies, and Security:  From Government to Governance to Security 
Governance 
 
 As the preceding section on theorization of the state demonstrates, the remaining 
tensions in the literature have led to arguments for ethnographic approaches to the state, 
as well as inclusive approaches which recognize that a variety of actors and relations, in 
fact, wield ‘state power.’  Hence, much of what may be identified as the work of the state 
is, in fact, located or conducted outside of the formal state apparatus (or governmental 
bureaucracy).  Growing recognition of the futility of delineating neat spheres of ‘state’ 
and ‘society’ has resulted in an increased scholarly focus upon ‘governance’ over 
‘government,’ which necessitates consideration not only of ‘non-state’ actors and 
activities, but also of the varying scales and transnational nature of these phenomena.  For 
the purposes of this dissertation, which investigates the reproduction of the state in the 
context of a transnationalizing and securitizing process, governance is considered in 
several ways.  This section will first review key general perspectives found in the 
literature on governance, then move on to consider the ways in which this concept has 
been merged with that of security.  Finally, it will provide an overview of the literature on 
international and supranational institutions who participate in the phenomenon of security 
governance.   
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Governance:   Key Definitions and Perspectives 
The notion of governance, at its core, and across varying veins of thought, denotes 
assemblages of actors (both individuals and groups), practices, and relations spanning 
both the governmental and non-governmental realms, that come together to order daily 
life for members of a particular collective, be it a community, national society, or 
supranational entity.  This contrasts with common understandings and usage of 
government, which refer to the formal state apparatus and its preeminence in maintaining 
public order and facilitating collective action (Stoker, 1998: 17).  Governance has proven 
an important concept in (or at least tangentially to) the theorization of the state.  
Throughout each wave of state theory, there have been challenges to the state as the 
container of society (Wallerstein, 1984; Taylor, 1995; Häkli, 2001; Corbridge, 2008).  
Given the difficulties identified above in theorizing the state, the problem is not simply a 
scalar one in which nation-state-centric views of society limit possibilities of identifying 
other important ways of organizing political and social life.  It is also one of dichotomies, 
which are a stubborn legacy of modernist, foundational, and structuralist thought.  For 
this reason, Jessop (1998) points out, governance is a crucial concept that facilitates 
moving beyond common, simplistic dichotomies in the social sciences, including market 
versus hierarchy in economics; market versus plan in policy studies; anarchy versus 
sovereignty in international relations; and, central to the present study, state versus 
society. 
For Jessop (1998, 2001) and others (Brenner, 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin, 
1999; Brenner, et. al, 2003) who conceive of governance from the perspectives of neo-
Marxism and regulation theory, shifts occurring from markets and hierarchies to 
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networks and from government to governance, in fact, reflect real-world shifts in 
fundamental political-economic structures, and not simply shifts in the way policy-
makers or intellectuals plan, conceive of, or analyze these phenomena.   The current 
‘reality,’ according to this perspective, is governance defined as heterarchy: “self-
organized steering of multiple agencies, institutions, and systems which are operationally 
autonomous from one another yet structurally coupled because of their interdependence” 
(Jessop, 1998: 29).  Due to the element of interdependence,  the system is dialogic, driven 
by a reflexive rationality in which individual economic actors exchange some autonomy 
for political influence and the state exchanges some top-down authority for influence 
over economic agents (Jessop, 1998).  The conceptual decoupling of the political and 
economic spheres of activity has been identified as problematic by opponents to 
regulation theory, for much the same reason that the state/society binary more generally 
has been identified as untenable:  even direct participants in the formal state apparatus 
hold stakes (personally and professionally) in the economy.  In other words, agents of the 
state proper are also capitalists (Cox, 2002).  In this sense, the political economists have 
weakened their own arguments for the utility of the governance concept, by remaining 
committed to a notion of economic and political spheres that are separate and interact 
with one another. 
Moreover, due to the reliance upon economic transitions to ultimately explain 
shifts in governing processes, scholars in this particular subfield of geography may 
overstate their case for the dwindling importance of the nation-state.  While on one hand, 
they are correct in arguing against the reification of the nation-state as a pre-given and 
natural container of society or preeminent scale of political authority and activity, they 
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neglect the possibilities of dealing with the nation-state in a post-foundational or post-
structural manner.  Instead, they insist upon the ‘reterritorialization’ of the state, in which 
‘new’ scales of subnational and supranational state spaces become crucial to regulatory 
activity.  Much of the governance literature in geography, then, has been preoccupied 
with a theoretical and empirical concern for changing scales of politics and the expansion 
of international and supranational governance regimes, as well as more localized 
networks of governance (Brenner, 1997; Jessop, 2001; Häkli, 2001; Brenner, et al., 2003; 
Trudeau, 2008).  Wilson (2012) updated some of the thinking on scale and governance to 
emphasize the very active role that local governances play in engaging capital, as well as 
the continued importance of nationalist ideologies in processes of economic 
development. 
An empirically demonstrated rise of governance may certainly be associated with 
parallel neoliberalizing processes (a stepping back of the state from traditionally 
‘governmental’ responsibilities and increased emphasis on the non-governmental sector 
and the individual citizen in shouldering those responsibilities) and the emergence of a 
geoeconomic order (Stulberg, 2005; Cowen and Smith, 2009).  However, perspectives on 
governance have been offered by a number of literatures beyond those of political 
economy and economic geography.  Among others, international relations, development 
studies, and Foucauldian analyses have employed the governance concept for their 
respective purposes.  With recently popularized language of ‘active citizenship’ linking 
the notion of governance to discussions of community and family life, this phenomenon 
clearly carries implications beyond the immediate realm of economic relations and 
regulatory practices—though such discourses often betray, at their core, a concern for 
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effective economic and political participation (Putman, 1993; Stoker, 1998).  
Nevertheless, the concept has gained traction in multiple fields.  Given the substantive 
focus of this study, the usage of ‘governance’ in international relations is of particular 
interest here. 
The utility of recognizing and theorizing governance—whether as a system, 
practice, or process—has featured prominently in international relations literature over 
the last twenty years or so.  In what is now regarded as a seminal work on governance in 
international relations, James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempeil (1992) produced an 
edited volume which laid out an agenda for approaching governance analytically, 
identifying it as a set of mechanisms of regulation in a given sphere of activity imbued 
with informal, rather than juridical, authority.  In this view, governance is distinguished 
from other terms such as regime or government in that it encompasses a broader spectrum 
of actors and interests (public and private) and extends beyond well-defined physical 
spaces.  Additional attempts in international relations to provide an analytically useful 
concept of governance have conceived of it as an activity rather than a system of rules or 
mechanisms; as just another regime, albeit one that incorporates private actors and 
agendas; as a process; or as a normative goal of the policy establishment (Finkelstein, 
1995; Risse-Kappen, 1995; Commission on Global Governance, 1995).   
In sum, early treatment of governance in international relations saw little 
agreement over how to bound the concept, but a number of catchy terms often peppered 
the discussion: intersubjectivity, participation, negotiation, dialogue, strategic interaction, 
and so on.  Such terms point to a growing recognition that non-governmental 
organizations, transnational peace movements, multinational corporations, and other non-
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state actors are also loci of power and activity in the global arena.  However, important 
problems remain in international relations over how to adequately address the issues of 
subjectivity, intentionality, and agency in systems, processes, or activities of governance.  
While there is broad agreement that governance (vis-à-vis government) features 
heterarchy over hierarchy and informal over formal authority, it is still largely treated as 
an intentional, monolithic, and purposeful thrust toward particular policy outcomes, an 
idea that warrants interrogation and a rethinking of the operation and spatialities of power 
(Allen, 2003; Mitchell, 2007). 
Despite the difficulties identified in defining a usefully analytical or testable 
formula of governance, the development of this concept in international relations was 
significant because it challenged realist and neorealist privileging of interstate 
interactions as the sole or primary basis for the management of international affairs 
(Smouts, 1998).  The challenge to state-centrism is two-fold:  On one hand, it aids 
scholars in thinking beyond a crude state/civil society binary on a global scale.  On the 
other hand, it provides a framework (however loose or imprecise) for thinking about 
practices and relations in the management of human affairs at scales beyond the nation-
state.  This has been particularly useful in the field of European Union studies, which has 
long struggled for appropriate language to describe an entity that is much more than an 
international organization, but certainly not commensurate with the nation-state (Jönsson, 
Tägil, and Törnqvist, 2000).  Rather, in tracing modes of managing social and political 
life in this supranational state space, scholars have often analyzed the activities and 
practices of the EU as functions of a complex, multilevel brand of governance 
(Pagoulatos, 1999; Webber et al., 2004; DeBardeleben and Hurrelmann, 2007; Gorenflo, 
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2008; Murphy, 2008; Mamadouh and van der Wusten, 2008).  Further, this 
conceptualization has been applied to specific issue areas, including security, as the next 
subsection details. 
 
Security Governance:  Blending Governance and Securitization 
The bulk of writing on the topic of security governance has proliferated in the 
field of European Union studies, although a number of other veins of scholarly inquiry, it 
could be argued, have investigated this phenomenon while not conceptualizing it as 
security governance per se.  The merging of security issues with the concept of 
governance has resulted from a realization that even in the security sphere, which has 
traditionally been viewed as firmly within the purview of the state proper, non-state 
actors have increasingly wielded influence in the management of policies and agendas 
(Webber et al., 2004: 5-6; Kirchner and Sperling, 2007).  The growing participation and 
recognition of a variety of security actors has occurred alongside an evolving concept of 
security, which has broadened from physical-military and state-centric conceptions to 
include human, environmental, societal, and other forms of security (Buzan, et al., 1998; 
Barnett, 1999; Wæver, 1995a; Weldes et al., 1999; Roe, 2005; Moustakis, 2005; Gheciu, 
2008).  With that, scholars in the subfields of constructivist international relations and 
political geography have emphasized the ways in which security perceptions, policies, 
and agendas are culturally informed (Lipschutz, 1995; Wæver, 1995; Weldes et al., 1999; 
Kuus, 2002 and 2007a). 
‘Security governance,’ as defined by Webber et al. (2004: 8), is a loose concept 
comprising five features:  
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heterarchy; the interaction of a large number of actors, both public and private; 
institutionalization that is both formal and informal; relations between actors that 
are ideational in character, structured by norms and understandings as much as by 
formal regulations; and, finally, collective purpose. 
 
It would be fair to say that this definition is nothing more than the dominant view of 
governance currently proffered in the international relations literature, applied to the 
sphere of security activity, which may imply that it inherits the same problems and 
limitations identified in the previous subsection.  A more recent attempt by Kirchner 
(2006:948) to improve upon this conceptualization gives us an equally vague 
conceptualization, in which security governance is defined as an “intentional system of 
rules” and interventions of both state and nonstate actors, “purposefully directed towards 
particular policy outcomes” in the realm of security.  Kirchner emphasizes the structure 
and process of governance, an approach which may overcome some of the earlier 
disagreements over whether governance is best viewed as a practice, system, or process. 
While the strength of the above definitions may lie in their flexibility and 
accommodation of many different types of security and security actors, this may also 
make security governance difficult to utilize as an analytical concept.  Moreover, 
collective purpose and intentionality are again central to the concept, which seems to 
assume that all of these diverse institutions, agencies, and individuals who participate in 
security through assorted modes and mechanisms, are constituted as security actors in 
uniform ways and with uniform objectives uniting their agendas.  Finally, existing 
investigations of security governance betray an elite or institutional bias, in which entities 
such as the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization are imbued with 
subjectivity and ‘actorness’ rather problematically, and inquiry rarely extends beyond the 
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realms of formal politics and powerful groups and individuals.  Nevertheless, the existing 
work on security governance in international relations valuably demonstrates the ways in 
which blending these two phenomena—security and governance—both conceptually and 
empirically, can shed light on the constructions of (in)security and threat that underpin 
security agendas and reproduce the state effect.  This is an aspect of security and 
securitization that policy-oriented analyses tend to neglect (e.g. Cornish and Edwards, 
2001; Gordon, 2009; Ilievski and Taleski, 2009; c.f. Gheciu, 2008). 
Examples of work that may be characterized as investigating security governance 
(if not by name) abound in the fields of international relations, security studies, and EU 
studies.  Much of this has focused on major inter-, trans-, and supranational institutions 
such as NATO and the European Union and their participation in the management of 
security issues (Baran, 2004; Archick and Gallis, 2005; Ethnopolitics, Fall 2009; Trauner, 
2009; Sasse, 2005; Sebastian, 2009; Ilievsky and Talesky, 2009; Gordon, 2009).  The 
overall approach in much of this work is largely descriptive or evaluative, although it 
usefully documents many of the institutional, legal, and political mechanisms of the EU’s 
approach to security.  For example, Gordon (2009) assesses the EU’s Stabilization and 
Association Process in the Western Balkans as a tool for post-conflict management, 
noting that while the program correlates with an absence of resurgent violence, it suffers 
from overly technocratic and top-down implementation of policies. Scholars focusing on 
NATO’s role in the post-Cold War security landscape have observed that the military 
alliance has fundamentally shifted its raison d’être by broadening its activities to 
democratization, norm-shaping, and peace-making (Baran, 2004; Kuus, 2007a; De 
Nevers, 2007; Gheciu, 2008). 
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The growing body of work within human geography and anthropology that 
investigates securitization (the process that embeds security-oriented beliefs, cultures, 
activities, and agendas deeply within non-security realms of society) has arguably 
provided the most grounded examinations of security governance (again, while not 
actually invoking the term).  The bulk of this work has entailed embodied investigations 
of the social relations and practices of militarization, a constituent process of 
securitization involving the military apparatus specifically (Lutz, 2001; Kuus, 2007b and 
2009; Bernazzoli and Flint, 2009; Loyd, 2010).  While these studies in no way make 
claims to investigating ‘security governance’ as such, they reveal the ways in which 
practices and relations of securitization are not confined to elites, to the national and 
supranational scales, or to individuals and groups who see themselves as directly 
involved in security.  Kuus (2007b) demonstrates this by documenting the participation 
of schools and postal services in Central and Eastern European countries who sought to 
sell NATO accession to their publics by making NATO a part of everyday life.  This 
included children’s drawing competitions and high school essay competitions with titles 
such as “Secure World” and “Loyalty of the Soldier.”  Additional work on securitization 
does look at broader-scale and less embodied processes, though this is generally not in 
dialogue with the more grounded approaches (Dalby, 2008b; Morrissey, 2008 and 2010). 
 In sum, the literature on security governance per se has not engaged with the 
literatures on militarization and securitization, which emanate from different disciplinary 
traditions.  For their part the militarization and securitization scholars do not conceive of 
their substantive focus as ‘security governance,’ despite a general acceptance in the social 
sciences that governance must be recognized as a more ideational and cultural 
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phenomenon than its past conceptualizations have allowed for.  As is evidenced from the 
preceding overview of the literature, key questions remain to be resolved.  While the 
concept of security governance is somewhat agreed-upon, how it relates to securitization 
is less clear.  Additionally, the literature lacks thick examinations of the practices and 
relations of security governance that would synthesize notions of scale and subjectivity 
and aim to get to ‘the bottom of’ the ostensible cohesion and intentionality found in 
existing analyses.  Finally, this section has demonstrated that the fields of international 
relations, security studies, and political geography lack a coherent approach to (and body 
of work on) these issues.  However, the cultural underpinnings of security governance 
comprise the basis for another strand of literature to be reviewed here.  These 
underpinnings, which I refer to as the security-identity nexus, are the subject of the next 
section. 
 
The Security-Identity Nexus 
The literature on the security-identity nexus investigates, in a number of ways, the 
mutual constitution of perceptions of security and sense of self and other.  From a 
political-geographic standpoint, this means that the forging of geopolitical spaces is 
always and everywhere intertwined with the forging of geopolitical identities.  The nature 
of geopolitical space—whether by this we mean regions, nations or states—is generally 
regarded in contemporary geographic thought as highly discursive.  This is not to say that 
political-geographic constructs such as identities and borders do not engender particular 
materialities—or that they do not have profound material implications for everyday life.  
But it is important to recognize how geopolitical identities and spaces fundamentally 
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shape the ways in which we envision world political space, and how, as a result of these 
geopolitical visions, we recognize salient threats to ourselves and the relevant collectives 
with whom we identify (Dijkink, 1996).  This section will review the considerable 
literature which has shed light on this central aspect of social and political life and will 
unfold in two subsections.  The first looks at the ways in which scholars in international 
relations, anthropology, history, and political geography have treated the delineation of 
self and other, a construction that undergirds virtually all geopolitical practices and 
relations.  I then turn to the abundance of work on the role of the security-identity nexus 
in producing and reproducing the state. 
 
Self and Other: The Basis for Material and Discursive Boundaries 
The prevailing contemporary thought on security and identity assumes that the 
links between these discursive constructions begin with the delineation of self and other.  
This is an active and ongoing process, as these categories must constantly be reaffirmed.  
Moreover, this delineation is a necessary, a-priori ingredient of identity formation, rather 
than a consequence of it.  Iver Neumann’s (1999) seminal work on the significance of 
identity in the shaping of nations, states, and regions recognizes identity as an exercise in 
inclusion and exclusion, but in a manner that departs somewhat from traditional, 
modernist views of the categories of self and other.  After reviewing the Continental 
Philosophical conception of self/other demarcation, which maintains that self and other 
represent discrete, bounded categories, he forgoes this line of thought in favor of what he 
terms the Eastern Excursion, which he bases on a Nietzschian (and, I would add here, 
Foucauldian) notion of dialogics.  In the former, modernist conception, as bounded 
30 
 
categories, self and other are thought to tangle with each other in a Marxian dialectical 
fashion.  In the latter, self and other are unbounded, contingent, and continuously 
engaged in dialogue with one another—leaving open much greater possibility that the 
lines between the two will be transgressed.   
 In the post-modern or, in Neumann’s language, “Eastern Excursion” view of 
identity, liminality and ambiguity are the watchwords of self/other identification.  Even 
categories of identity that have typically been treated as essential, particularly race and 
ethnicity (but also gender), have proven fluid, contingent, and context-dependent (Geertz, 
1973; Searle, 1995).  This case has been made by multiple scholars who have examined 
the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, in which large numbers of people did not behave and act 
as expected based upon their ethnic identity (Donia and Fine, 1994; Gagnon, 2004).  
Further, the unboundedness of the self/other categories has been demonstrated in the oft-
cited ‘in-betweenness’ of Balkan identity, as Europe’s constantly becoming, partial 
‘other’ (Bakić-Hayden, 1995; Todorova, 1997).  However, even in this post-foundational 
phenomenology of the self, many scholars are compelled to acknowledge that identities 
quite often concretize and remain fairly stable over time, creating profound material 
implications for social and political life, including conflict and violence (Taylor, 1994; 
Searle, 1995).   Otherwise, they could not become the object of contestation and 
deconstruction.  As Howe (1998: 17) pointed out, “although social categories have no 
essence independent of what humans have constructed, they, like money, are no less real 
for that” (emphasis in original). 
 This approach to identity formation abandons the notion that there is some 
foundation for ‘knowing’ the world from which the self is formulated.  Rather, it inverts 
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that proposition by recognizing how sense of self creates conditions of possibility for the 
production of particular strains of geopolitical knowledge.  In this view, what we ‘see’ or 
‘know’ about the world is shot through and through with our own positionality, an idea 
that forms what is perhaps the key theoretical starting point for most of the work 
produced under the mantle of critical geopolitics (Dodds and Sidaway, 1994; O’Tuathail, 
1996; O’Tuathail and Dalby, 1998; Sharp, 2000; Hyndman, 2004).  Critical geopolitics 
and its cognate sub-field of constructivist international relations have built on these now 
widely-accepted propositions about sense of self and ‘knowing’ the world in order to 
further theorize the ways in which security and insecurity are co-constituted with identity, 
asserting that these are mutual cultural productions (Weldes et al., 1999; Sharp, 2000).  A 
corollary to this is the mutual production of security threats and the objects targeted by 
them.  As Connolly (1991:64) noted, “Identity requires difference in order to be, and it 
converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty,” a process that 
underpins the very act of social recognition.  Put another way, the security-identity nexus 
produces identity and threat recursively because, “as each subject seeks to perform its 
identity, it threatens others, whose identities are consolidated in response” (Weldes et al., 
1999:15).  
Neumann’s work (1993, 1994, 1996, 1999) led off this section because his 
theorization of self and other in international relations has influenced much of the 
subsequent work on identity and security in constructivist IR, political geography, and 
other fields (e.g., Krause and Williams, 1996; Todorova, 1997; Buzan et al., 1998; 
Campbell, 1998; Kuus, 2007a and 2011).  This is not to say that his writings provided a 
starting point for this line of theorization; indeed, the question of how to theorize the self 
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(and, by extension, the other) has long been a problem of anthropology and social theory 
(see Hegel, 1977; Geertz, 1979; Mauss, 1985; Sampson, 1989; Strong, 1992).  However, 
Neumann and those who built on his efforts to bring a philosophy of self and other to 
international relations have demonstrated how these fundamental building blocks of 
identity are essential to the analysis of how geopolitical spaces are forged.  It is on this 
basis that geographic partition and segregation become not only acceptable, but ethical, 
and upon which geographies of inside/outside and normal/pathological are then founded, 
providing the very modalities of foreign policy (Walker, 1993; Campbell, 1998; Sharp, 
2000).   
Security, then, at a fundamental level, may be viewed in terms of the perceived 
need to guard these material and discursive boundaries—between political-spatial 
entities, to be sure, but also between identities.  Indeed, the formation and maintenance of 
both manners of boundaries are wholly interrelated processes (O’Tuathail, 1996; Lewis 
and Wigen, 1997).  The next subsection looks at the ways in which these intertwining 
constructions have been treated in several fields by reviewing a body of literature that 
takes seriously the above propositions about security and identity, connecting them to the 
post-foundational views of the state outlined previously. 
 
Security and Identity: (Re)Producing the (Nation-)State 
 As the section on contemporary theories of the state demonstrated, the key 
tensions currently characterizing political geographic theorizations on the state relate to 
the issues of materiality versus discursivity, as well as the related problem of how to treat 
the separation of state and society (however constructed that separation may be).  This 
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has led to a mystification of what really constitutes security, how the state operates ‘in 
security,’ and how questions of security might be pursued systematically, given the 
various economic, physical-territorial, human, and societal conceptions of it that have 
proliferated over the last several decades.  Given the current mode of theorizing the state, 
the problem with any study aiming to explain how the state operates ‘in security’ is that it 
inevitably must take the unified ‘actor’ view of the state as its starting assumption, 
because it endows the state with subjectivity, goals, and actions of its own.  In response 
to this dilemma, recent developments in security studies have occurred alongside those in 
constructivist international relations, anthropology, and political geography, which have 
updated thinking on the state to accommodate post-structuralist, constructionist 
orientations.   
What this has meant is that the starting point for investigations into security and 
the state has been inverted.  States are now widely held to be constituted by their 
participation in the international system, rather than existing prior to it (Campbell, 1993; 
O’Tuathail, 1996; Kuus and Agnew, 2008; Sharma and Gupta, 2006).  In this view, states 
do not construct and act upon security concerns; rather, security concerns are key 
mechanisms actively constructing the state (Kuus and Agnew, 2008).  Those in positions 
of relative power, with the ability or responsibility to construct widely-consumed 
narratives about security and threat, most often do so in the name of a particular state.  In 
everyday or popular understandings, this practice is equated with the state acting upon 
security concerns, which reifies the notion that the state is a subject, akin to an individual 
who can be threatened (Migdal, 2001).   
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As with other discursive formations, then, the construction of (in)security and 
threats results from the practices and decisions of particular groups and individuals that 
actively construct the state as a political effect (Mitchell, 1991; Weldes et al., 1999).  
Hence, discourses of state security are  
neither strictly objective assessments nor analytical constructs of threat, but rather 
the products of historical structures and processes, of struggles for power within 
the state, of conflicts between the societal groupings that inhabit states and the 
interests that besiege them  
(Lipschutz, 1995:8). 
Lipschutz’s statement about the content and formation of security discourses, at first 
blush, appears to fit well with the notion of security governance, in the sense that it 
recognizes a multiplicity of groups, individuals, and agendas who participate in the 
identification of threats.  With that, it seems to highlight the substantial role that 
representatives of civil society—or those who are not participants in the formal state 
apparatus—play in the formulation of security agendas.  However, the language of 
struggles within the state, from the standpoint of constructivist approaches, reinforces the 
notion of a state as a unit that stands apart from an exterior, international state system.  
This is not, of course, unique to one particular author, but is rather representative of the 
extreme difficulty of problematizing several key working concepts simultaneously—in 
this case, security, the state, and society. Given this, I wish to argue that an intersection of 
the security governance concept with newer views on the post-structural state in a 
transnational and supranational context would be profitable, an idea that is brought to 
fruition in the empirical essays. 
The relationship between the construction of security concerns and their attendant 
identity questions on the one hand, and the reproduction of the state on the other, also 
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underscores the importance of nationalism and nation/state identity (Kuus and Agnew, 
2008).  While statist discourses position states as subjects with intentionality and agency, 
they do so with the aid of nationalism, which presumes homogeneity and thus posits 
states as sovereigns of particular territories, and populations as sovereigns of particular 
states (Yack, 2001).  Importantly, just as states are produced and maintained through the 
security-identity nexus, so, too, are nations (Anderson, 1991; Penrose and Mole, 2008).  
Because of this, the frequent incongruence between states and nations, so fervently 
downplayed—or altogether ignored—by the doctrine of nationalism, intensifies the links 
between security, identity, and nation, as has been observed in scores of nation-states 
with histories of ethnic tension (Kristof, 1967; Cohen, 1995; Kelley, 2003; Roe, 2005; 
Mulaj, 2006).   
The above observation about security, identity, and the problem of the nation-
state is certainly not a new one, but it has been examined of late in new contexts and with 
fresh perspectives about the various forms of security, particularly in the post-socialist 
and supranational contexts of Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union.  As 
has been pointed out in a number of recent works on this topic, the processes of NATO 
and European Union expansion have fostered a return to classical geopolitical thinking, a 
harmful refocus on ethnic nationalisms, and invoking of old historical antagonisms, all of 
which has reified the security-identity link with reworked discourses of threat and risk 
(Kuus, 2007a, 2009; Gheciu, 2008).   
More specifically, the literature examining how Euro-Atlantic integration has 
impacted national politics and minority rights has produced several prominent debates.  
Roe (2004) and Jutila (2006), advancing opposing conceptualizations of minority 
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identities, advocated differing approaches to the issue of minority rights.  Roe (2004), 
positing that it is the very security-ness of minority concerns that lies at the heart of these 
collective identities, argued that the desecuritization of minority rights is a logical 
impossibility.  Instead, he argues, we should focus on replacing ‘emergency politics’ with 
‘reasonable security.’  Jutila (2006) directly responded to Roe by asserting that to even 
assume monolithic minority identities with accompanying collective concerns is 
deterministic and essentializing.   
This debate, which is not confined to Roe and Jutila, raises the question of 
whether we can ever view any identity or any politics as decoupled from security 
concerns.  Many scholars of critical security studies and constructivist international 
relations would be inclined to assert that while the very delineation of self and other is a 
securitizing practice which fundamentally (re)produces states and nations, it is possible to 
conceive of security in ways that emphasize human lives over economic and military 
concerns.  Others would argue that challenging state security with ever more conceptions 
of security will inevitably reproduce alienating notions of ‘us and them,’ ‘inside and 
outside.’  Perhaps Sasse’s (2005) concept of a security-rights nexus, as applied to the 
cases of Russophone minority populations in Estonia and Latvia, offers a way of 
transcending the debate.  Particularly as she is careful not to deny the relative 
cohesiveness and stability of certain minority identities (which Jutila seems quick to 
dismiss); but at the same time remains conscious of the potential pitfalls of either/or 
approaches which pit state-centered and political-military solutions against more 
humanized ones. 
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This section has presented several threads of inquiry that I have loosely grouped 
together as a literature on the security-identity nexus.  The overview of this literature 
makes clear that the disparate approaches do not really constitute a coherent and linear 
progression of thought on the relationship between security and identity.  Further, there 
have been many unrealized opportunities for this body of work to enter into dialogue with 
scholars of multi-level security governance.  This is a key task of the present work.  
Further, I would argue, if we are to take seriously the notion that governance, security, 
and culture are co-constitutive, and that aspects of culture are not epiphenomenal to the 
‘form and function’ of states, we must also apply this idea to other subjects that are 
produced through the security-identity nexus.  Of concern here are key institutions, such 
as NATO, and emerging supranational state spaces, namely, the European Union.  The 
fourth and final section of this chapter reviews the ways in which the security-identity 
nexus has been fundamental to the process of Euro-Atlantic integration, as examined in 
the existing literature on this process. 
  
Security and Identity in Euro-Atlantic Integration 
 The preceding sections traced the evolution of several key concepts: the state, 
security governance, and the security-identity nexus.  The security-identity nexus, in 
particular, has been discussed as an intersection of discourses that (re)produce both the 
nation and the state; undergird practices of security governance; and play a key role in the 
reconfiguration of geopolitical space.  Further, the processes of Euro-Atlantic integration 
that serve as the substantive focus of this dissertation constitute a major instance of the 
reconfiguration of geopolitical space in contemporary international affairs, bringing into 
38 
 
play the major concepts framing the empirical investigations.  This final section of 
literature review will examine the various scholars and works that, since the mid-1990s, 
have shed light on the security-identity nexus as a crucial mechanism for the swift 
changes that have swept Central and Eastern Europe toward its “Euro-Atlantic” present 
and future.  Lastly, it will look at this topic in the narrower context of Croatia, the 
specific geographic focus of the latter two empirical essays. 
 
Europe’s Eastward Enlargement 
The Euro-Atlantic integration of Central and Eastern European Countries has 
underscored the centrality of the security-identity nexus to this process.  As a number of 
scholars note, in the period immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
accompanying transitions in former communist countries, Central and East Europeans did 
not necessarily perceive themselves as navigating an especially grave security landscape 
(Baran, 2004; Kuus, 2007a).  And yet, the embrace of a history characterized by centuries 
of being located in a ‘geopolitical battlefield’ between Russia and Germany proved 
crucial to the discourses that propelled Central Europe toward EU and NATO candidacy 
(Neumann, 1999).  As Kuus (2007a) has observed, Central Europe’s insecurity soon 
came to function as a truism in the post-Cold War context—despite the lack of a 
physical-military threat. 
The sense of needing to ‘rejoin’ Europe was, at this time, a major facet of Central 
European identity shaping the course of events.  Neumann (1999) asserts that for Central 
Europeans, the integration project has not been one of forging a new regional geopolitical 
space.  Rather, they see themselves as fully realizing a moral, attitudinal, and cultural 
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brotherhood—in other words, they are simply observing the ‘reality’ of cultural traits and 
common history that bind them with Western Europe.  One can find, in the elite political 
narratives of the 1980s and 1990s, many examples of how Central European statesmen 
and public intellectuals mobilized these discourses for Western European and American 
consumption.  Pronouncements can be attributed to figures such as Vaclav Havel, for 
example, who paint Europeanness as a spiritual sort of identity (Kuus, 2007a).  Indeed, as 
Czech writer Milan Kundera’s (1984) impassioned appeal to ‘the West,’ The Tragedy of 
Central Europe, illustrates, the trope of Central Europe as “the kidnapped West” was a 
deliberate scripting of Central Europe’s communist experience as a civilizational struggle 
for Central Europeans to preserve their cultures and languages, all of which are 
essentially Western, in the face of an Asiatic brand of socialism imposed from outside.  
As narratives of essential Europeanness proliferated, ‘persuasive’ cartography projects 
emerged in which newly independent governments provided the U.S. and other Western 
governments with maps which aimed to redefine Central and East European Countries’ 
(or, CEEC’s) characterizations and relative locations within Europe (Zeigler, 2002: 672). 
Paradoxically, scholars have pointed out, the post-communist stigma also 
compelled these states to buy into policies that frequently had the unforeseen effect of 
compromising aspects of economic security.  Poland, for instance, had many able 
economists, but their skills and expertise were sidelined in favor of Western economists 
such as Jeffrey Sachs, whose gravitas was needed to guide populations whose sense of 
self had been shaped for so long by the denial of economic gains.  Unfortunately, this led 
to the exclusion of local officials from decision-making and to unfulfilled promises of 
foreign direct investment (Wedel, 1998; see also Bockman, 2011).  Indeed, the crucial 
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operation of regional identity and culture can be seen in this way to interact with the 
perceived economic realities dominating the region at that time to produce a number of 
undesirable outcomes that have had lasting impacts.  Ultimately, this gave way to a 
situation in which Western influence was viewed with suspicion and negotiated with an 
element of deceit, predicated upon the idea that ‘you pretend to help us, and we’ll pretend 
we’re being helped’ (Wedel, 1998; Kuus, 2007a). 
Throughout this period of transition, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
came to be perceived in terms of their placement along a spectrum of Europeanness, 
Westernness, and amenability to democracy and capitalism.  The upshot was that security 
and identity discourses were deployed intra-regionally as the prospect of Euro-Atlantic 
integration became a reality for post-communist states.  ‘Nesting Orientalisms’ (Bakić-
Hayden, 1995) allowed Central Europe to distinguish itself against an Eastern Europe 
that has overwhelmingly been viewed as significantly less ready to ‘rejoin’ Europe:  This 
points again to the ambiguity and unboundedness that mark categories of self and other 
(Todorova, 1997; Neumann, 1999). Central Europe could be constructed precisely 
because of the politically expedient construction of Europe/Eastern Europe.  In other 
words, the East-West binary has been reconfigured into a sliding scale of more 
European/less European.  This has frequently been reproduced by academics who study 
transitology and democratization in post-communist Europe, and who often utilize 
categorizations based on speed of reform and amenability to western-style, liberal and 
free-market democracy (e.g. Way and Levitsky, 2007; Kuzio, 2008).   
Moreover, the European Union, in its official decoupling of the Balkan states 
from other CEECs, deployed a discourse of ‘Balkan exceptionalism’ in order to 
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differentiate the accession processes for Romania, Bulgaria, and the Western Balkans 
from those followed by their Central European predecessors  (Papamanditriou and 
Gateva, 2009; Gordon, 2009).  This strategy gained traction with policy-makers because 
the region, especially the Western Balkans, was perceived as an ‘unstable’ or ‘insecure’ 
area to be stabilized and eventually absorbed by the Euro-Atlantic community (Bartlett 
and Samardžija, 2000; Zielonka, 2006; Jeffrey, 2008).  Perhaps unsurprisingly, this 
discourse has also been appropriated by parties within the candidate countries 
themselves, allowing them to construct ‘Balkan exceptionalism’ as a factor that should 
accord them leeway in meeting the EU’s benchmarks of accession.  For example, 
Romania can claim the ‘Ceausescu’ factor and the fact that Communism lingered in their 
country well after it had been eradicated from other societies (Papamanditriou and 
Gateva, 2009).  Balkanist discourses have also fostered some contention and competition 
between the Western Balkan states, where politicians are eager to shed the stigma of the 
violent wars that marked the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia (Trauner, 2009; Razsa 
and Lindstrom, 2004; Jeffrey, 2008).   
Importantly, scholars also cite the ‘upward’ influence that engagement with this 
part of Europe has exerted on the inter- and supra-national organizations.  The Western 
Balkans are often credited with serving as a catalyst for deeper political and security 
integration, and as a ‘testing ground’ for the EU’s rapidly evolving Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) (Keukelaire 
and McNaughton, 2008: 261).    In fact, insofar as it has been credited with contributing 
to regional stability and the realization of European Union (EU) security objectives, 
enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe, to include the current expansion into the 
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Western Balkans, has been called the EU’s most successful foreign policy to date 
(Gordon, 2009). 
Despite the EU’s and NATO’s stated goal of stability and democratic 
consolidation by way of Euro-Atlanticization (See Delanty, 2007; Fink-Hafner, 2007), 
some scholars assert that overall, these developments have fed into a renewed emphasis 
on ethnic nationalisms, with security constructed in light of deeply rooted historical 
animosities and the ubiquitous possibility of national violence (Kuus, 2007a; see also 
Chaterjee, 2004 for discussion of this in the post-colonial context).  This may be 
compounded by the post-communist context, where the weak tradition of civil societies 
combined with an ethno-nationally-based conception of citizenship, are often proffered as 
obstacles to the cosmopolitan, ‘European’ conception of citizenship and identity based on 
diversity and inclusion (Verdery, 1996a; Verdery, 1996b; Bauböck, 2002; Delanty, 2007; 
Bialasiewicz, 2009; Beck, 2009).  As existing scholarship has demonstrated, these 
dynamics have played a key role in Croatia’s recent history, the subject of the following 
subsection. 
 
Croatia’s ‘Return’ to Europe 
When Croatians first declared themselves an independent state by way of a 
referendum (largely boycotted by Croatian citizens of Serb ethnicity) in May 1991, they 
were optimistic about their prospects for a smooth and speedy ‘return’ to Europe 
(Lindstrom, 2008).  However, within two years, Franjo Tuđman’s policies, including 
involvement in combat operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ensured that the fledgling 
Croatian state would be haunted by a dubious international reputation for some time after 
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the conflict.  The legacy of the war, which became associated with ‘Balkanism,’ 
explained in terms of backwardness, lawlessness, and primordial ethnic hatreds, would 
prove difficult to overcome (Kaplan, 1994).  Consequently, the onus was on Croatians to 
demonstrate to the Euro-Atlantic community they hoped to join that they were 
progressive, tolerant, civilized, and capable of meeting the various formal and informal 
accession criteria required by NATO and the EU, as well as the more intangible and less 
formal criterion of embracing a cosmopolitan, European sense of citizenship and social-
political life. 
 Scholarship on Croatia’s post-communist period has discussed how the events of 
the so-called ‘War for Independence’ of 1991-1995 were in many ways tinged with the 
memory of Croatia’s troubled World War II history.  In the decade following Tito’s death 
in May 1980, Serb popular culture and political rhetoric reassessed the Yugoslav 
experience during World War II as an instance in a long history of national suffering.  
Memories of the Croatian Ustaša state, officially known as the Nezavisna Država 
Hrvatska (NDH), or the Independent State of Croatia, a puppet state of Nazi Germany, 
were invoked in poems, plays, novels, and music during this time (Ramet, 2002).  The 
Ustaša regime had granted political rights only to ethnic Croats and engaged in forced 
conversions (from Orthodoxy to Catholicism), expulsions, and mass killings of Serbs and 
other citizens who were not ethnically Croatian (Mulaj, 2006; Goldstein, 1999).  In 
addition to reliving the tragic past, some of these works of popular culture leveled 
criticism at the League of Communists of Yugoslavia for not constructing a post-WWII 
society in which the “prejudices of the internecine struggle of World War II” could be 
sufficiently managed and overcome (Ramet, 2002: 155; see also Duijzings, 2008).  It is 
44 
 
unsurprising, then, that the conflict of the 1990s resurrected epithets such as ‘ustaša’ and 
‘četnik’ (the latter referring to Serb nationalist and royalist fighters operating before and 
during the World Wars), along with potent constructions of threat and mistrust between 
ethnic groups. 
 In the realm of Slavic studies, much of the work on the former Yugoslavia has 
taken into account how the historical forces noted above had produced particular relations 
between the republics and their diasporic communities.  These external relations had 
important implications for the 1990s conflicts and continue to influence socio-political-
economic affairs within the former Yugoslav republics.  The Croatian diaspora has been 
of particular interest because pockets of it, especially in South America, have consisted of 
participants in the NDH regime who escaped Croatia in 1945 (Bellamy, 2003).  The high 
degree of nationalism among members of the Croatian diaspora as a whole made this 
group important in the breakup of Yugoslavia, manifesting in electoral support for Franjo 
Tuđman and, in some cases, physical support for the war effort as people of Croatian 
descent, some who had never even been to Croatia previously, traveled there to fight in 
the Croatian armed forces (Carter, 2005).  But the most prominent diaspora group was the 
Hercegovinian Croatians.  Often regarded within Croatia as ''extremists and criminals,“ 
the Croatian community of Hercegovina played a key role in the campaign to create an 
ethnically pure Croatian territory within Bosnia (supported by Tuđman's regime) 
(Bellamy, 2003: 93).  The post-conflict years were marked by strained relations between 
Croatia and Bosnia, and difficult adjustments for those left behind in communities whose 
ethnic composition was profoundly changed by the war (see, for example, Kolind, 2007).  
Another key relationship in the region, that between Croatia and Serbia, began to 
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improve after 2000, but has faced continuous challenges due to issues such as the return 
of Serb war refugees to Croatia and the prosecution of war criminals on both sides 
(Lukić, 2009). 
For Croatia and the other Western Balkan countries, the post-conflict phase has 
been characterized in the EU studies literature (which neglects the deeper history outlined 
above) as a straightforward story of post-conflict stabilization by way of Euro-Atlantic 
integration.  This work often assumes a congratulatory tone on behalf of the EU and 
NATO, attributing enhanced regional stability to conditionality, which produces 
disciplining effects in candidate countries by compelling them to implement crucial 
political, economic, and social reforms in order to gain entry into the organizations.  
Many of the largely positive assessments of the efficacy of EU conditionality take an 
instrumental view of the process.  From this perspective, there are clear benchmarks for 
candidate countries to meet, and when the countries make progress based on these 
(usually) tangible and quantifiable criteria, they successfully move forward in the 
integration process.  However, this mode of evaluation tells only part of the story.  As 
noted above, some research has found that conditionality can produce unintended adverse 
effects in candidate societies (Innes, 2001; Vachudova, 2006; Papadimitriou and Gateva, 
2009).  In the case of Croatia, this has led to some rhetorical battles with neighboring 
countries, in which government officials strive to present an image of the country as more 
‘Western’ and less ‘Balkan’ than the other former Yugoslav republics (Rasza and 
Lindstrom, 2004; Lindstrom, 2008).  Recent tensions with Slovenia over disputed 
maritime borders and with Serbia over the prosecution of war criminals serve as concrete 
examples of these rhetorical practices. 
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While the challenges facing Croatian society have been well-documented in the 
above-cited literature, and the ‘Eastern’ experience of European integration has been 
examined from competing perspectives (both congratulatory and critical), pivotal 
questions remain.  Firstly, what are the specific ways in which Croatian leaders have 
wielded some measure of agency in negotiating the Euro-Atlantic integration process?  
This is examined in Chapter 4.  And secondly, in what ways is the wider Croatian public 
able to participate in the process of integration, and what impact does this have on how 
they view their state, society, and role in the international community?  This question is 
taken up in Chapter 5.  Given the centrality of historical independent statehood to 
Croatian national identity (Bellamy, 2003), it would seem that common understandings 
and experiences of state, society, and governance should be brought to light in an 
exploration of this fundamentally transnationalizing process.  However, due to the 
lacunae identified above, as well as a lack ethnographic approaches to these questions in 
Central and Eastern Europe broadly, and in Croatia specifically (c.f. Obad, 2010), they 
remain as fruitful avenues of future inquiry. 
 
Conclusions and New Directions 
The aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate how several fundamentally 
political-geographic phenomena—reproduction of the state, security governance, and the 
mutual construction of security and identity—intersect to provide the basis for a multi-
scalar exploration of the process of Euro-Atlantic integration.  This is a process that is 
simultaneously transnationalizing and constitutive of the state, as existing scholarship has 
pointed out.  However, the preceding analysis of this scholarship has also shown the 
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various gaps, remaining tensions, and missed opportunities for synthesis and dialogue 
between various literatures and strands of inquiry.   
The key remaining tension in theorization of the state is how best to ‘know’ and 
study the state in the wake of post-foundational developments in our conception of it.  
This is a crucial question even in disciplines that do not count themselves as 
constructivist.  For example, even most scholars of international relations, a discipline 
still widely influenced by neorealist thought, would now agree that it is problematic to 
treat the state as a ‘black box’ or as a unitary actor endowed with ‘personhood.’  And yet, 
because of the nature of data and common methodological approaches utilized in IR, this 
is typically how the state continues to be treated.  This problem extends to EU studies, 
where member states and candidate countries are treated as individuals operating within 
and vis-à-vis the EU and other inter- and supra-national organizations.  Alongside this 
tendency continues another conceptual tension which is arguably more difficult to 
overcome:  that of reproducing the troublesome state/society binary when incorporating a 
concept of the state into research—or when directly studying the state.  I propose that the 
antidote to both tensions may well lie in taking seriously the recent calls for 
anthropological approaches to the state.  This is all the more important in an era of 
intensely transnationalizing processes, which raise many fundamental questions about 
sovereignty, identity, and the viability of the (nation-)state.   
With that, I argue that contemporary developments in state theory emanating from 
political sociology, geography, anthropology, and constructivist IR could lead to richer 
understandings of security, securitism, and processes of securitization.  In order for new 
insights to be achieved, however, I aim to synthesize recent theorizations of the state, 
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governance, security, and identity.   This is where I have identified significant, but as of 
yet unrealized, openings for ground-breaking dialogue between several traditions of 
scholarship.  For example, the rapidly-expanding body of work on securitization in 
political geography has yet to make use of new insights into the governance of security (a 
rather important task, given the problem of reifying the twin state/society and 
military/civilian dichotomies).  Further, the growing literature on security governance 
would benefit from deeper and more explicit theorization of the security-identity nexus, 
which undergirds both the state and institutions and drives the very practices and 
activities associated with securing political collectives.  The study of multi-level 
governance in the context of Europeanization and Euro-Atlanticism requires engagement 
with identity studies, as the EU and Euro-Atlantic spaces increasingly raise questions of 
citizens’ loyalties to multiple political collectives (Murphy, 2008). 
Finally, the conglomerate of social scientists and their scholarship broadly 
referred to as ‘EU studies’ has taken a largely instrumental, policy-oriented, and 
evaluative tack in exploring the relationships between the European Union, NATO, and 
their areas of operation and influence.  As discussed in the final section above, research 
demonstrating how the post-communist European context has been profoundly shaped by 
forces that are simultaneously democratizing, privatizing, transnationalizing, and 
globalizing has quite fruitfully analyzed these developments and their impact on domestic 
political and economic systems.  Yet, the everyday experience of Euro-Atlantic 
integration—and its interaction with processes of state maintenance—have yet to be 
understood through grounded research that ventures beyond the formal state apparatus 
and economic and cultural leaders.   
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As a result, the integration project continues to come across as an activity of the 
international organizations and candidate country elites, and candidate countries continue 
to read as monolithic entities moving toward a common goal of membership in the Euro-
Atlantic community.  Bialasiewicz, et al. (2009: 80) assert, however, that European 
integration and enlargement are neither inevitable nor unidirectional, but rather “prone to 
institutional and ideational reflexivity.”  It is the multi-directionality and contingency of 
these processes that this dissertation aims to capture, with three essays examining 
different facets and different ‘levels’ of Euro-Atlantic governance.  With the work now 
situated within several key literatures and disciplines, the next three chapters will present 
the empirical analyses of the concepts outlined above. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
NOT WHETHER BUT HOW:  CONSIDERING THE SECURITIZATION OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION THROUGH THE LENS OF  
CONTINGENT SECURITY GOVERNANCE 
 
 A first step in the task of investigating the securitization of Euro-Atlantic 
integration is to address the question of whether the European Union can become an 
autonomous global security actor, an issue that has occupied the field of EU studies for 
some time.  The discussion typically coalesces around the willingness of the member 
states to coordinate on foreign policy, relying upon a conceptual decoupling of ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ power.  This essay questions the utility of that distinction, arguing that sensitivity to 
contingency, as well as attention to the centrality of geoeconomic logics, offers helpful 
insights into the sort of security actor the EU is becoming.  A textual analysis of EU 
documents explores modes of securitization frequently neglected by observers focusing 
primarily on political cohesion.  I conclude that when these issues are viewed through the 
lens of contingent security governance, a pivotal facet of security integration is 
illuminated:  the forging of a European military-industrial complex.  Hence, the relevant 
question about the EU’s securitization is perhaps not whether it is happening, but rather 
how it is proceeding. 
 
Introduction 
Before the current debt crises captured the attention of observers of the EU, one 
of the key debates regarding European integration concerned the prospects for a robust 
and autonomous European security and defense apparatus.  The term “security and 
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defense apparatus” refers to the collection of policies, institutions, individuals, 
equipment, and capabilities that together comprise the European Union’s capacity to 
secure and defend itself without the need to rely on non-European assets or external 
alliances.  Apparently, the debt crises and security integration are related; as recently as 
2008, Andrew Moravcsik, a prominent scholar of the EU, noted, “A truly independent 
European defense policy, including the development of European transport, air and space 
resources, would cost some two percent of European GDP—a political impossibility at a 
time when budget cuts are critical,” (Moravcsik, 2008: 27).  Moravcsik is far from alone 
in this skepticism about an independent security and defense apparatus for Europe, as 
evidenced by a substantial body of work on the matter (Bailes, 2006; Salmon, 2005; 
Mottola, 2005; Koskenniemi, 1998; Salmon and Shepherd, 2003; c.f. Posen 2006).  
Likewise, practitioner positions often range from the unfavorable to the scathing, such as 
Margaret Thatcher’s characterization of the UK’s contribution to the European Rapid 
Reaction Force (ERRF) as “a piece of monumental folly that puts our security at risk 
[presumably, by undermining US-dominated NATO] in order to satisfy political vanity” 
(White and Norton-Taylor, 2000). 
Amongst the array of scholarly and practitioner assertions that the EU could not 
or should not become more autonomous in its security and defense capabilities, one finds 
lack of political will, budgetary resources, common foreign policy, and so on.  Indeed, 
the many compelling arguments drawing upon political, economic, and cultural factors 
are both accurate and worthy of consideration.  However, the discussion typically relies 
upon a conceptual decoupling of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power, and thus an incomplete picture 
of how securitization, and its constituent process of militarization, unfolds.  This essay 
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questions the utility of such a distinction, arguing instead that the latest theorizations of 
security and the state, brought together within a framing concept of ‘contingent security 
governance,’ can offer deeper insights into the sort of security actor the EU is becoming.  
I focus mainly on the European Defense Agency (EDA), exploring the question of 
whether distinctly EU norms can be forged regarding the building and use of military 
power.     
A textual analysis of EU documents and publications explores the modes of EU 
securitization that often fly under the radar of observers who focus primarily on the 
ability of the member states to coordinate on foreign policy, or on the success or failure 
of EU security and defense missions (Gordon, 2009; Ilievski and Taleski, 2009; Duke, 
2009; Fischer, 2009).  I conclude that when these issues are viewed through the lens of 
contingent security governance, which includes economic neoliberalization, an important 
facet of security and defense integration is illuminated:  the forging of a European 
military-industrial complex.  Hence, the relevant question about the securitization of the 
EU is perhaps not whether it is happening, but rather how it is proceeding. 
 
Reconceptualizing the Securitization of the European Union 
 Despite relatively swift progress toward a European security and defense 
apparatus (see Salmon and Shepherd, 2003), it is commonly concluded that a fully 
autonomous EU defense is an unlikely or distant outcome due to weak cohesion on 
foreign policy, budget cuts, and lack of political will to pool national sovereignty and 
resources on security and defense matters (Bailes, 2006; Moravscik, 2008; Koskenniemi, 
1998; Salmon and Shepherd, 2003).  Within this vein are scholars, such as Smith (1998), 
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who contend that regardless of the degree of coherence and autonomy observed in the 
EU, it is the organization’s external economic relations, rather than its Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), that constitute the EU’s role as an international actor.  With 
that, it is activity in the economic sphere, rather than the security and defense sphere, that 
will likely serve as the causal mechanism for a coherent EU foreign policy (Smith, 1998).   
Moreover, the literature tends to largely concern itself with normative questions, 
such as whether a securitized EU is a positive development and whether Europe would do 
better to wield its comparative advantage:  ‘soft power’ (Bailes, 2006; Gorenflo, 2008; 
Mottola, 2005; Hettne and Söderbaum, 2005).  The hard power/soft power dichotomy is 
meant to distinguish between more coercive measures (usually involving the military) 
and more persuasive ones (economic, ideological, or norm-shaping measures) in pursuit 
of policy agendas.  Yet this central binary must be problematized, particularly where 
scholars may be tempted to draw conclusions about the relative benevolence of the EU’s 
foreign relations.  Situating the EU’s external policy within a broader context of 
economic neoliberalization and globalization (as well as former colonial relations 
perpetuated through new economic agreements), we may find that notions of ‘soft 
persuasion’ become less meaningful.   Even relations solely economic in focus, or relying 
on ‘soft power,’ have proven asymmetrical and coercive, placing ‘partners’ in the 
developing world in disadvantaged positions vis-à-vis the EU (Meyn, 2008; Nwobike, 
2006).  This is one manner in which the soft/hard power distinction is untenable.  
Another manner, which underpins my view of security governance, is that it is difficult to 
disentangle the sources and uses of soft and hard power, especially in the context of a 
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military-industrial complex.  Rather, many agencies, actors, and modes of economic 
livelihood rely on the twinning of soft and hard power.  
My aim is to show that existing perspectives are neglecting a key facet of the 
process because they either rely upon the tenuous hard/soft power binary, or—related to 
this—take a limited view of what securitization means.  My expanded concept of 
‘contingent security governance’ usefully frames the analysis by highlighting the fluidity 
and constructed nature of this process and the forms of power implicated within it.   In 
the debate over what must come first in security and defense integration—the functional 
or the political (Salmon and Shepherd, 2003)—I posit, in distinguishing against a crude 
functionalism, that it is not so much one following the other as a thorough intertwining of 
the two.  Thus, it is misleading to view the ‘economic’ and ‘political’ spheres as 
completely separate realms, with activity in one being independent of, or ‘following 
from,’ activity in the other.  Rather, any ‘state’ space (nation-state, supranational, or 
otherwise) comprises a dense entanglement of individuals and institutions with 
converging (and often opposing) interests and goals.   
Increased scholarly focus upon ‘governance’ over ‘government’ follows from an 
increasingly complex and poly-scalar arrangement of actors and interests who shape 
political and institutional courses (Zürn and Leibfried, 2005; Jessop, 1998).  Security 
governance, as a specific instance of these reconfigurations, has been defined as an 
“intentional system of rules” and interventions of both state and nonstate actors, 
“purposefully directed towards particular policy outcomes” in the realm of security 
(Kirchner, 2006: 948, emphasis added; see also Webber et al., 2004).   Security 
governance has been reconceptualized repeatedly over the last decade and half, with 
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Webber et al. noting in 2004 that the concept, though “not fully developed,” provides a 
framework for incorporating functionalist and constructivist perspectives on norms, ideas 
and culture (pg. 25).  One crucial contribution to this field of study, Kirchner and 
Sperling’s EU Security Governance (2007), goes further in developing security 
governance as a framework within the context of the EU.  Kirchner and Sperling 
incorporate the notion of securitization as a highly discursive process, as well as the 
notion of the post-Westphalian state, in which security comprises economic welfare, and 
transnational, non-state risks and threats.   
This work, however, misses a critical opportunity to think more fundamentally 
about what it really means to abandon a strict hard/soft power binary in light of an 
emergent geoeconomic order.  This is not to assert that a geoeconomic order is replacing 
a geopolitical order in a tidy progression over time, as Luttwak (1990) argued.  Rather, I 
concur with Cowen and Smith (2009: 22) that a geoeconomic perspective helpfully 
informs our study of the “spatial reconfiguration of contemporary political geography.”  
This adds an explicitly spatial angle to the study of EU security governance, which is 
ultimately the forging of a supranational security arena, located within the broader 
process of neoliberal globalization.  Geoeconomics is understood as the growing 
tendency to reframe territorial security in terms of supranational and transnational issues 
and to rethink security matters in terms of market logics (Cowen and Smith, 2009; 
Rozov, 2012).  The emergence of geoeconomic calculation raises the question of whether 
we should speak of the EUropeanization of security, or the (further) neoliberalization of 
the EU’s security apparatus.  This is not an issue I aim to resolve here, however, as I 
argue: 1. Both the former and the latter phenomena may well be underway; and 2. Due to 
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1., it is perhaps more interesting and important to recast the concept of security 
governance (and dismantling of the hard/soft power binary) with contingency in mind. 
Hence, I wish to further develop the security governance concept to account for 
the frequent lack of ‘purpose’ and intentionality contained in Kirchner’s definition above, 
highlighting instead the incoherence in the path toward security policy outcomes.  I 
therefore conceive of ‘contingent security governance’:  a complex system blending 
various modes of power (soft/hard) and the convergence of diverse actors and agendas 
(state/nonstate; security/nonsecurity) which often have contradictory goals, yet come 
together in contingent ways to produce particular security policy outcomes.  Contingency 
exists because of diverse political, economic, and cultural contexts shaping policy 
courses, but also because entities that do not operate in the interest of security or defense 
frequently become implicated in ‘hard power’ agendas due to paradoxical alignments of 
objectives (Kuus 2009).  While my empirics largely focus on security actors, they also 
show how entities opposed to securitization have contributed to the process in various 
ways.  
The hard/soft power dichotomy is, itself, a driver of securitization, as it reifies 
ostensibly separate military and civilian spheres, and economic and defense interests.  
However, viewing these seemingly disparate realms and agendas as part of a larger 
phenomenon of contingent security governance allows us to recognize the inseparability 
of these things and the ways in which securitization
3
 is multi-tracked and incoherent 
                                                 
3. This view of securitization takes it as the process that embeds security-oriented beliefs, cultures, 
activities, and agendas deeply within non-security sectors of society through political, economic, and 
cultural processes, related to Enloe’s concept of militarization.  This differs somewhat from the common 
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(Enloe, 2004; Bernazzoli and Flint, 2009).  Indeed, agendas are not neatly 
compartmentalized into particular institutions or corners of government or the market.  
Moreover, even within a particular institution or corner of government or the market, it is 
impossible to cleanly delineate which activities are ‘military’ and which are ‘civilian;’ 
which are ‘economic’ at their core and which are purely ‘security.’  In other words, as the 
perspective of geoeconomics would envisage, it is the very untidiness that makes 
securitization a viable process.  My empirical focus on the European Defense Agency as 
a key site of the practices of contingent security governance aptly illustrates this facet of 
the contemporary state
4
.  It also provides the opportunity for both a theoretical and 
empirical contribution to the literature.  Empirically, the EDA is still somewhat neglected 
in the study of EU security governance, as it was only founded in 2004 (for instance, it 
does not even merit an entry in the index of Kirchner and Sperling, 2007).  Theoretically, 
an examination of the EDA as the latest manifestation of geoeconomic thinking in the 
EUropean security apparatus imparts insights into how the practices and discourses 
shared between policy makers and market actors aim to foster both the will and the 
ability to ‘securitize’ further. 
                                                                                                                                                 
understanding of securitization in international relations as explicated by the Copenhagen School, which 
holds that issues become securitized through the discursive practices of security agents (Wæver, 1995; 
Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998). 
4. References to ‘the state’ or ‘state spaces’ in this essay are not to argue that the European Union should be 
viewed as an entity commensurate with contemporary nation-states, but to make the point that in many 
policy areas, the EU faces the same coherence issues as nation-states, who themselves only give an illusion 
of cohesive, unified ‘actors’ (see Kuus and Agnew, 2008, for a comprehensive account of current 
theorizations of the state). 
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The challenge of investigating securitization is to tackle an exceedingly complex 
and multifaceted phenomenon in a systematic manner.  Bernazzoli and Flint (2009) 
approach this in part by recognizing securitization as being comprised of numerous 
constituent processes, including militarization, which imbibes the seemingly non-military 
spaces of social life with military culture, imperatives, and values.  In the context of the 
EU, the term militarization denotes the shift from an overwhelmingly economic raison 
d’être to one that includes common European military structures and activities.  Most 
often in the present study, I have found it appropriate to utilize the term ‘securitization’ 
rather than militarization, given the broad European scope of security—including the 
pooling and development of military capabilities, but also of functions such as civilian 
crisis management.  Therefore, I use the term securitization somewhat interchangeably 
with security and defense integration, referring to the drive toward a distinct European 
security and defense identity. 
Finally, contingent security governance accounts for the importance of culture 
and identity in analyses of securitization, a process seemingly devoid of these ‘softer’ 
considerations.  The security-identity nexus, or the intersection and mutual construction 
of security and identity, has heretofore been neglected in studies that take a solely 
instrumental or policy-oriented view of security governance (though it has received 
attention in work on security cultures more broadly; see Kuus 2007 and Weldes, et. al 
1999.).  This neglect belies the vast discursive power of ostensibly ‘dry’ and 
straightforward texts such as policy documents and institutional bulletins.  In fact, such 
materials are laden with assumptions of security and threat predicated upon—and 
justified by—notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Campbell, 1998; Sharp, 2000; Walker, 1993).  
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Security, then, is fundamentally about the perceived need to guard the material and 
discursive boundaries between identities—and with that, between geopolitical spaces 
(Neumann, 1999).   
This facet of securitization is all the more interesting in the context of the EU, 
which is commonly characterized as lacking a unified identity and demos (Delanty, 
2007), yet has always had an explicit security rationale to its existence (Wæver,1995).  
Among the various challenges to security and defense integration in the EU, oft-cited 
factors include the differing histories, security/threat perceptions, and strategic cultures 
across the member states.  In response to this, key security institutions such as the EDA 
have demonstrated awareness of the importance of culture and identity to security, and of 
the potential of security and defense integration to play a constitutive role in the forging 
of a distinctly European identity.  On this score, the European brand of contingent 
security governance is unique in demonstrating an increasingly overt awareness of the 
fuzzy line between the realms of military and civilian, though in a pragmatic, rather than 
a conceptual, way.  The task of this essay is reconciling the practical European 
experiences with the way in which I conceptualize these processes. 
 
Data and Methods 
Given the vast wealth of materials accessible through the EU online portal 
(http://europa.eu/), it was essential to bound the collection of data both temporally and in 
terms of substance.  I analyzed documents and publications from the year 2000, when the 
ESDP (now called the Common Security and Defense Policy [CSDP] as a result of the 
Treaty of Lisbon) was created, to the end of 2010, which allowed me to capture 
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developments post-Lisbon Treaty and to include the more recent bulletins of the 
European Defense Agency.  While it is a dubious exercise to try to disentangle the web of 
documentary materials in terms of policy area (there is no neat separation between 
internal and external affairs, or between economic, political, and security/defense 
matters), I have focused my analysis on the pool of strategy documents, policy memos, 
and bulletins most closely associated with security and defense matters as they related to 
the ESDP/CSDP.   
The European Defense Agency, whose bulletins are drawn upon most heavily in 
the empirical sections, features prominently in the empirical analysis due to its central 
role in managing the security and defense capabilities of the EU, including the 
development of a common defense technology industrial base (DTIB
5
).  Additionally, I 
have identified a relative lack of attention accorded to the EDA and its activities thus far 
in studies of the EU and securitization.  While the documents analyzed herein are 
accessible to the public, and speak to citizens of the European Union on some level, these 
materials primarily comprise a discussion within the institutions of the EU.  My concern, 
then, is with what Bailes (2008) refers to as ‘practitioner discourse.’  In particular, the 
EDA bulletins perform two major purposes:  1. to promote the activities of the EDA and 
related actors; and 2. to serve as a forum for advancing key agendas of European security 
and defense integration.  In this sense, these materials do not simply and passively report 
on the process of securitization, but are also constitutive of it by urging other institutions 
and actors of the EU into the EDA’s objectives. 
                                                 
5. This is the term commonly used by the EU institutions and officials themselves (see European Defense 
Agency, 2007a). 
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I subjected the documentary data to a themed textual analysis which unfolded in 
several phases
6
. Early in the analysis, conceptual themes emerged out of the theoretical 
framework and guided a cursory investigation of data sources.  Subsequently, empirical 
themes were determined following close and repeated scrutiny of the materials within the 
framework of the conceptual themes.  Thematic categories were formed using a process 
of coding that linked the specific activities and utterances documented in the texts with 
the theoretical themes of concern to the study (Maxwell, 2005).   The subsections of the 
analytical portion of the essay represent the key empirical themes that emerged out of this 
engagement with the texts:  constructing moral responsibilities around securitization; 
foregrounding neoliberal imperatives; and eroding the military/civilian distinction 
through policy dialogues.  A concluding section summarizes the major findings and poses 
some additional questions that follow from the analysis, suggesting avenues for further 
research. 
 
The Language and Practice of Securitization in the European Union 
The findings presented in the following subsections construct a picture of 
European security and defense integration that is somewhat at odds with many 
conventional interpretations of this phenomenon.  By shedding light on efforts toward a 
European military-industrial complex, and the discourses undergirding those efforts, I 
will underscore the ways in which security and defense integration has been spurred 
                                                 
6. Textual analysis of government documents is highlighted by Sharma and Gupta (2006) as a fruitful way 
to study the discursive reproduction of the state.  See also Dalby (2007) and Espeland (1993) for examples 
of work that employs this type of analysis. 
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along while public debate has persisted over whether such integration is even likely or 
imminent.  While the question of whether or not to further securitize the EU is often 
publicly represented and debated in largely geopolitical terms (such as concerns for 
nation-state sovereignty), the security and defense policy discourses analyzed here 
demonstrate the profoundly geoeconomic logics at the heart of security and defense 
integration.  As these developments are traced through the European Defense Agency 
bulletins (2005-2010), European Security Strategy (2003), and other relevant documents 
and publications, a broad pattern emerges of progression from moralizing language 
emphasizing the need for a common security and defense toward more overt discussion 
of an eroding civil/military binary.  The articles of the bulletins, contributed by key 
security and defense figures such as Javier Solana, as well as by prominent individuals 
from other EU institutions and industry representatives, are clearly aimed at forging a 
sense of European unity, identity, and independence in the realm of security and defense.  
And perhaps most importantly, they seek to convince their audiences that the 
development of these capabilities is as important for the EU as an economic union as is it 
for the EU as a major political actor in the global arena. 
 
Moralizing Securitization 
Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free.  The violence  
of the first half of the  20
th
 Century has given way to a period of peace and 
stability unprecedented in European history 
(Council of the European Union, 2003: 1). 
The above quotation appears in the introduction to the European Union’s security 
strategy document, which was produced for the first time in 2003.  Ironically, despite the 
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assertions of the ‘unprecedented’ security and peace Europe was experiencing at the time, 
the security strategy signals a major step toward a progressively more securitized EU.  
The strides made in security and defense integration, then, were certainly not an 
inevitable outcome, despite the fact that they are discussed this way in a multitude of EU 
documents and speeches.  Rather, they occurred in spite of budgetary deficiencies, an 
absence of a commonly-perceived physical security threat, and the strident objections of 
a number of influential member states.  The relevant question is how this progress was 
facilitated through the language and practice of various actors both within and outside of 
EU institutions.  One of the primary ways in which this has unfolded is via the 
construction of a moral discourse about the responsibilities bound up with the EU’s role 
as an economic powerhouse.  The Common Foreign and Security Policy and subsequent 
policy developments (ESS, ESDP, CSDP, and so on) have transpired on the wings of this 
discourse, which compels EU institutions and the citizens they serve to live up to 
political-security obligations within the bounds of the EU and abroad. 
The morality of securitization has been asserted in light of political, security, and 
economic responsibilities, which are overtly discussed by proponents of security and 
defense integration as inseparable from one another.  This discussion has come not only 
from EU officials themselves, but also from representatives of industry, as when the 
president of the Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) urged, 
“if Europe does not act, others will act in our place, and we will come to regret that” 
(European Defense Agency, 2007a: 8).  The intertwining of moralities culminated in the 
statement of Günter Verheugen, the Vice-President of the European Commission for 
Enterprise and Industry, who noted in February 2007 that Europe “must” raise its 
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political profile in order to make it more commensurate with the EU’s vast global 
economic role.  The obvious way to do this, according to his comments, is to build up the 
EU’s defense capabilities and military-industrial complex, as he noted at the 2007 
European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) Conference: 
If you ask me what the most important challenge is for the EU in the 21
st
 century, 
it is to fully accept our global responsibility and maintain our capacity for 
independent decision-making…if you believe we can continue to be an economic 
giant and political dwarf, then sooner or later the dwarf will not be able to defend 
the giant, and we will become an economic dwarf too.  A strong defence 
industrial base is a critical part of it. 
(European Defense Agency, 2007a: 7) 
 
It is significant that this declaration came not from a representative of the EDA, or even 
of the CFSP more broadly, but rather from a representative of the European Commission 
responsible for developments in enterprise and industry.  Further, Verheugen’s comments 
linked several different modes of moral responsibility together under the imperative of a 
common defense industry.  Amid the urgings to build up Europe’s defense industry was 
an overt—yet vague—concern about Europe’s capacity for independent decision-making 
as the key to fulfilling the EU’s global responsibility.   
Verheugen did not specify whether he meant independence, in a supranational 
sense, from the member states or from the USA as a domineering ally (or perhaps both), 
but his comments buttressed the position of many key players within the EU who feel 
that an integrated and sophisticated military-industrial complex is essential to realizing 
this independence.  What is significant in this quote is the way in which Verheugen’s 
words urge EU security actors to recast their view of independence in a collective way—
EUrope’s independence—as opposed to the independence of member states to act on 
security in the 21
st
 century.  This de-linking of ‘freedom to act’ from nation-state 
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sovereignty illustrates one facet of geoeconomic thinking.  Another facet of 
geoeconomics illustrated in this quote is the assertion that a strong defense industrial base 
(a major market development) is the chief mechanism linking economic prowess with 
political maneuverability.        
Is it precisely the de-linking of independence from nation-state territorial bounds 
that characterizes the more recent EU security policy dialogues.  What emerges is a sense 
that the potential for an integrated defense industrial base must win primary allegiance 
from policy makers and security actors.  While earlier EU security documents and 
publications tended to contain justification for having a common foreign policy and 
security identity at all, over time, the discussion shifted toward a sort of economic 
moralizing, with the supremacy of the markets being leveraged against ‘selfish’ concerns 
for national sovereignty.  This is not to say that the language of political responsibilities 
ceased, but rather that as this facet of European integration became more widely take-for-
granted by parties within the EU, the more recalcitrant opponents to it were chided by the 
ostensibly ‘pure’ economic concerns at stake.  When it comes to armaments policy, there 
is exceptional unwillingness to pool national sovereignty (Salmon and Shepherd 2003, 
181).  However, when the coordination of defense industries is characterized as the 
economically ‘right thing to do,’ those who would prefer to see the EU remain a 
primarily economic project may find their arguments against security integration 
imperiled.  As the EDA’s Long Term Vision of 2006 contends, member states must 
accept that “the DTIB in Europe can only survive as one European whole, not as a sum of 
different national capacities” (European Defense Agency, 2006c: 24). 
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In the same year that the Long Term Vision was drafted, the July issue of the EDA 
bulletin ran an article written by Ulf Hammarström, then the Industry and Market 
Director for the EDA, extolling the significance of the Code of Conduct on Defence 
Procurement.  The article warns member states about what is at stake for European 
companies if the national fragmentation of defense markets continues to hinder their 
competitiveness internationally.  Stressing the importance of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), “the key” to European industry and innovation, he urges that market 
forces alone cannot be relied upon to “create the industrial base needed for the future 
military capabilities of the EU.”  Rather, member state governments, in their unique role 
as both the regulators and sole customers of this industry, “have a responsibility in their 
own right for the structure of the industry” (European Defense Agency, 2006a: 8).  In this 
sense, despite Cowen and Smith’s (2009) objection to a Luttwakian conceptualization of 
geoeconomics, EU policy elites appear much more amenable to Luttwak’s (1990) notion 
that in response to globalization, geoeconomics requires states to function in the interest 
of economics (growing and integrating markets) rather than territory.   
This message has been taken up by the representatives of a number of member 
states themselves.  The Greek National Armaments Director observed during the 
European DTIB Conference held in Brussels in February 2007 that it was no longer 
realistic for member states to cling to their nationally-bounded defense industries:  “pure 
sovereignty,” he noted, “exists in few areas today, and industry wants a level playing 
field at a European—not national—level” (European Defense Agency, 2007a: 14).  
Hence, through these pressures of economic moralizing, security and defense integration 
is framed as an important responsibility that member state governments hold to the 
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defense industry.  This is illustrated rather conspicuously in the stated concern for what 
iindustry wants—a concern that subordinates member-state desires for sovereignty to the 
needs of the market. 
However, this trend does not constitute a simple story of the economic trumping 
the political in the moral rationalizing of defense integration.  Both conceptually and 
practically, contingent security governance involves the inseparability of these concerns.  
Hence, the importance of political will has not gone away, but is achieved through 
language of economic moralizing that connects the importance of a viable European 
defense industrial base with the imperative of force protection.  The safety of European 
troops is an imperative that few, if any, politicians and government officials would argue 
with.  Of course, the EU is not unique in this, but it serves as a pivotal argument for the 
pooling of member states’ security and defense assets and capabilities.  As the Research 
and Technology Director of the EDA noted in a bulletin article entitled “Facing the 
Facts,”  “the imperative to do everything possible for the safety of our troops on 
operations is of course a top capability priority” (European Defense Agency, 2006a: 4).   
Yet even this politically compelling objective has been viewed through the lens of 
industry viability, as when Javier Solana (then head of the EDA) referred to the Defense 
R&T Joint Investment Program on Force Protection as “an innovative and practical 
example of European countries investing more together in R&T” (European Defense 
Agency, 2007c: 2).  These examples further demonstrate the ways in which the architects 
of European security and defense integration have deftly woven together multiple 
imperatives in order to advance a compelling case for forging a common European 
security and defense apparatus.  By blending political, security, and economic senses of 
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responsibility to a ‘greater good,’ actors both within and beyond EU institutions have 
sought to create a moral discourse about the imperative and virtual inevitability of 
security and defense integration.   
 
“Spend More, Spend Better, and Spend More Together” 
A major contention of this essay is that the securitization of the EU may well be 
marching forward not because security concerns reign supreme, but rather because they 
are part of a larger context of contingent security governance, which brings a variety of 
actors and practices into the drive toward security-related policy outcomes, despite 
contradictions and conflicts between them.  The impetus bringing these actors together is 
an apparent commitment of EU political and economic elites to a Luttwakian form of 
geoeconomic reasoning, in which state territorial interests are subordinated to the needs 
and imperatives of an increasingly powerful market.  This section explores another key 
theme in the picture of contingent security governance that emerges from the EU:  When 
political and security agendas converge with the economic, the tendency in policy 
dialogues is toward neoliberal sensibilities.  Thus, where economic priorities were 
emphasized by politicians and industry representatives alike, they promoted the 
constituent tenets of neoliberalism: efficiency, competition, and privatization, a theme 
which remains consistent across the temporal range of the data examined. 
One of the stated reasons for the European Defense Agency’s creation was to 
place the forging of a common defense industry officially within the purview of EU 
institutions and policies.  An integral part of this, for the EDA and for members of the 
defense industry, has been the research and technology sector.  As early as the inaugural 
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edition of the EDA Bulletin, efficiency in this sector was stressed as a major concern for 
EU governments (European Defense Agency, 2005).  On this point, the president of the 
Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe, as well as Javier Solana, 
broached the need for a “paradigm shift” within the European Union.  Since then, the 
substance of this shift—“spend more, spend better, and spend more together,” has been 
repeatedly invoked in the publications and activities of the EDA (European Defense 
Agency, 2006a: 3).  These calls have been leveled in the face of the persistent aversion of 
some member states to increasing their defense spending levels.  However, the message 
has been rendered more palatable when coupled with language of efficiency and the 
streamlining of research and development (R&D) in the defense sector.  As several 
analysts have concluded, such practices would actually boost, rather than further strain, 
tightening budgets (Salmon and Shepherd, 2003).  This point was exploited by former 
EDA Chief Executive Alexander Weis, who touted European cooperation on security and 
defense as the solution, rather than the problem, in wake of the financial crisis (European 
Defense Agency, 2009c: 1).  Whether or not developments ‘on the ground’ will 
ultimately bear out these analyses, the key point is that these claims have bolstered the 
evolving neoliberal discourse within EU policy circles on the economic gravity of 
security and defense integration.   
Early in 2009, the EDA held a conference on helicopters, the proceedings of 
which were published in a special edition of the EDA Bulletin in March of that year.  
After an opening address from then EDA Chief Executive Alexander Weis and a series of 
keynote speeches from various EU and defense industry officials, two discussion panels 
were held, addressing topics such as “aviation interoperability” and “coherent strategies.”  
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Solana insisted that reducing duplication of defense efforts between member states would 
exploit economies of scale and lower overall costs (European Defense Agency, 2009b).  
The appeals to economic efficiency continued throughout the conference, with particular 
focus on how better-integrated approaches could alleviate the helicopter shortages that 
have hindered EU security capabilities.  Once again, the aerospace and defense industries 
were represented by the ASD president, who suggested in response to the problem—and 
the underlying unwillingness of member states to invest more—that stakeholders 
collectively “sanctuarize” defense spending (European Defense Agency, 2009b” 11).  
While he did not elaborate on his use of the term “sanctuarize,” it would seem to point to 
the establishment of defense budgets as off-limits to questions, scrutiny, and reductions.  
Improved efficiency in defense spending and capabilities development, according 
to the prevalent policy dialogue, is essential to enhancing the competitiveness of 
European companies in the global marketplace.  This is not to say that the dialogue is free 
of language about enhanced security for EU citizens, troops, and parts of the world in 
which the EU is engaged, but most often in the documents and publications, the 
imperative of competitiveness achieved through efficiency was spotlighted.  This was 
made all the more pressing with repeated references to increasing international 
competition in defense industries.  The emphasis is not only on international 
competitiveness, but also on public procurement opportunities within a Europe-wide 
defense market (previously lacking due to the security exemptions from internal market 
rules in the Treaty establishing the European Community).   Again, ‘SMEs’ were 
highlighted when an industry and market report in the first EDA Bulletin noted,  “An 
important part of this is the expansion of opportunities for small- and medium-sized 
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companies from across Europe to sell into a continental-scale market” (European Defense 
Agency, 2005: 5).  
Over time, attention was increasingly focused upon two additional principles of 
neoliberalization within the security and defense apparatus:  those of privatization and 
outsourcing.  These were expressed by both EU and industry representatives as important 
objectives in the process of integrating member states’ defense industries and capabilities, 
as during an EDA conference held in Brussels in February 2008 entitled 
“Commercializing Logistics.”  Citing news articles about the conference, the March 2008 
EDA Bulletin signals a shift in the EU’s approach to logistics, to a more US-style model 
of outsourcing to private logistics contractors (European Defense Agency, 2008b: 16).  
At the outset of the conference, the bulletin reported, a representative from Argus Media 
Group (an energy market analytics company based in London) touted the savings to be 
gained through outsourcing, according to a report the EDA had issued (European Defense 
Agency, 2008b).  Later in the conference, the Head of Logistic Processes for 
Finmeccanica (an Italian high-tech industrial group serving multiple fields including 
defense, aerospace, security, and energy) suggested that the defense industry could 
remedy gaps in information sharing between national and multinational operations, 
asserting, “we need an integrated logistics solution”  (European Defense Agency, 2008b: 
10).  Again, geoeconomic reasoning presents an integrated market solution to the 
difficulties of multi-level security governance, with multinational assemblages of 
companies easing cooperation between authorities located at various scales. 
 The conscious transition to a more neoliberal model of privatization and 
outsourcing of security and defense services such as communications and other tasks 
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traditionally covered by military units has brought with it a development that may be 
troubling to those who view a military-industrial complex (or perhaps more accurately, a 
defense and technology industrial base) as a potential threat to the democratic process.  It 
has meant that by according the representatives of defense industrial companies a 
prominent seat at the table when EU institutions meet to discuss security integration, 
these events provide corporations a privileged platform from which to dictate the needs 
and desires of industry to policy-makers and military officials.  Industry representatives 
not only from European companies, such as Argus Media, Finmeccanica, and Eurocopter, 
but also from the ‘usual suspects’ in the United States, such as Kellogg, Brown and Root 
(a private military contracting firm), have maintained a presence at EDA events.   
The ability of these interests to exert influence in the circles of EU policy-making 
was clearly demonstrated at the EDA’s 2009 conference on helicopters, when the CEO of 
Eurocopter outlined his company’s vision for how procurement in an integrated European 
DTIB should function, with a “well identified customer leading party (versus unanimity 
rule), as well as industrial prime (versus consensus-driven Joint Ventures), for the benefit 
of users, governments and industries” (European Defense Agency, 2009b: 22).  While 
laden with business jargon in need of deciphering, this statement appears to sketch out a 
procurement system in which decisions come about in a more ad-hoc manner, with 
stakeholders and their interests coalescing around particular ventures, and without the 
burden of reaching agreement between all member states participating in the European 
Defense Agency.  If adopted, these pointers would constitute a significant shift away 
from the principle of consensus among member states on matters of security and defense, 
which remains important to many national governments (and publics) in the EU.  The 
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vision of an ad-hoc approach to procurement is indicative of how the profoundly 
contingent nature of EU security governance suits the geoeconomic proclivities of EU 
policy and economic elites.  If realized, it would further contribute to an amorphous 
tangle of relations and activities that align around particular opportunities for profit and 
increasing market share rather than around territorially-defined (in a nation-state sense) 
security needs and concerns. 
 As this section has shown, a process of neoliberalization, of the embedding of 
principles such as efficiency, competition, and privatization, has occurred concomitantly 
with the process of securitization in the European Union.  Or perhaps more accurately, 
the neoliberalization of security and defense matters seems to be a driver of the 
securitization of the European Union.  The activities and discourse documented above 
also demonstrate the flimsiness of the oft-cited (in both academic and practitioner 
dialogues) distinction between hard and soft power, as economic and security agendas are 
thoroughly intertwined when a DTIB is actively pursued.  The following section will 
examine this idea with greater depth as it investigates the evolving dialogue within the 
EU about the eroding civil-military distinction. 
 
“The Separate Worlds Don’t Exist Anymore”:  Eroding the Civil-Military Binary   
The concept of contingent security governance, as a frame for examining 
securitizing processes, highlights ever more binaries in need of complication:  war/peace; 
combat/crisis management; security/defense and so on.  Somewhat in contrast to defense 
professionals in the United States, which has been characterized as a thoroughly 
securitized society (Lasswell, 1962; Bacevich, 2005; Bernazzoli and Flint, 2010), 
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officials of the European Union seem, on a pragmatic level, to be acutely aware of the un-
tenability of these neat distinctions.  This awareness is, perhaps, an outcome of the 
integration experience as a whole, which has been rife with reminders of how difficult it 
is to contain different agendas (political, economic, security) within their respective 
‘pillars.’  In this regard, it could be argued that the integration project has always been, at 
its core, driven by a geoeconomic precept:  political stability and collective security via 
economic interdependence.  However, while the discussion in EU security and defense 
texts has increasingly spoken of the ‘eroding line between military and civilian,’ on a 
theoretical level, contingent security governance implies that the distinction was always 
highly constructed.  Thus, while both representatives and scholars have seen the complex 
web of categorized interests (political, economic, defense) as a complication for 
securitization, my analysis demonstrates how it is this complexity that gives momentum 
to the process.  Nevertheless, the increasingly overt discussion of the intertwining of 
military and civilian needs and objectives (a shift perceptible in the texts since 2008) 
points to an important discursive strategy which seems to be driving security and defense 
integration in the European Union.  As the head of the EDA Planning and Policy Unit 
noted in July 2008, “the separate worlds don’t exist anymore” (European Defense 
Agency, 2008c: 18). 
Building a coherent defense identity by “moving the boundaries” in the conduct 
of defense business has been a vital component of the EDA’s core mission since its 
inception in 2004 (European Defense Agency, 2007c: 6).   In more recent publications, 
the discussion has turned to developing a defense identity that complements what is 
already purported to be the EU’s forte:  ‘soft’ or ‘civilian’ approaches to foreign and 
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security policy.  I view this as a particularly EU-style brand of contingent security 
governance.  In one sense, this has always been the tenor of European security and 
defense integration:  as the European Security Strategy demonstrates, the EU sees pivotal 
relationships between security and development (Hughes, 2009).  For example, in citing 
persistent poverty and malnutrition in the developing world, the document stresses that 
“security is a precondition of development” (Council of the European Union, 2003).  
Moreover, the EDA’s Long-Term Vision document declares that over the next twenty 
years, 
the EU will increasingly utilise a comprehensive approach combining its hard and 
soft power instruments and coordinating civilian, military, governmental and non-
governmental bodies to collectively achieve the necessary political effects 
(European Defense Agency, 2006c: 13). 
 These earlier, foundational documents indicate that EU institutions always placed the 
intertwining of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ modes of power at the heart of their distinctive approach 
to security and defense.  However, the most recent discussions within the EDA’s 
activities and publications have merged ‘military’ and ‘civilian’ concerns and agendas in 
ever more explicit and conscious ways, a development referred to herein as the erosion of 
the civil-military binary. 
One fundamental way in which this is accomplished is through the building of 
institutional linkages, drawing from every corner of political, social, and economic 
activity.  Hence, present in virtually all EU security and defense dialogues and activities 
(such as the annual EDA conferences) are representatives not only from the military 
establishment, policy circles, international aid agencies, and the defense industry, but also 
from the academe.  In fact, the inauguration of the European Union Institute for Security 
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Studies (EUISS) in 2002, with the stated goal of finding a “common security culture” for 
the member states and enriching “Europe’s strategic debate” (European Union Institute 
for Security Studies, n.d.), has brought researchers and academics directly into the 
security and defense integration process—both as full-time staff and as external 
contributors from universities across Europe.  With the apparent emergence of a military-
industrial-academic complex at the European level, the reach of contingent security 
governance is both wide and deep. 
For defense industry representatives and the EU officials who interact with them, 
the aims and benefits of eroding the civil-military binary in an explicitly economic sense 
are captured in buzz words such as ‘synergies,’ ‘interfaces,’ and ‘cross-fertilization.’  
What this has meant, in practical terms, is the sharing of ideas and technologies between 
civilian and military activity in order to efficiently grow security and defense capabilities.  
As a European security expert asserted in 2009, “Europe has the potential to be militarily 
independent, but only when barriers between national defence establishments are broken 
down and military R&D plugs more fully into the civilian European R&D base, which is 
already competitive worldwide” (European Defense Agency, 2009a: 11).  Some of the 
chief areas in which civil-military technological cross-fertilization is being pursued 
include communications systems, satellite capabilities, and maritime surveillance 
services.  The burgeoning discourse of eroding the civil-military binary was manifested 
in the EDA 2010 annual conference, “Bridging Efforts:  Connecting Civilian Security 
and Military Capability Development.”  Interestingly, despite the repeated insistences 
over the preceding years that boundaries were being eroded, then-EDA Chief Executive 
Alexander Weis asserted in his keynote speech that the aim was not to merge the two 
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sides (civilian and military) or to blur the lines of responsibility, but rather to increase the 
dialogue between them (European Defense Agency, 2010b: 4).  However, it is unclear 
how strict distinctions between security and defense, and combat and crisis management, 
might be maintained in the array of ‘complex security threats’ so often invoked by the 
security and defense establishment. 
This question has proven especially vexing for the neutral member states of the 
European Union, most of whom have been pulled into security and defense cooperation 
despite the mechanisms established to allow them to ‘opt out’ (not to mention Norway, a 
non-EU member who has cooperated closely with the EDA, as well as Great Britain, an 
EU member who has resisted a lockstep march toward security and defense integration, 
though the British position has softened considerably in recent years).  Significantly, the 
creation of the EDA itself occurred during the 2004 Irish Presidency of the EU, which is 
somewhat counterintuitive, given the Irish public’s notable resistance to defense 
integration and distaste for the arms industry.  Nevertheless, the EDA was readily 
embraced by the Irish government at the time, a position which some observers found 
disturbing, given the lack of parliamentary debate over the matter (Peace and Neutrality 
Alliance, 2008).   Language in the Irish Department of Defence Statement of Strategy 
2008 – 2010 implicated the influence of defense industry lobbyists and the lure of 
economic gains via a more cohesive, efficient, and robust military-industrial complex:   
We will continue to support Irish participation in EDA Programmes on a case by 
case basis, supporting those programmes that contribute to capability 
development in the Defence Forces and provide opportunities of interest to Irish-
based enterprises and researchers. We will work closely with Enterprise Ireland to 
exploit potential research and commercial opportunities arising  
(Department of Defence and Defence Forces, 2008).   
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This contradictory development exemplifies the contingent nature of security 
governance: it is the powerful culmination of the factors explored above—sometimes 
foreseen and ‘intentional,’ other times contradictory and unexpected—that has brought 
about the policy outcomes we witness today. When, in 2006, the EDA’s armaments 
director spoke of the “jigsaw of political desire, military desire, industrial desire and 
money that is often hard to bring together in one nation, let alone among a number of 
nations in a cooperative program,” he was summarizing what are typically viewed as 
hindrances to security and defense integration (European Defense Agency, 2006a: 10).  
On the contrary, I argue, my analysis shows that the ‘jigsaw’ itself makes the 
securitization of the European Union a viable (though not inevitable) outcome.  The 
pervasiveness of geoeconomic logics throughout EU security and defense policy 
dialogues during the years studied is what compelled the multifarious desires and agendas 
to come together at particular times and around particular ventures, spurring development 
of a EUropean security and defense apparatus. 
 
Concluding Thoughts and New Directions 
In this essay I have endeavored to shed light on some previously under-studied 
aspects of security and defense integration, specifically the dialogue and practices of the 
European Defense Agency.  By reconceptualizing the securitization of the European 
Union through the lens of contingent security governance, the analysis has underscored 
some key themes that build upon previous conclusions about this topic.  I found that an 
array of discursive strategies have been employed by actors located both within and 
outside of EU institutions in order to advance the goals of security and defense 
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integration.  The earlier discussions manifested in EU publications emphasized a 
discourse of morality—not only regarding the EU’s security obligations to its citizens and 
the rest of the world, but also an economic morality that prioritized the vitality of EU 
industry and markets over national self-interest and sovereignty.  Over the years, the 
focus shifted to explicit assertions that ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ could no longer be viewed 
as separate realms, whether in terms of security activities or in the research and 
development sector.  This was highlighted as a conscious effort to ‘erode the civil-
military binary.’  Constant over time was the discourse of neoliberal imperatives, which 
stressed the objective of enhanced competitiveness for EU defense industry achieved 
through privatization, outsourcing, and other strides toward economic efficiency.   
These themes demonstrate that securitization, as a multi-tracked process, requires 
that many sorts of actors and agendas are taken into account when considering the sort of 
security actor the European Union is becoming.  Many of these actors are outside of the 
formal (supranational) state apparatus, yet exert considerable influence over policy.  
Increasingly, pronouncements about the EU’s potential as a ‘soft power’ versus a ‘hard 
power’ hold little conceptual or practical value, because on both counts (conceptually and 
practically), these forms of power cannot be neatly decoupled.  Rather, participants in the 
security and defense apparatus are progressing toward their objectives by identifying and 
capitalizing on the ways in which the political, economic, and security/defense are not 
neatly delineated spheres or separate sets of goals and resources.  The exemplars 
presented in the empirical sections illustrate the deeply geoeconomic rationales at the 
heart of the securitization process.  While Cowen and Smith (2009) caution against a 
Luttwakian concept of a neat historical progression from a geopolitical order to a 
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geoeconomic order, my analysis shows how the practices and relations of EU security 
governance are tinged with a straightforwardly Luttwakian flavor of geoeconomic 
thinking.  The actors and institutions of EU security and defense must make a convincing 
case for abandoning nation-state sovereignty concerns in favor of the security and 
prosperity of a supranational whole.  Thus, it is in their interest to present a view of the 
world that emphasizes the supplanting of territorial threats and security solutions with 
supra- and trans-national threats and security solutions.  Moreover, their imperative is to 
present a view of the world in which larger, integrated, and increasingly powerful 
markets can and should dictate to nation-state governments on the intertwined matters of 
security and economic well-being. 
Finally, the process of securitization, as shown above, is sometimes incoherent 
and riddled with conflict between actors and agendas, advancing in spite of resistance 
from numerous parties within the EU.  The findings lend support to my development of 
the contingent security governance concept, which holds that this system of actors, 
agendas, and practices does not operate in a simple, top-down manner, and lacks the sort 
of centralized intentionality others have assumed it to possess.  As the example of Ireland 
shows, there are various centers of authority and multiple ‘intents,’ at times producing 
policy outcomes that are counterintuitive.   
Perhaps the key question following this analysis is, “what are the costs and 
benefits of a robust European military-industrial complex and security and defense 
apparatus?”  The actors examined in this essay clearly see a number of benefits:  to 
European defense industry, to be sure, but also to the agenda of forging a unified identity 
both amongst EU citizens and as a ‘political actor’ on the world stage.  However, it is 
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worth asking, in light of the US experience of the last fifty or so years, whether the 
increased influence of the defense industry in the circles of policy-making could one day 
allow the “tail to wag the dog.”  Given Bailes’ (2008: 121) observation that “treating 
others badly in the non-military field and dodging security challenges are both tactics that 
risk building up greater animosity and a more hazardous environment in the longer run,” 
it would seem that the EU’s current approach to external relations, coupled with a 
growing military-industrial complex, could potentially lead in the direction of a more 
militarily active EU. 
Moreover, is there more reason to fear the military-industrial complex in the 
European Union versus in the United States?  An important consideration on this point is 
what is commonly referred to as the democratic deficit in the EU, and the oft-cited lack 
of accountability to EU citizens.  Many EU institutions wielding significant power and 
influence over numerous aspects of everyday life are not subject to election 
(DeBardeleben and Hurrelman, 2007: 2).  Even where representatives are directly 
elected, as in the European Parliament, the lack of public participation in these elections 
is striking (LeDuc, 2007).  Although the Lisbon Treaty provides some mitigating factors 
for the so-called democratic deficit, many observers remain skeptical, and citizens of the 
EU are often characterized as uninformed about the function and reach of this body of 
institutions.  All of this raises the question of whether the prominent place of defense 
industry representatives and other ‘outside’ actors at the policy table makes the forging of 
a military-industrial complex more problematic than it would otherwise be.  On the other 
hand, the military-industrial complex implies a sort of ‘democratic deficit’ that, as 
demonstrated by the example of the US, afflicts nation-states as much as it afflicts the 
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supranational state space of the EU—that is, the growing influence of corporate interests 
in the making of policy.  This is not to make a normative judgment about such influence, 
but to underscore its relevance to other ways in which many citizens and observers have 
viewed the problems of accountability within the EU (Bailes, 2008).   
In light of the conclusions about contingent security governance, these questions 
point to a need for continued investigation into the process of securitization of the EU, 
particularly where citizens’ views are concerned.  Future studies should utilize more 
grounded and ethnographic methodologies in order to examine everyday perceptions of 
security culture, identity, and threats, and how they constitute and shape one another.  
Particularly as EU-NATO and EU-US relations have been strained under the War on 
Terror (Posen, 2006; De Nevers, 2007; Ray and Johnston, 2007), it is worth considering 
whether an autonomous security and defense apparatus would allow Europeans to avoid 
military misadventures via a US-dominated North Atlantic Alliance.  At the time of 
writing, violence and political instability persist in Northern Africa and the Middle East; 
disputes remain unresolved in the Western Balkans and the Caucasus, and the world 
continues its long recovery from financial and economic crisis.  All of these factors have 
vast implications for European security, making this a vital pathway for sustained 
inquiry. 
 
 This chapter has presented one facet of multi-level governance in the European 
Union, focusing specifically on the governance of European security.  The analysis 
illuminated the links between differing ‘levels’ of this security governance, particularly 
between the supranational level and the nation-state level.  However, these levels are not 
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viewed as fixed scales; rather, the object of the analysis was the way in which a security 
arena at the supranational scale has been—and continues to be—forged through the 
geopolitical and geoeconomic strategies of various governmental and non-governmental 
actors that span the national, multinational, and supranational realms.  The following 
chapter presents a more direct theoretical engagement with the concept of scale in its 
analysis of the multi-scalar discursive strategies of Croatian political elites undergoing 
the process of Euro-Atlantic integration.  The essay adds another facet to the study of 
multi-level governance, by revealing how the scalar metageographies of nation-state 
elites shape political strategies for managing and bridging the needs and expectations of 
multiple audiences, at home and abroad.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
BALKANISM REVISITED:  THE MULTI-SCALAR GEOPOLITICS OF 
CROATIA’S SELF-REPRESENTATION IN THE EURO-ATLANTIC 
INTEGRATION PROCESS 
 
This essay explores the ways in which the Croatian government sought to 
represent itself in discussions of Euro-Atlantic integration in its website content in the 
years 2008 - 2012.  Using a critical geopolitics approach and qualitative content analysis, 
I examined speeches, press releases, official bulletins, and policy documents from the 
main Croatian government website, the Ministry of Defense website, and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and European Integration website.  In the three key empirical themes that 
emerged from the analysis, Croatian leaders have selectively engaged with the discourse 
of Balkanism, intertwining it with the security imperatives both of the Euro-Atlantic 
community and of Croatian citizens.  Firstly, the government constructed an image of 
Croatia as both a key regional leader for stability and peace, as well as a glowing 
international example of reform; secondly, tropes of secular morality and national 
sacrifice were deployed to construct Croatia as a virtuous society who, due to the 
Homeland War experience, is uniquely deserving of full Euro-Atlantic membership; and 
thirdly, an emphasis on geoeconomic reasoning was often featured in order to present 
Croatia as a rational and pragmatic global actor who has fully internalized the  neoliberal 
logics of marketization perpetuated by the United States and European Union.  The 
findings suggest that political elites creatively deployed particular representations shaped 
by a logic organizing audiences into domestic and international scales.  Hence, while 
political-geographic theories of scale have abandoned the notion of pre-given scales, 
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security-identity constructions reflect that policy makers’ rhetoric is nested in a scalar 
hierarchy. 
 
Introduction 
 On April 5
th
, 2008, U.S. President George W. Bush gave a momentous speech 
from famed St. Mark’s Square in Croatia’s capital city of Zagreb, the purpose of which 
was to tout the offer of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership to this 
former Yugoslav republic.  His two-day trip to Croatia coincided with the NATO Summit 
in Bucharest, Romania, during which several important decisions were reached regarding 
the accession of new members to the world’s largest military alliance.  In response to 
President Bush’s invitation, then Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader said: 
When I look back today on Croatia and our dream on the life in a free, democratic 
country, on the life in ordered and civilized country, of equal citizens, of equal 
opportunities, then I see how it is precisely America, together with others, that 
helped for us to realize our dream, as well…with the invitation of our country to 
join NATO, and with the new energy in our negotiations to accede to EU, this 
visit by American President means that the aspirations of many Croatian 
generations have been fulfilled. 
(Croatia in Focus, May 2008: 10)  
 
The language in this excerpt reflects a now commonplace narrative on the ‘Euro-Atlantic 
community’:  that is, it conflates membership in NATO and the European Union (EU), 
brought about by partnership with the United States and other ‘Western7’ international 
actors, with order, civilization, and democracy.  This construction in itself is not 
surprising or unusual, as previous work (notably, that of geographers Merje Kuus, Alex 
                                                 
7
 ‘West’ and ‘Western’ are admittedly contested and problematic terms; however, their usage is helpful in 
this discussion in order to refer collectively to the United States and countries commonly thought of as 
comprising Western Europe. 
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Jeffrey, and Luiza Bialasiewicz, among others) has uncovered its pervasiveness in the 
post-1989 Central and East European experience.  However, Sanader’s equation of Euro-
Atlanticism with peace, freedom, democracy, and prosperity is highlighted here because 
it serves as a fitting entry point into further insights about the intersection of 
securitization and Balkanism undergirding the Euro-Atlantic integration process in 
Croatia.      
A growing literature on Balkanism, inspired anew by Maria Todorova’s highly 
influential work Imagining the Balkans (1997), has thoroughly investigated the Western 
constructions of  the countries and societies comprising the Balkan peninsula, as well as 
the ways in which these constructions have been negotiated and, at times, internalized by 
the peoples of the region.  Building on Todorov’s insights, further literature, discussed 
below, has examined the implications of Balkanist discourses for European accession 
(e.g., Lindstrom, 2003 and Krajina, 2009).  In this essay, I argue that it is time to revisit 
Balkanism in the context of Euro-Atlanticism, but through the critical geopolitics lens of 
securitization and the security-identity nexus.  Hence, rather than simply documenting the 
deployment of Balkanist discourses in the Euro-Atlantic integration process, this essay 
will demonstrate the ways in which the Republic of Croatia, positioned to accede to the 
EU and having acceded to NATO relatively recently, utilizes a strategy of multi-scalar 
geopolitics in its official governmental website content in order to creatively wield 
Balkanism—and its attendant security implications—for international and domestic 
audiences simultaneously.  In short, the empirical focus is on the ways in which 
discourses of security and identity are mobilized in government website material and key 
policy documents posted on the official websites.   
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The analysis seeks to unmask how representations of ‘self,’ ‘other,’ ‘risk,’ and 
‘threat’ have been used in order to construct careful representations of Croatia for 
international audiences—particularly those in Europe and the United States—by 
providing English language versions of key documents and other web-accessible 
material.  With that, we can see how these tropes are employed to ‘sell’ the project of 
Euro-Atlantic integration to the wider Croatian society.  While the materials consulted for 
this project are aimed largely at international audiences, many, if not most of them, are 
also available on the websites in the Croatian language as well as in English.  As the title 
implies, the larger focus in this essay is on the former goal—that of exploring practices of 
self-representation; however, the account would be incomplete without also addressing 
the appeals made to everyday Croatians by state elites.  Indeed, many of the data sources 
drawn upon for this project indicate that demonstrated success in bringing Croatian 
society on-board buttressed the government’s constructions of Croatia as being prepared 
for NATO and EU membership. 
I follow a critical geopolitics approach to this endeavor of unmasking, and frame 
my analysis with theories of discourse and self-representation.  Previous work in political 
geography and related fields such as international relations has investigated the 
mechanisms of Western influence in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) 
by focusing on how civil society in these states has come to reflect the priorities of ‘Euro-
Atlantic’ values and structures (Jeffrey, 2008; Kuus, 2007a, 2007b, 2009; Wedel, 1998).  
This essay will add the dimension of how the practice of self-representation in 
government internet content has aimed to present Croatia as a ready and willing partner 
in the future of the Euro-Atlantic community.  The analysis reveals the 
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creative/selective/competing uses of Balkanism in this content and the intersections of 
Balkanism with security discourses and agendas, which defined elite political discourse 
in Croatia for the years studied.  Unlike in the years immediately following the wars of 
Yugoslav dissolution, when Croatian and Slovenian leaders clammored to exhibit their 
'exit' from the Balkans and 'return' to Europe (Lindstrom, 2003), I demonstrate that in 
more recent years, the Balkan legacy has been at times derided and downplayed, and at 
other times positively invoked as a characteristic that makes Croatia a particularly 
desirable member of the overarching Euro-Atlantic security regime.   
However, these discursive strategies have required an artful balance on the part of 
political elites, as they need to carefully package their messages for multiple audiences, 
domestic and international, simultaneously.  This is what is meant by the idea of “multi-
scalar geopolitics” invoked in the title of this essay.  Rather than investigating the 
representations of a country’s foreign policy solely as offered by the government to its 
public, the focus is on the ways in which a government entity undergoing a trans-
nationalizing process, such as Euro-Atlantic integration, must repackage aspects of its 
country’s history, culture, economy, and so on, in order to persuade multiple audiences at 
once.  Notably, despite the mutuality involved in the social construction of the relevant 
scales, policy makers tend to invoke a nested and reified sense of scale that drives how 
security and identity discourses are wielded for particular audiences at particular times.  
Moreover, given the explicit security imperative for the integration of the Western 
Balkan countries into NATO and the European Union, the intersection between identity 
discourses (Balkanism) and the practice of defining security agendas (securitization)—
something I refer to as the security-identity nexus—warrants explicit attention.  Thus, the 
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empirical scope of the essay includes website text and online documents from entities 
overtly involved in security  (the Ministry of Defense and the various branches of 
Croatia’s armed forces), as well as from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European 
Integration and the main government web portal.   
 
Discourses of Identity and Security 
The attention to specific discourses of identity and security in government website 
materials on Euro-Atlantic integration follows from the assumption that the two notions 
are inextricably linked in the profoundly geopolitical process of joining these institutions.  
This process has involved both political and cultural mechanisms that work in concert to 
establish the necessity and morality of NATO and EU membership, as well as their 
location on the ‘right’ side of the new, post-Cold War discursive divide in Eurasia (Kuus, 
2007a; De Nevers, 2007; Dawson and Fawn, 2002).  At the heart of these discourses is a 
constant (re)construction of the Self/Other nexus, which both compels governments to 
include Euro-Atlantic membership in their foreign policy imperatives, and allows them to 
make the case to their publics that this membership is an obvious and necessary 
objective.  As a concept, the Self/Other nexus encapsulates the notion that a nation-state’s 
sense of ‘self’ is in large part formulated against the foil of an international arena rife 
with threatening ‘others.’  Thus, the politics of forming one’s own state or national 
identity are facilitated by the formation of policies and actions toward other actors, which 
delineate a ‘normal’ inside and a ‘pathological’ outside (Campbell, 1998).  These ideals 
of normal/pathological and inside/outside are justified to the public through political 
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speeches, the mass media, and popular culture, and often become “taken for granted” 
while alternative views are frequently excluded (Sharp, 2000).   
Poststructural approaches to understanding collective identities in Eastern Europe 
are rooted in the assumption that we formulate our sense of self through the 
internalization of significant others’ objectification of ourselves (Neumann, 1999).  In 
Croatia and the other countries of Southeastern Europe, sense of self is overwhelmingly 
characterized by the oft-cited liminality of Balkan identity, as Europe’s constantly 
becoming, partial ‘Other’—at once both a part of and somehow separate from European 
identity (Todorova, 1997).  The cultural, political, and economic implications of 
‘Balkanism’ have received ample treatment in recent social science work (Dodds, 2003; 
Lindstrom, 2003; Rasza and Lindstrom, 2004; Lindstrom, 2008; Papadimitriou and 
Gateva, 2009; Krajina, 2009).   
Examining the political discourse of Tuđman’s Croatia in the 1990s, Rasza and 
Lindstrom (2004) found that Balkanism was a political tool that Western leaders and 
journalists wielded against Croatia, but Croatians also deployed Balkan stereotypes in 
order to differentiate themselves against regional neighbors further southeast.  Using 
official government documents, they found that “Europe always stands outside the 
nation, as an identity to be achieved” (pg. 630).  By revisiting this issue, but through the 
lens of security-identity constructions in the context of the Euro-Atlantic integration 
process, I am shedding light on how the status of ‘candidate country’ created a greater 
need for self-representations of Croatian elites to challenge the binary of inside/outside 
Euro-Atlantic space, with growing emphasis placed on how selected aspects of Croatia’s 
‘Balkan-ness’ are actually assets—rather than threats—to the Euro-Atlantic community.   
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Slightly later work on Balkanism has taken up analyses of how Balkan identity 
plays a direct role in the Euro-Atlantic processes of the countries of the Balkan peninsula 
(Hammond, 2005 and 2006; Lindstrom, 2008; Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2009; Krajina, 
2009).  For Papadimitriou and Gateva (2009), the EU accession process of Romania and 
Bulgaria produced a two-fold phenomenon of Balkan exceptionalism:  1. Political elites 
in the candidate countries themselves may seize upon historical and external factors such 
as the particularly traumatic communist experience under Ceausescu in order to account 
for their failures to catch up to the “frontrunners” of European integration; and 2. The EU 
treated Bulgaria and Romania differently than the other accession countries at the time, 
both by creating extra conditions for them to meet and by bending certain criteria in order 
to let them in, arguably before they were ‘ready,’ in order to avoid instabilities and 
insecurity potentially created by their exclusion.  From the perspective of discourse 
analysis rather than policy analysis, Hammond (2006) and Krajina (2009) found that the 
‘Balkanist’ discourses imposed upon the countries of the region by Western entities were 
as much about the insecurity of a unified European identity as they were about the 
candidate country itself.   
The fruitful body of work already produced on Balkanism and integration begs 
further analysis of how the security imperatives and identity discourses deployed by 
accession country elites must simultaneously appeal to the structure of expectations 
dominant within the accession society and exhibit a proper adoption of Euro-Atlantic 
‘values’ and imperatives.  An analysis of government web materials on integration 
provides an ideal mode by which to do this, because it exhibits the geopolitical practices 
aimed at multiple scales:  to the international community and to the domestic audience.  
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Such multi-scalar geopolitical practices reflect the strategic thinking of high-level 
political officials, who are nested in a hierarchy of, for them, taken-for-granted scales:  
domestic and international, or domestic and supranational.  Recent contributions to the 
scale debate in human geography (notably, Marston et al., 2005 and Delaney and Leitner, 
1997) have questioned the utility of scale as a theoretical concept, as scholars frequently 
default into taking scales of analysis as pre-given and hierarchical in a way that does not 
reflect social-political life.  While I join these voices in opposing an ontology of 
hierarchical, absolute scales (e.g., local, national and global), I agree with Corey Johnson 
(2008: 87) in his assertion that a concept of scale is still useful in a conceptualization 
“that emphasizes its constructed, produced and political natures” (see also Jonas, 2006).    
Although we, as human geographers, largely reject the notion of pre-given scales, 
political elites operate in everyday life within just such a metageography, consciously 
deploying geopolitical representations for audiences ostensibly organized in a hierarchy 
of scales—in this case, individual, national/domestic and international or supranational.  
In essence, the larger enterprise here is to understand how contemporary processes of 
European integration and reterritorialization, or the reorganization of boundaries and 
territories within newly constructed scales of political authority, (Jessop, 2001; Brenner, 
1997; Häkli, 2001; Brenner et al., 2003) prompt practices of self-representation that both 
shift and entrench collective identities in the face of ongoing Euro-Atlantic integration. 
This is part and parcel of the agenda identified by Mamadouh and van der Wusten (2008) 
and Murphy (2008) for the geographic study of EU governance:  to go beyond the realm 
of the legal and the formal, of policies and treaties, in order to understand the Euro-
Atlantic as a “meaningful social unit” (Mamadouh and van der Wusten 2008: 30).  I 
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contend that because the realm of the legal and formal corresponds with a hierarchical 
scalar logic, it is important to comprehend the ways in which policy discourses mirror 
this logic in constructing a Euro-Atlantic social unit.  Investigating these constructions at 
the margins (that is, within a country in the process of ‘becoming’ Euro-Atlantic) yields 
important insights on this matter. 
The implications of Balkanist discourse for Croatia’s place in the Euro-Atlantic 
sphere have as much to do with security as they do with identity.  My concept of a 
“security-identity nexus” indicates that the two—security and identity—are mutually 
constructed, with neither being prime in the relationship.  Rather, they are linked 
recursively.  The process of securitization, or the practice of defining issues as matters of 
risk and threat, is wholly driven by assumptions about who is ‘Self’ and who is ‘Other.’  
This perspective owes much to the field of constructivist international relations, which, 
beginning in the 1990s, has placed growing emphasis on how ideas about security 
develop, enter the realm of public policy debate and discourse, and eventually become 
institutionalized (Lipschutz, 1995; see also Wæver 1995a and 1995b; Weldes et al., 
1999).  Kuus (2007a) has pioneered the application of these perspectives in her work on 
Central Europe’s integration into NATO.  Building on this work, I contend that the 
Croatian case can be used to demonstrate the ways in which the post-socialist and post-
conflict designators are creatively engaged by political leaders in order to represent 
Croatia to the international community as ready for—and deserving of—full inclusion in 
the Euro-Atlantic organizations, while simultaneously representing this inclusion as an 
imperative of Croatian security and identity to Croatian citizens. 
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Self-representation has been defined as the “process by which individuals attempt 
to control the impressions others have of them” (Dominick, 1999: 647).  As the definition 
suggests, this concept has traditionally referred to how individual people have chosen to 
present themselves to others.  However, Volčič (2008) has recently used the concept to 
explore the self-representational constructions of the former Yugoslav republics on their 
government websites in neoliberal processes of nation-branding.  I follow Volčič’s use of 
the term in my exploration of how Croatian government websites are utilized as sites of 
self-representation in their discussions of Euro-Atlantic integration.  The availability of 
particular speeches, news releases, and policy documents on the government websites is 
the outcome of a rigorous process of selection and omission.  Certain texts are selected, 
perhaps even featured, to be viewed by the public.  While a large swath of the general 
public may not regularly read such texts, they are intended to inform the community of 
journalists, who will digest, condense, and synthesize the contents of national security 
strategies, legislative transcripts, and other texts and then disseminate them to the broader 
public in the form of mass media articles and broadcasts.  They also are clearly aimed at 
the policy communities (governments, think tanks, and academics) in other countries.  
Some materials are translated into English, while others are not, reflecting deliberate 
decisions about the messages policy elites wish to convey about the Republic of Croatia 
to the European Union, NATO, United States, et cetera, while other bits of information 
remain muted to audiences outside of Croatia.   
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Investigating Self-Representations:  Websites as Data Sources 
 The data used to critically analyze the Croatian government’s self-representations 
in the Euro-Atlantic integration process were drawn from three primary websites:  the 
main government web portal, the website of the Ministry of Defense, and the website of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration.  Volčič (2008) notes that while 
much research has illuminated the ways in which the former Yugoslav states have 
historically been the object of Balkanist and orientalist discourses constructed by the 
West, important contributions remain to be made by investigating the ways in which 
these states construct counter-images of themselves for the rest of the world.  In an 
increasingly digital world, where a growing number of individuals and groups inform 
themselves and gain ‘knowledge’ about others utilizing online information outlets, 
website content has become a crucial source of data for anyone wishing to study the 
construction and mobilization of geopolitical narratives and images.   
 Self-representation as a practice of governing elites is nothing new, but as Jackson 
and Purcell (1997) argued earlier in the internet age, the added communication and 
presentation technologies available via the World Wide Web yield greater power to 
define geopolitical spaces.  Internet sites provide interactivity and transmit multiple cues, 
rather than simply provide information or data.  Government websites have become 
increasingly adept at this, using mixes of standard press releases, multimedia features, 
and visually stylish periodic bulletins to package the particular representations they wish 
to convey.  In a process such as Euro-Atlantic integration, which requires the nimble 
management of representations both to a domestic audience and to international 
audiences simultaneously, government websites allow political elites to publish vast 
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amounts of material in multiple languages, making some texts front-and-center on 
homepages, while necessitating searches for others.  All told, this enhanced 
communication, and smoother management of self-representation via internet 
technologies, enhances actors’ ability to construct political geographies.8   
 My use of official government websites afforded me the ability not only to 
explore the text of web pages themselves, but also to peruse the selection of documents 
and bulletins available for download from these pages.  Given the overwhelming volume 
of information available on a single site, it was necessary to delineate a temporal scale 
within which to collect the texts that would be used as data.    The text of the websites 
themselves was monitored over the course of the study, which encompassed Croatia’s 
invitation to NATO in April 2008, as well as key moments in Croatia’s EU accession 
process, such as the conviction of the Croatian generals at the ICTY and completion of 
accession negotiations.  However, in the case of press releases and news articles on the 
three sites, material was available dating as far back as 2001. I chose to include materials 
from mid-2007 to January 2012, which captured the discussion leading up to Croatia’s 
invitation to NATO in 2008, and covered the key moments of Croatia’s EU accession 
                                                 
8
 It is important to note the limitations of this approach, however.  As Dodds (2006) has pointed out, the 
ways in which audiences consume the geopolitical narratives constructed by elites is a crucial factor in the 
negotiation of political-geographic knowledge.  This essay cannot make any claims about audience 
reception or the impacts of the narratives proffered by Croatian elites.  However, the issue of audience is 
tangential to the principal aims of the present analysis, which explores how a multi-scalar metageography 
was central to elite geopolitical rhetoric in the Euro-Atlantic integration process.  The process of audience 
consumption and negotiation of knowledge is taken up in Chapter Five. 
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process.  Because of the very large volume of press releases available for this time 
period, the content was narrowed by conducting a keyword search using “NATO” and 
“EU.9”  In the case of the main government web portal, the large volume of featured 
news stories, mostly from the HINA
10
 news agency, was further narrowed by including 
articles that had relevance ratings of fifty percent or higher in the keyword search results.   
 Finally, a number of downloadable materials, in the form of pdf documents, were 
included in the dataset.  The first of these is a set of English-language bulletins called 
Croatia in Focus, which aims to inform non-Croatian audiences (and members of the 
Croatian diaspora) about the activities of the Croatian government.  In order to maintain 
consistency with the temporal scale for press releases, I looked at issues of the bulletin 
dating from 2007 to January 2009 (which, at the time of writing, is the most recent 
edition).  Additionally, I examined two key strategy documents.  One, the Strategic 
Defence Review, is featured in English on the Ministry of Defense website.  This 
document, which is fifty-two pages in length, was released in November 2005.  Although 
this is outside of the temporal scale established for the data collection, this was the most 
recent incarnation of the Strategic Defence Review, and it was included due to its 
centrality to the government’s preparation for Euro-Atlantic integration.  Similarly, the 
                                                 
9
 Additional keywords, such as “Atlantic” and “integration” were tested, but produced mostly overlapping 
search results. 
10
 HINA (Hrvatska izvještajna novinska agencija) is a news agency that produces a large amount of 
information, for Croatian audiences, as well as audiences outside of Croatia, including foreign 
governments, NGOs, and business interests.  Services include daily English-language news digests and 
bulletins (http://websrv2.hina.hr/hina/web/index.action).   
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Croatian Armed Forces Long-Term Development Plan 2006 - 2015 (ninety-nine pages in 
length and also available from the Ministry of Defense website) was released in June 
2006, but was meant to guide the drive toward NATO membership and subsequent 
military activity through 2015.  The content of these documents, and the choice to present 
them in English, is strongly indicative of the Croatian government’s aim of using them to 
demonstrate key aspects of Croatia’s military and foreign policy preparedness in the 
context of impending Euro-Atlantic membership.  
 The materials were screened for relevance to the research topic, and then 
subjected to a thematic analysis which identified commonly occurring themes in the 
dialogue (Maxwell, 2005).  Three major themes emerged from the analysis as particularly 
significant:  Firstly, the government website content constructed an image of Croatia as 
both a key regional leader for stability and peace, as well as a glowing international 
example of reform; secondly, tropes of secular morality and national sacrifice were 
deployed in order to construct Croatia as a virtuous society uniquely deserving of 
membership in the Euro-Atlantic community; and thirdly, an emphasis on 
geoeconomic—rather than geopolitical—reasoning was often featured in order to present 
Croatia as a rational and pragmatic global actor who has fully internalized the  neoliberal 
logics of marketization perpetuated by the United States and the European Union.  The 
manner in which Balkanism and securitization intersected in various ways in the self-
representations illustrates that policy makers’ discursive practices are shaped by a 
metageography of scales as a nested hierarchy, with particular security-identity 
constructions aimed at audiences at particular scales as perceived by political elites. 
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Croatia as a Regional Leader and International Example 
 The self-representation of Croatia as a key promoter of stability within the 
Southeastern European region, as well as an example of modernity, progress, and reform, 
was the most prominent theme to emerge from the analysis.  This image was constructed 
in a number of ways, with several sub-themes comprising it.  Among these sub-themes 
were an emphasis upon Croatia’s recent contributions to global security; the ways in 
which “Homeland War” (the name used by Croats to refer to the 1990s war of secession 
from Yugoslavia) experiences have prepared Croatia for Euro-Atlantic integration; and 
the usage of ‘nesting Balkanisms,’ in order to send pointed messages about what Croatia 
is not, to be juxtaposed with positive notions of what Croatia is.  The sub-themes 
demonstrate the ways in which self-representations are packaged for audiences perceived 
as existing at particular scales, with the intersections of Balkan identity and security 
imperatives forming differing strategies for the ‘domestic,’ ‘regional,’ and ‘international’ 
communities.  All of these ideas were mobilized, often within a single text, in order to 
highlight the various aspects of Croatia’s collective history and identity that make the 
country particularly well-suited to NATO and the EU, and that make integration into 
these institutions an obvious ‘next step’ in the evolution of Croatia’s foreign policy since 
it gained independence in 1991.    
The language about Croatia’s military, economic, and foreign policy progress, 
and its unique standing in Southeastern Europe, appeared frequently throughout all of the 
data sources.  News stories and speeches from Croatian leaders and from U.S. and 
European leaders were used repeatedly to construct Croatia as an indispensible player in 
‘Europe’s new south.’  One way in which this was done was to point out how rapidly 
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Croatia has evolved from being a customer of security to a provider of security.  The 
focus of the international community a mere fifteen years ago as a site of violence and 
instability, Croatia now deploys hundreds of its soldiers to places such as the Sudan for 
EU peace missions and Afghanistan for NATO operations.  This was often highlighted by 
Gordan Jandroković, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, 
who noted that “within a relatively short time, from being a country where peacekeeping 
missions were deployed, Croatia has become a country that participates in peacekeeping 
missions throughout the world.
11”   
However, Croatian governmental actors do not simply present these activities as 
Croatian military units doing the bidding of arguably more powerful global actors (which 
is a criticism often leveled at the government from those in Croatian society who oppose 
NATO and/or EU membership); rather, such discussions typically present Croatia as 
figuring prominently in the very policy that directs these activities.  As Jandroković 
asserted elsewhere in the same speech, “Croatia, from its position as an object of world 
policy, has taken a great stride forward and put itself in the position of a country which 
co-decides on the most important issues of world policy.
12”  While the emphasis on 
Croatia’s contributions to global security appear to be aimed at international audiences, 
as markers of Croatia’s indispensability to the Euro-Atlantic community, the assertions 
that Croatia is a key ‘decider’ simultaneously aim to persuade domestic audiences that 
Croatia will maintain its sovereignty as a part of that community. 
                                                 
11
 Quote from speech posted at 
http://www.mvpei.hr/custompages/static/hrv/templates/_frt_govori_en.asp?id=322. 
12
 Ibid. 
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 Another common focus was that of Croatia’s position of leadership in the 
Southeastern European region (one prominent notion of regional scale in these rhetorics), 
with Croatian government representatives taking every opportunity possible to promote 
Croatia’s purported role in bringing stability to the region following nearly a decade of 
conflict.  Carefully sidestepping discussion of persistent problems in Croatia, some (such 
as corruption and organized crime) that have at times threatened progress toward Euro-
Atlantic integration (Hendrickson, 2006), state elites instead emphasized Croatia’s efforts 
toward favorable relations between the states of Southeastern Europe.  This was evident 
as Jandroković noted that 
Regional cooperation is one of the pillars of Croatian foreign policy. Our Euro-
Atlantic integration process sets a good example and encourages all the countries 
in the region of South-East Europe. Croatian membership in the Alliance will 
present a strong additional impetus to promote good and open neighborhood 
relations, ensuring further regional stability and prosperity as well.
13
 
 
Such points were often reinforced with press releases featuring praise from foreign 
governments.  A large number of stories in the Croatia in Focus bulletins, for example, 
were headlined with titles such as “Strong Czech support for Croatia’s membership in 
NATO and EU.”  In this particular story, it was noted that former Czech Prime Minister 
Mirek Topolanek and former Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader shared their views on 
the political situation in the region, concluding that Croatia “was a true leader and a 
factor of stabilisation in the region.
14”  These pointed references to external validation 
elucidate the deeply scalar thinking involved in matters of international integration.  
                                                 
13
 Quote from speech posted at 
http://www.mvpei.hr/custompages/static/hrv/templates/_frt_govori_en.asp?id=322. 
14
 Croatia in Focus, April 2008, pg. 9. 
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Jandroković, for his part, accords the requisite acknowledgement of regional 
responsibilities within Southeastern Europe.  At the same time, the Croatian government 
bulletins’ copious inclusions of praise from other European leaders indicate the need for 
recognition from the broader Euro-Atlantic region.  Validation at one scale, it would 
seem, is required in order for Croatia to become a viable member in a broader-scale 
political collective, according to the nested scalar logic of integration. 
 Also within this theme, Croatia’s actions in the Homeland War were drawn upon 
frequently in English-language government website content in order to enhance the 
image of Croatia as a country with many important qualities to offer the security remits 
of NATO and, to a lesser extent, the European Union.  The uniqueness of Croatia’s 
wartime experiences were invoked throughout the speeches, press releases, strategy 
documents, and bulletins in order to highlight important assets and capabilities that 
Croatia can bring to Euro-Atlantic institutions.  As Ivo Sanader stated in an interview for 
Croatia in Focus,  
Since we are one of the very few countries that has experienced war on its own 
territory in recent times, I think that this mentality of decisiveness in defending of 
territory is something that we can bring to the alliance  …we have a lot of 
experience in trying to reconcile people and bringing them together in a peaceful 
way.
15
 
 
Where the war crimes and wrong-doings of other entities, particularly of Serbia, were 
often pointed out, for Croatia’s part, past conduct in conflict was represented with 
language such as “mentality of decisiveness in defending of territory.”  Similar ideas 
were found in the text of the Ministry of Defense homepage, which stated that  
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 Croatia in Focus, April 2008, pg. 13. 
103 
 
the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia have grown into a respectable and 
well-organised armed force during the Homeland War of independence. Many 
military analysts consider that the defence of the Croatian territory was 
successful, resulting in final military victory. Military tactics and strategy were 
carried out directly in practice and that is unique in the world.
16
  
 
Hence, while certain Croatian actions during the Homeland War could be construed as a 
liability for an international military alliance (and indeed constituted a key issue in EU 
accession), Croatian political elites have re-presented them as valuable exercises in 
defense operations that endow Croatia with the experience necessary to actively 
participate in the security mandates of the Euro-Atlantic institutions.  As the text from the 
Ministry of Defense website makes clear, Croatia’s qualifications as a military power are 
represented as being unique within the Euro-Atlantic community precisely because of the 
scale at which the Croatian armed forces were tested during the 1990s conflict—that is, 
the scale of their own nation-state territory.  However, the way in which territorial 
defense uniquely qualifies Croatia for broader-scale, extra-territorial operations is never 
explicitly spelled out.  Rather, the novelty of a European country having fought on its 
own territory in the post-World War II era is meant to speak for itself. 
A final way in which Croatian government website content worked to construct 
Croatia as a vital international and regional force for reform, peace, and stability was 
alluded to in the previous paragraph.  That is, many texts employed ‘nesting Balkanisms’ 
(Bakić-Hayden, 1995) as a political tactic by juxtaposing positive constructions of 
Croatia with negative constructions of Croatia’s regional other, neighboring Serbia.  This 
was sometimes achieved with sharp references to the Homeland War, such as “we are 
                                                 
16
 Found at http://www.osrh.hr/data/about_en.html.   
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looking towards the future, but we know very well who was the aggressor, and from 
where the war was initiated.
17”  With this clear reference to Serbia’s actions in the war, 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs Jandroković presented Croatia as eager to progress 
beyond past differences and less ‘enlightened’ moments in regional history, precisely by 
portraying Serbia as acting erratically—both in the past, and possibly in the future.  
Indeed, the notion that Serbia has not been able to ‘move on,’ particularly when 
accompanied with references to the ongoing dispute with Kosovo, was used in order to 
allow Croatian elites to make prescriptive statements such as: “If it wants to go forward, 
Serbia must face the legacy of Milošević’s regime.18”  The notion of nesting Balkanisms 
is, in itself, a fundamentally scalar concept, as it evokes a geography of progressive 
scales at which a country or culture is more or less Balkan than its neighbors, depending 
upon the ‘granularity’ with which ones views them. 
 The deployment of nesting Balkanisms served to buttress Croatian political elites’ 
constructions of Croatia as the most progressive, enlightened, and benign presence in the 
region, sustaining an image of Croatia as more ‘Western’ and less ‘Balkan’ than the other 
former Yugoslav republics (Rasza and Lindstrom, 2004).  As this signifies, Balkanism, a 
discourse the West has historically aimed at the countries of Southeastern Europe 
(Todorova, 1997), is sometimes wielded as a political weapon between the countries of 
the region.  This is particularly important in light of the scalar implications of Euro-
                                                 
17
 Quote from speech posted at 
http://www.mvpei.hr/custompages/static/hrv/templates/_frt_govori_en.asp?id=322. 
18
 Quote from speech posted at 
http://www.mvpei.hr/custompages/static/hrv/templates/_frt_govori_en.asp?id=322. 
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Atlantic integration for Croatia.  While the process has essentially reified the Western 
Balkans as an entity to be “dealt with” via the accession processes, it has required 
Croatians to imagine how they would break with the negative legacies of ‘belonging to’ 
this region in order to be worthy of membership in the broader-scale Euro-Atlantic and 
EUropean entities.  Ultimately, though, there has been recognition that the regional-scale 
belonging (to the Western Balkans) will not wane in importance once Croatia becomes a 
fully Euro-Atlantic state, as regional leadership will remain an imperative.  Speaking 
about NATO accession in 2008, former Prime Minister Sanader explicitly employed 
‘Balkanism’ in suggesting a way forward for the region:  "Our common goal must be the 
integration of the entire southeast of Europe with the frameworks of a new undivided 
Europe .... Everything else would be a waste of time and going back to the unwanted 
Balkanisation that has recently been overcome with great difficulty
19
" (emphasis added 
for this essay).   
This quote from Sanader exhibits a rare, explicit use of the term "Balkanization" 
in this period, citing it as the key threat to the region.  Without elaborating on the 
meaning of the term, Sanader invokes a taken-for-granted understanding adopted from 
international usage:  backward, ethnic divisiveness.  The label of "Balkan" is in official 
discourse a perjorative term and signals to Croatian society the un-desirability of 
remaining in the past, a past without NATO or EU membership.  The integration of the 
entire region into Euro-Atlantic frameworks is again represented as the only sane, 
civilized, and peaceful way forward for Southeastern Europe.  At the same time, the 
                                                 
19
 Found at 
http://www.vlada.hr/en/naslovnica/novosti_i_najave/2008/travanj/predsjednik_mesic_i_predsjednik_vlade_
sanader_prijamom_u_nato_hrvatska_u_najelitnijem_svjetskom_klubu.  
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quintessential Euro-Atlantic moral principle of "unity in diversity" is the only vision that 
can save the Balkans from further, violent confrontations. 
 By the time current President Ivo Josipović addressed the Council of Europe in 
June 2010, the rhetoric surrounding Serbia had softened considerably.  This is likely due, 
in part, to the fact that Josipović himself has embodied a more conciliatory stance toward 
the region (for example, he formally apologized to Bosnia for Croatia’s actions in the 
Bosnian conflict shortly after taking office in 2009).  The softer language also seems to 
signal growing awareness on the part of Croatian political elites that directing accusations 
of Balkanism at their regional neighbors could only produce so much political mileage.  
At the Council of Europe, Josipović asserted,  
We are intensively promoting cooperation with our neighbours in order to close 
the painful chapter of recent history and ensure lasting peace and security in the 
region. This is a condition of our progress, but also of the progress of our 
neighbours with whom we share an increasing number of interests and with whom 
we are gradually closing open issues.
20
 
 
More than just another instance of a Croatian official asserting the importance of 
Croatia's example in guiding the other Western Balkan countries toward Euro-Atlantic 
integration, Josipović’s speech also alludes to the idea that leaving behind the region’s 
‘Balkan-ness’ (i.e., the “painful” history explicitly mentioned) is the overarching security 
imperative for Croatia and its neighbors.  This notion of shedding Balkan identity in 
order to gain security exhibits acceptance of the rationale underlying the Euro-Atlantic 
community’s absorption of the Southeastern European region.   
                                                 
20
 Found at http://hub.coe.int/address-by-ivo-josipovic (no longer accessible through Croatian government 
web portal). 
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In cultivating an image of Croatia as a pillar of peace, stability, and 
progressiveness both internationally and in the Southeastern European region, the 
Croatian government has utilized language that seeks to both persuade the Euro-Atlantic 
community that they (Croatians) have internalized the lessons of a difficult recent past 
and to convince domestic audiences about the virtue of leading the Southeastern 
European region into a Euro-Atlantic future.  Simultaneously, decisive action and 
leadership at the nation-state and regional (Western Balkan) scales are presented to 
international audiences as evidence of Croatia’s considerable preparedness to participate 
in governance and the provision of security at the broadest (most global) scales.  A 
primary component of this tactic has been for Croatian elites to draw upon the Homeland 
War experience and represent it as a positive aspect of Croatian history and identity, 
providing Croatia with important assets to offer its Euro-Atlantic partners.  As the next 
section will detail, the Homeland War has also been invoked in a distinct but related 
theme:  tropes of morality and sacrifice in Croatian government discussions of Euro-
Atlantic integration. 
 
Tropes of Secular Morality
21
 and National Sacrifice 
                                                 
21
 The word “secular” is used here to distinguish the present topic from religious, and specifically, Catholic 
morality.  As has been noted by previous scholars (Ramet, 2002; Bellamy, 2003; Bremer, 2008), the 
Roman Catholic Church is an extremely prominent and influential institution in Croatia and thus plays an 
important role in shaping notions of morality in Croatian society.  The sort of morality under analysis here, 
however, is a secular one that has to do with conceptions of loyalty (both to the nation and to Europe) and 
the justness of the 1990s conflict. 
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 In contrast to the previous theme, in which Balkanism (in its pejorative 
understanding of violent divisiveness) was constructed as an identity to be left behind in 
order to enjoy the security of Euro-Atlantic membership, memories of the Homeland War 
have also been selectively invoked in ways that make positive use of Balkanist discourse.   
Whereas the wars of Yugoslav dissolution have largely been viewed by Western actors as 
synonymous with ‘Balkan’ identity:  irrational, backward, and volatile (representing a 
persistent threat to European stability), Croatian political elites have also creatively 
framed the war for independence as moral, just, and consistent with past Croatian 
sacrifices on behalf of the West.   
This section illuminates how the war memories were woven, along with other 
facets of the collective Croatian national experience, into tropes of (secular) morality and 
national sacrifice in government website content.  Ideas of both national suffering and 
national victory were commonly utilized in order to present Croatia as particularly 
virtuous and deserving of membership in the Euro-Atlantic institutions.  Importantly, in 
carving out an outward identity of morality, state elites ostensibly sought a balance in 
portraying Croatia as unique in its collective national experience, and yet, in its values 
and goals, an integral part of Europe, and a society that has always embraced ‘Western’ 
norms of modernity.  As in the previous theme, the evidence presented here suggests a 
scalar hierarchy of characteristics.  Sacrifices at the individual scale in the Homeland War 
create a collective, national-scale virtuousness that makes Croatia particularly suited to 
the ubiquitously-cited yet amorphous scale of the Euro-Atlantic or ‘Western’ space. 
In one news article featured on the main government portal, former P.M. Sanader 
was quoted in underscoring Croatia’s self-reliance during the war, while also carefully 
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acknowledging the contributions of its allies.  Nevertheless, he emphasized, Croatia had 
fought hard for its achievements and for its ‘rightful’ place in Europe, fending off those 
(read: Serbia) who would threaten Croatian territorial integrity:  “‘Croatia has succeeded. 
Croatia will never be the object of others' territorial aspirations,’ Sanader said, adding 
that none of the modern European countries had gone through a more difficult path 
towards independence than Croatia.
22”  At the same time, however, Sanader repeatedly 
emphasized that in terms of its values and vision for the future, Croatia was just like other 
European or Western countries, asserting that “freedom, peace, democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights, national minority rights, a free and responsible market economy - 
these are the values our citizens have opted for when Croatia gained independence.
23
"  
Consistent with the notion of Croatia ‘coming home,’ as quoted from Sanader in the 
introduction to this essay, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and European 
Integration also characterized Euro-Atlantic integration as a natural next step for his 
country because, “as is well known, Croatia has always – in terms of history, culture and 
values – belonged to the community of western democracies.24” 
The simultaneous self-representations of Croatia’s uniqueness in Europe and 
fundamental alignment with European/Western culture have their roots in some of the 
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 Found at http://www.vlada.hr/en/layout/set/print/content/view/full/39003Govor 
predsjednika Vlade dr.sc. Ive Sanadera u Hrvatskom saboru. 
23
 Ibid. 
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 Quote from speech posted at 
http://www.mvpei.hr/custompages/static/hrv/templates/_frt_govori_en.asp?id=322. 
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commonly-cited convictions about Croatian history, identity, and security.  These tenets 
can be found in the introduction to a Croatian history book entitled Hrvatski ratnici kroz 
stoljeća (Croatian Warriors through the Centuries), written by Croatian historians 
Tomislav and Višeslav Aralica.  The introductory chapter itself may be read as an 
exercise in self-representation, as it is presented in Croatian, German, and English (while 
the remaining chapters are presented only in the Croatian language), suggesting that it is 
directed at Western audiences as well as at Croatian readers.   
The security-identity constructions presented in the book connect with those in 
contemporary representations of elite Croatian political discourse.  Asserting that 
Croatian history is, in essence, a military history, the authors emphasize that the warrior 
role has repeatedly been forced upon the Croats (who are never the aggressors) as 
Western European powers have relied on Croatia as a buffer against Eastern incursions 
(most notably from the Ottoman Turks).  In this struggle, they note, “Croatia earned and 
bore, with every right and in all honor, the epithet it had won in blood, an epithet 
admitted by the whole of Europe:  antemurale christianitatis, the Bulwark of 
Christianity” (Aralica and Aralica, 1996: 20).  To many, this role has demanded of 
Croatia significant political and cultural sacrifices:  while large numbers of Croats were 
pressed into military service for, among others, the Venetians, Hungarians, and Austrians, 
these more powerful entities enjoyed adequate security to develop wealth and culture.  
This, the authors claim, explains contemporary Croatia’s ‘backwardness.’  At the same 
time, they note, Croatians have historically demonstrated a great capacity to learn, adapt, 
and innovate, embracing Western European values and cultures, but also developing their 
own artistic, philosophical, and architectural traditions (Aralica and Aralica, 1996). 
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The narrative of sacrificing national security and development for the benefit of 
Western neighbors has also tinged relations with Slovenia, the country to Croatia’s 
immediate West.  This has been particularly evident throughout the Euro-Atlantic 
integration process, in which the Slovenians, who historically were spared much of the 
‘buffer’ role and more recently avoided the worst of the violence in the 1990s, outpaced 
Croatia to both NATO and EU accession in 2004.  On the one hand, the two countries 
have shared an affinity of common historical closeness to Western political and economic 
structures due to their location in the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Woodward, 1993).  
However, Slovenia’s speedy integration process has created some political and cultural 
distance between it and Croatia, as Croatia has, at times, joined the other Western Balkan 
states in a pattern of simultaneously resenting and aiming to emulate Slovenia 
(Lindstrom, 2008).  For their part, Slovenian political elites acted to shed their 
‘Balkanness’ by promoting their country as the crucial interlocutor between Europe and 
the Balkans, yet from a position unquestionably within Europe (Rupel, 2001). 
In the Slovenian-Croatian border dispute, which temporarily blockaded Croatia’s 
accession negotiations with the EU, Croatian political elites sought to contradict such 
Slovenian self-representations by defining Croatia’s position and actions as more in line 
with European values and culture.  In June 2009, just three months prior to a 
breakthrough in Croatian-Slovenian relations which finally unblocked Croatia’s entry 
talks, Croatia’s then Prime Minister Sanader made a statement during a government 
session (publicized in a press release on the government web portal)  that characterized 
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Slovenia’s behavior as “using its EU member status as blackmail.”25  Sanader went on to 
assert that this is “unacceptable and non-European behavior,” calling on Slovenia to 
“stop with it and lend a helping hand to Croatia in its membership talks.”26  In this rather 
overt effort to cast Slovenian practices as ‘non-European,’ Sanader was, of course, 
simultaneously casting Croatia’s practices as ‘European.’  These characterizations of the 
situation made rather pointed, albeit implicit, equations of European-ness with behavior 
that is moral, ethical, and civilized. 
 Another key sub-theme within the tropes of morality and national sacrifice was 
the way in which the individual and national scales were linked in Croatian government 
website content.  Within this sub-theme, the actions of soldiers, firemen, police officers, 
and other ‘heroic’ figures in the Homeland War were frequently held up as examples of 
ideal behavior for all Croatian citizens, and a key factor in Croatia’s successful invitation 
(and eventual accession) to NATO.  On March 31, 2009, just one day before Croatia’s 
official joining of NATO, a ceremony was held to memorialize the eighteenth 
anniversary of the Plitvice Action, in which Josip Jović became the first officially 
recognized victim of the Homeland War.  A press release on the Ministry of Defense 
website reported on the memorial ceremony, explaining, 
In their addresses all speakers emphasized the dimension of the sacrifice of the 
first Croatian policeman and the importance of preserving the value of the 
Homeland war, and memories of all Croatian victims…If there were not their 
deeds, Croatia would not achieve its goals,’ Jadranka Kosor said, adding that the 
sacrifice of Jović proved that the Homeland War was just, defensive and 
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 Press release retrieved from 
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liberating….Noting that Jović was one of about fifteen thousand of Croatian 
victims fallen in the war, [Defense] Minister Vukelić concluded that they were 
merit for the upcoming Croatia's joining NATO.
27
  
 
In this way, government actors overtly connected the sacrifice of individuals’ deaths in 
the Homeland War to the integrity of Croatia’s conduct of the hostilities, using the image 
of victimized bodies to vindicate the actions of the state.  Moreover, all of this is 
intertwined with notions of Croatia’s rightful place in NATO, and NATO membership as 
the ultimate way to make sense of the deaths of individual Croatians.  As Defense 
Minister Vukelić concluded at the memorial ceremony that day, “Joining NATO is our 
debt to knights who have built their lives in the foundation of the Croatian freedom.
28”  
Here, NATO accession is represented by Vukelić as an act of national gratitude and 
reverence for the long-ago sacrifices of Croatian knights.  This constructs Euro-Atlantic 
integration as the natural and obvious culmination of Croatia's 'centuries-old dream' 
(Bellamy, 2003) of independence, sovereignty, and a deservedly strong position on the 
international stage.  The narrative of brave Croatian knights (historically) and selfless 
contemporary Croatian soldiers emphasizes the idea that at a national scale, Croatia has 
always comprised individuals who possess the needed values to strengthen the relations 
of international security governance at the Euro-Atlantic scale. 
Finally, messages about values such as selflessness were connected to the 
individual scale in discussions of Croatian national identity.  This mutual construction of 
morality between the national and individual scales of identity was evident in a Croatia 
in Focus story about a speech Sanader made to a group of Croatian-Americans in New 
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York City.  The speech, and its prominent positioning in the official government bulletin, 
seemed to be aimed as much at audiences within Croatia as it was at members of the 
Croatian diaspora.  In discussing “a new paradigm of being Croat,” Sanader said that it 
“transcended historical divisions in the Croatian nation, was oriented towards the future 
and always put national interests above party interests and politics.
29”  In this way, 
individual Croatians—whether within the Croatian state or within the diaspora—were 
encouraged to support the government’s goals and imperatives of Euro-Atlantic 
integration to raise its international profile.   
Also in these explicit overtures to the Croatian Diaspora, the above news story 
featured Sanader’s expressions of gratitude to Croatian Americans for their help to 
Croatia during the Homeland War, stressing that Croatia would not be in the UN Security 
Council or on its way to NATO and EU membership if it had not been for the unity of 
Croats living in Croatia and the emigrant community.  Such overtures to the Croatian 
diaspora in the United States constitute a key aspect of the multi-scalar geopolitical 
practice of self-representation, as they provide a platform for reaching an audience that is 
at once both international and domestic, as many members of Croatian communities 
outside of Croatia retain strong ties to political processes in the country.  At the same 
time, these active communities also provide a link to a key Euro-Atlantic partner, the 
United States.  The diaspora, in this sense, makes the Croatian nation itself multi-scalar, 
which shapes the discursive strategies of elites of the Croatian state when conjuring 
representations for the international community. 
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While the support of Croatian Americans does not necessarily present a fraught 
issue, the sacrifices of veterans of the Homeland War (literally called “branitelji” or 
“defenders” in the Croatian language) have constituted a particular challenge for Croatian 
political elites throughout the Euro-Atlantic integration process.  As a group, these 
veterans have occupied a special place in society in general, and in rhetoric about Euro-
Atlantic integration more specifically, where they are held up as heroes of the nation who 
have made Croatia’s Euro-Atlantic moment possible.  For example, Josipović stated in 
his 2010 Council of Europe address that the achievement of full Euro-Atlantic 
membership would fulfill “the hopes of all the citizens who invested everything they had 
into the process of creation of our state, from their ideals, strength and physical strength 
to their most valuable resource - their own lives.”30  This statement connects the morality 
of the Homeland War, or the fight for an independent Croatia, to the morality of the 
Euro-Atlantic imperative itself, in a way that seeks to obscure international misgivings 
about Croatia’s conduct in the war, while also convincing Croatians at home that a Euro-
Atlantic Croatia is, indeed, the sort of Croatia they or their loved ones fought for.   
However, this narrative was complicated by the fact that a key condition for 
accession both to NATO and to the EU was to turn the famed war generals Gotovina and 
Markac over to the ICTY in the Hague.  When the generals received a guilty verdict in 
2011, Croatian leaders were put in the difficult position of responding in a way that 
would not anger the Euro-Atlantic community, but would satisfy outraged Croatian 
citizens—that is, a multi-scalar discursive strategy was quite clearly needed in addressing 
this outcome.  Hence, Josipović quickly assured the Croatian public that the verdict 
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would not “bring into question the legality of Homeland War, or Operation Storm31,” 
while Jadranka Kosor asserted, “We are not afraid. We are proud of our victory.”32  Over 
time, the convictions of Generals Gotovina and Markac came to be viewed as another 
national sacrifice necessary to secure Croatia’s place in the Euro-Atlantic community33, 
though their subsequent, successful appeal has overturned the ICTY’s original decision.  
The common tropes of morality and sacrifice around Homeland War veterans continue to 
feature prominently in official government documents and rhetoric, as the current 
“Government Program” released by the newly elected government in December 2011 
asserted:  “The government has determined the Homeland war was a defensive and just 
war …We will not repeal or even diminish a single right [accorded] to the participants 
and victims of the Homeland War” (author’s translation).34   
Thus far, the essay has focused upon the more cultural, identity, and values-
oriented aspects of self-representation in Croatian government narratives of Euro-Atlantic 
integration.  These may all be viewed as constituting geopolitical logics that reflect, on 
the one hand, the ways in which the integration process reifies a metageography of 
hierarchical scale; and on the other, the multi-scalar strategies that guide the rhetoric of 
political elites in the accession process.  The third and final theme presents a more 
pragmatic and ‘rational’ side to the self-representations found on government websites, 
that which I will refer to as geoeconomic logics.  The geoeconomic reasoning employed 
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in discussions of Euro-Atlantic integration certainly does not exist in isolation from the 
geopolitical reasoning, and indeed the two can be seen to converge to produce the 
representations explored in the following section.  Moreover, as with the above themes, 
the geoeconomic logics are tinged with a pervasive sense of hierarchical scale, not only 
with regard to security regimes, but also with regard to a concept of nested economies—
nation-state, regional, and global. 
 
Geoeconomic Logics Underlying Security Integration 
 The apparent ongoing shift from geopolitical reasoning to geoeconomic reasoning 
in international affairs (Cowen, 2010; Cowen and Smith, 2009; Mercille, 2008) has 
meant a decreased emphasis on exclusively geopolitical concerns, such as the creation 
and defense of nation-state territories, and a growing emphasis upon the marketization 
and neoliberalization of national governments’ activities—both within their borders and 
in international affairs (Cowen and Smith, 2009).  Many aspects of Euro-Atlantic 
enlargement in general, and Croatia’s Euro-Atlantic integration in particular, which is 
taking place in a post-conflict and post-communist context, may be viewed through this 
lens.  While this phenomenon is most striking in discussions of NATO accession (as 
NATO contains a much less overt economic remit than does the EU), the online texts 
repeatedly pointed out that the security and stability fostered by NATO membership are 
crucial to the increased economic activities (tourism, trade, and foreign direct investment) 
that accompany EU candidacy and accession.  Moreover, geoeconomic reasoning is 
highly relevant to the idea of EU expansion as a securitizing process, as the original 
rationale behind the EU was security and stability achieved through economic 
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interdependence.  Given the representations highlighted in the previous sections, Croatian 
political elites have readily sought to demonstrate to the international community that the 
logic of intertwining economic and security imperatives has been thoroughly internalized 
at the national scale.  Hence, Croatia is presented as a ready and responsible player in the 
broader security regime of Euro-Atlantic institutions, but also in global neoliberal 
capitalism.  
Many of these ideas were evident in the military and security documents found on 
Croatian government websites.  The Strategic Defense Review, as well as the Croatian 
Armed Forces Long-Term Development Plan, both discussed the decreasing importance 
of what they called “the individual, territorially-based self-defense concept” in favor of a 
collective, multinational notion of security.  Moreover, the newer, collective notion of 
security was promoted alongside admissions that the security environment for Croatia 
and for the rest of Europe is quite favorable at this time.  However, an expanded notion of 
security recognizes the contemporary nature of global capitalism, in which any potential 
member of the Euro-Atlantic security regime must be competitive.  In the context of 
NATO and EU accession, this has meant demonstrating that from the scale of the 
individual citizen to that of the nation-state, Croatia has adopted the necessary geo-
strategic thinking in order to maintain stability in the Western Balkan region and to fulfill 
the promise of security via integration.  Thus, what I found in discussions of NATO on 
Croatian government websites was an overriding emphasis of the economic gains 
associated with a multinational security apparatus.   
I do not wish to argue that this is, at its core, an economically-driven process, with 
the cultural appeals used solely to build and maintain support for geoeconomic strategies.  
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Rather, the geoeconomic reasoning that featured prominently in much of the web content 
consulted for this project suggests that the lines between political and economic 
rationales (which have never been distinctly separate considerations, anyway) are 
increasingly blurred in the political rhetoric surrounding integration.  In keeping with the 
scope of this essay, I will explore this reasoning as a significant part of the multi-scalar 
practices of self-representation on the part of the Croatian government.  These practices 
have tailored messages for both domestic and international audiences and exhibit the sort 
of worldview that international and supra-national integration entrenches:  a security 
landscape in which practices at “lower” scales must complement and support the needs of 
“higher” scales, such as the EU and the broader Euro-Atlantic community.  In short, this 
seemed to be a way in which the government demonstrated that it can now reason and 
speak in terms of the neoliberlization and marketization that continue to transform the 
conduct of international relations.  As has been pointed out, this transformation has, in 
large part, involved the marketization of military and security apparatuses (Cowen and 
Smith, 2009). 
 Interestingly, much of the discussion of the intersection of economic prosperity 
and military or physical security echoed similar discussions found in European Defense 
Agency bulletins posted on the European Union website.  The key similarity is the way in 
which a circular logic seems to be applied to defense integration in both cases, where 
economic development is presented as being integral to military security, but at the same 
time, military security is set up as the indispensible precursor to economic development.  
For example, the Strategic Defense Review lists among Croatia’s security objectives “the 
establishment of an economically well-off, stable society that will in the long-term be 
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able to build and sustain effective security mechanisms,
35” suggesting that economic 
stability and prosperity must precede new mechanisms for physical or military security.   
 At the same time, however, when aiming to persuade the Croatian public that 
NATO accession was a good and proper goal for Croatia, government leaders would 
often deploy arguments such as: “Croatia's admission to NATO would mean that the 
national economy is considered to be in line with leading world economies and safe for 
doing business and making investments,
36” and “Apart from their mutual trade, member-
countries can engage in trade with NATO as an organization.
37”  This latter statement is 
also significant in that it seems to indicate that Croatia may seek to develop a more robust 
military-industrial complex as part of its new defense identity within NATO and eventual 
membership in an increasingly securitized European Union.  The June 2010 military 
cooperation agreement signed with Serbia, which largely hinges on potential cooperation 
between the countries’ military industries, also speaks to this development.  These 
arguments highlight the scalar logic of a competitive national economy nested within the 
broader regional and global economies, but they also recognize the Euro-Atlantic 
community (embodied in NATO as an organization) as a new, regional scale of economic 
activity. 
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 Ultimately, it seems that the reframing of NATO’s raison d’être at a 
supranational scale—from a purely military alliance into a movement associated with 
peace, democratization, and legitimate European-ness (Kuus, 2009; Baran, 2004; Gheciu, 
2008)—has prompted shifts in the self-representations mobilized by the Croatian 
government.  Such shifts were evident in various online texts which repeatedly pointed to 
the ubiquitous role of NATO in Croatian everyday life:  a guarantor of security, a force 
for modernization, and a mechanism for economic growth and stability.  In much the 
same way, Croatia’s transformation for NATO was represented in very sweeping terms, 
with the online government bulletin noting, “Croatia’s reform achievements are 
irreversible. Not only have the defense and national security sectors undergone reforms, 
but the whole of Croatian society has been deeply changed as well.
38”   
The reference to the deep changes in Croatian society implies shifts in values and 
behavior at the individual scale—in other words, that individual Croatians have 
internalized and accepted the new, vital role that the alliance was to play in their lives.  
The need for individuals to embody the new Euro-Atlantic principals in everyday life has 
remained a key part of Croatian political rhetoric, as when President Josipović observed 
in 2010,  
Transition of a society based on planned economy into a democratic and free 
society distinguished by rule of law and the free market is a project of major scale 
and distant horizons. It calls for the effort of all social structures, all citizens and 
of every individual regardless of his position on the social ladder.
39
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Josipović was, in this quote, connecting the task of establishing these 'Western' principles 
of security, freedom, and free market capitalism to individuals at all scales and all sectors 
of society.  This can be read as an effort to instill a sense of responsibility and ownership 
over economic reforms in individuals; in other words, constructing a neoliberal notion of 
citizenship within Croatian society. 
As an update on the status of the NATO accession process, published in the April 
2008 Croatia in Focus, noted, “so far, there have been numerous activities across the 
country to inform and educate the public, which have reached out to all groups within the 
Croatian society.
40”  Additional sources noted that the public has been continuously made 
aware of how NATO membership would enhance their country’s status as a prime tourist 
destination and recipient of foreign direct investments.  Hence, it seems that the process 
of NATO accession has included the attempted construction of a new kind of neoliberal 
subject in Croatia, one who views the goal of economic security as being inextricably 
linked with the imperative of membership in the world’s most powerful military alliance.  
Further evidence of neoliberal subject formation can be seen in an economic initiative 
presented in the June 2008 edition of Croatia in Focus.  The article explained: 
The Department for Bilateral Economic Relations, International Economic Co-
operation Board of the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European 
Integration estimated that the experience and knowledge gained in mine clearance 
of the Croatian territory could be used for starting the project ˝Mine Clearance as 
export product˝…This Counseling on mine clearance as Croatian export product 
was welcomed as a step forward in defining Croatian economic diplomacy needed 
for Croatian companies for moving into a foreign market.
41
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This initiative is interesting in that it takes a security issue that quite clearly connects with 
an aspect of the ‘Balkan’ legacy—that is, the problem of land mines remaining in the 
country in the post-conflict era—and re-envisions it as the sort of economic opportunity 
that would be applauded by the Euro-Atlantic community.  The scalar underpinnings to 
this project are clear:  what was previously a regional and local problem is now an added 
opening into the global economy for entrepreneurial Croatians. 
In sum, the “Mine clearance as export product” initiative, as well as the other 
exemplars in this section, indicate the intertwining of Balkanism, security imperatives, 
and neoliberal subject formation, as the Croatian government voices the importance of 
finding market value in security and humanitarian activities, as well as the need to think 
entrepreneurially about Croatia's recent war experience.  The inclusion of geoeconomic 
logics in Croatian elites’ discursive strategies in the Euro-Atlantic integration process 
further illustrates the importance of multi-scalar geopolitical practices in an accession 
country.  The quotes captured in this section point to a heightened awareness on the part 
of Croatian political leaders that they must prove their society’s readiness for the 
neoliberal security regime of the Euro-Atlantic community, while at the same time 
demonstrating to the domestic audience the multiple benefits of membership in the 
community:  enhanced freedom, security, and prosperity for all. 
 
Conclusion 
 This essay demonstrates that a key aim of Croatian elites’ discursive strategies has 
been to represent Croatia as already straddling the boundary between the Euro-Atlantic 
community and ‘everyone else’ by virtue of an historical legacy of defending ‘Western’ 
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values, which was reprised in the recent war for independence.  This challenge to a rigid 
inside/outside metageography of Euro-Atlantic space is especially possible for the 
Croatian government, given the central characteristic of Balkanism or Balkan identity:  
the Balkans as Europe’s partial other, situated in a liminal space that is neither fully 
European, nor fully un-European.  However, unlike the cases of Bulgaria and Romania 
expounded upon by Papadimitriou and Gateva (2009), the Western Balkan countries have 
had to contend with the added challenge of an ongoing post-conflict reconciliation 
process.     
The three empirical themes identified:  Croatia as a regional leader and 
international example; tropes of morality and national sacrifice; and the intertwining of 
geoeconomics and security imperatives, all reveal the close relationship between 
Balkanism and securitization that has undergirded the self-representations of the Croatian 
government throughout the Euro-Atlantic integration process.  Diverging from the 
Balkanist discourses of the 1990s, the new strategies of self-representation borne out of 
the Euro-Atlantic integration process rarely directly use the terms “Balkan,” “Balkans,” 
or “Balkanist.”  However, rather than signifying a new cultural repertoire, the themes 
identified in this study show that Balkan-ness remains present in Croatian political elites’ 
discursive strategies, but is invoked only implicitly.  It is alluded to in the ways in which 
contemporary Croatia is represented vis-à-vis both its former self and its neighbors, as a 
foil against which the Croatian government can now showcase its new, responsible 
international role and ‘lessons learned’ from its not-so-distant ‘Balkan’ past. 
 The thematic analysis demonstrates how multi-scalar geopolitical representations 
require a delicate balancing act between discursive strategies.  On the one hand, Croatian 
125 
 
political elites must persuade their citizens that full Euro-Atlantic membership is a 
worthy goal through which they will strengthen their security (national, economic, and 
otherwise) and identity.  On the other hand, they must do so in ways that occasionally run 
the risk of displeasing ‘Western’ governments, as when Croatian political leaders reacted 
to the convictions of Generals Gotovina and Markac.  Interestingly, while moderate 
Croatian political actors from all major parties have tended to be  pro-EU/NATO and 
draw upon moments in Croatian history such as the Homeland War experience to make 
their case, these same factors are key to certain brands of Euroskepticism found within 
the more right-wing and nationalistic political parties and interest groups (Stojic, 2006).  
Also, it should be noted that despite the constant barrage of messages from the 
government about the necessity of full membership in the Euro-Atlantic community, 
there has been substantial skepticism amongst Croatian youth about the costs—economic 
and otherwise—of Euro-Atlantic integration (Kersan-Škabic and Tomić, 2009). 
Given Krajina’s (2009) findings, we may speculate that the discursive strategies 
of elites in Croatia and other countries in Europe’s liminal spaces are profoundly 
affirming for EU officials who fret over the perpetual instability of a European identity.  
It must be quite helpful, in the face of constant challenges to a concretized European 
identity, to have aspirant ‘members of the family’ continually and adamantly proclaim, in 
very positive terms, what it means to be ‘Euro-Atlantic’ and to be ‘European.’   My 
findings, in some respects, show the exercise of agency on the part of political leaders in 
an accession country, but this agency is, of course, only partial.  While the elites are 
finding their own strategies for coping with the ‘Balkan’ legacy that has dogged their 
country throughout its accession process, they are always negotiating their security and 
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identity imperatives within the parameters of what is acceptable, important, and required 
in the eyes of the Euro-Atlantic community.  Because they are ostensibly embedded in a 
hierarchy of political scales, and ever more so with increasing Euro-Atlantic integration, 
they are continually compelled to see their own practices and rhetorics as consequential 
to relations with “broader scales” of political and economic organization, be it NATO or 
the EU. 
Through the lens of the security-identity nexus, we can see that Croatian leaders 
guiding the country through NATO and EU accession have selectively engaged with 
Balkan identity, alternately mobilizing it in both positive and negative ways.  It remains 
to be seen how future leaders will wield this carefully crafted image in order to influence 
international affairs once full Euro-Atlantic membership is achieved.  But perhaps in light 
of this pending Euro-Atlantic status, a question that is more theoretical in nature should 
be raised.  Specifically, to what extent is it helpful to conceptualize the geopolitical 
practices of political elites in an accession society as multi-scalar?  While the analysis 
clearly suggests that political elites undergoing the accession process operate as everyday 
realists when it comes to hierarchical, vertical scales, there is also a sense that the 
accession process reinforces a metageography of inside and outside Euro-Atlantic space.  
Whether these are competing or complementary conceptualizations of geopolitical 
practices in the Euro-Atlantic integration process is a compelling theoretical question to 
be taken up in subsequent research, particularly when the goal is informing policy-
makers who are navigating these dynamic political geographies. 
The findings of this essay also suggest additional implications for the forging of 
new political identities, and the interplay between existing and emerging subjectivities.  
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The extent to which elites, and the everyday citizens at which their rhetoric is targeted, 
continue to operate within a scalar metageography, almost certainly shapes their nested 
sense of memberships in various political collectives.  In one sense, there is the less-
defined conception of a Euro-Atlantic community in which Croatians have gained 
membership, and with which they are meant to identify, in order to support, among other 
things, the use of their troops in NATO missions abroad.  In another sense, there is the 
(largely) supra-national collective of the European Union, with which Croatians, along 
with all other EU citizens, are intended to identify increasingly both as they gain full 
membership, and as European integration deepens over time.   
But as the analysis above shows, the international community has required a 
continued sense of identification with a regional collective—that of the Western 
Balkans—in order for Croatia to successfully integrate into the broader-scale entities.  
Indeed, the integration process, which has called on Croatia to be a leader to its region, 
has profoundly reified the regional scale in this way.  And finally, there is the continued 
sense of identification with the Croatian nation-state, the prism through which all of the 
other memberships and identities have been represented to Croatians.  Thus, for an 
“accession society” such as Croatia, the embrace of multiple, scalar political identities is 
deeply important.  Additional, ethnographic research is required to investigate the ways 
in which this construction and reification of nested identities is shaping an emerging 
“EUropean” subjectivity in Croatia.  Particularly at a time when the EU’s cohesion is 
continually threatened by the ongoing sovereign debt crisis, the interplay between 
identity, subjectivity, and governance in existing and future member states will be 
increasingly important to understand. 
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 This essay has illustrated the important ways in which political elites’ discursive 
strategies bolstered the imperatives and agendas of Euro-Atlantic security governance in 
the course of Croatia’s Euro-Atlantic integration process.  The dominant security-identity 
discourses analyzed in this research illustrate how the Euro-Atlantic is actively 
constructed as a key scale of geopolitical belonging, while at the same time, the 
commonly taken-for-granted scales of national, regional, and global are often reified.  
The following chapter, which presents the third and final empirical essay, provides a 
more grounded view how multi-level governance and identity intersect in Croatia’s 
accession process. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
“GEESE IN THE FOG”: CONSTRUCTING THE EURO-ASPIRANT SUBJECT 
IN CROATIA  
 
This essay presents a “peopled” investigation of the European Union accession 
project in Croatia.  Utilizing semi-structured interviews, participant observation, focus 
groups, and document analysis, the research traces a process of political subject 
formation that recreates Croatian citizens as citizens who aspire to membership in the 
EU.  Of central concern are the contested processes of knowledge production and 
consumption that aim to inform and persuade citizens about the imperative of EU 
accession.  The work bridges the body of political geographic literature on the everyday 
geographies of the nation-state with the burgeoning literature on identities and 
cosmopolitanism in Europe.  The findings highlight the relations of governance in 
Croatia’s EU accession, revealing how the process of subject formation, which is part and 
parcel of the process of accession, relies on the deployment of potent identity binaries, 
primarily that of Balkan vs. Cosmopolitan.  The essay concludes by reflecting on the 
fraught relationship between power/knowledge and political subjectivities, and the 
implications of this relationship for the multi-level governance of Europe’s Eastern 
enlargement. 
 
Introduction 
In the years 2010 to 2012, during which the research for this essay was conducted, 
conversations with people in Croatia would occasionally include the expression “like 
geese in the fog.”  It was used to evoke the sense that Croatian society was barreling 
130 
 
toward something rather blindly.   That something, of course, was the key foreign policy 
goal to which Croatians were told they, as a society, were aspiring:  accession to the 
European Union.  As with any other major policy outcome, the responsible institutions 
(those of the EU and of Croatian government and civil society) were hard at work for 
roughly a decade informing and persuading individual citizens about the importance of 
this project.  In practice, this meant taking the notion of Croatia joining the EU and 
reframing it as the notion of the Croatian citizen becoming an EU citizen.  However, as 
this essay reveals, this was far from a straightforward process of disseminating facts to 
the public.  It instead unfolded as a profoundly contested process of negotiating 
knowledge, with pervasive and dichotomous conceptions of identity shaping the 
production and consumption of information about the EU.  From this process, we learn 
how European integration, a profound reconfiguration of political geography, requires the 
practices and relations of governance to shape sense of self for citizens of an accession 
country. 
The process of European Union enlargement over the last several decades 
provides a surfeit of evidence that within any given candidate country, multiple positions 
exist within governments and across public opinion regarding EU accession.  Yet, the 
mere prospect of EU membership, however likely or unlikely it may be for a particular 
country, or how distant a possibility, inevitably makes that country into a “candidate,” 
“potential candidate,” “accession,” or “EUro-aspirant” country.  Although media 
coverage of EU affairs, along with statements from the EU itself and from the 
government of the country in question, make it seem as though the progression from 
country to “candidate country” occurs instantaneously, with a meeting of EU leaders, or 
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with the signing of an accession agreement, a country must be constructed as an 
accession country.  More fundamentally, the construction is not of a country but of an 
accession society.  As the existing literature on EU enlargement shows, the process of 
constructing the accession society unfolds in a number of ways:  through the 
Europeanization of political party systems, (Innes, 2001; Vachudova, 2006; Fink-Hafner, 
2007; Kuzio, 2008) through policy debates amongst political elites and within the media, 
(Lindstrom, 2008; Obad, 2008; Krajina, 2009) and through efforts of subject formation 
aimed at everyday citizens (Kuus, 2004, 2007a, and 2009; Jeffrey, 2008 and 2011). 
A society is composed of individuals and their group affiliations.  Hence, an 
accession society requires the construction of a particular form of political subject.  It is 
the process of subject formation that is of central concern to this essay, in ways that are, 
as of yet, relatively neglected in the afore-cited scholarship.  As with previous work 
(especially Kuus, 2004, 2007a and 2009), the present project is interested in how the 
process of informing everyday citizens about the European Union is carried out.  It pays 
careful attention to the ways in which the EU and candidate country government 
communicate the meaning of the accession project and its relationship to the needs and 
interests of candidate country citizens.  This essay builds on the existing literature by 
exploring how knowledge and information about the EU are negotiated by the very 
citizens who are the target of EU and government messages.  The essay seeks to answer 
the question of how the process of EUropean subject formation is carried out and 
achieved (or partially achieved) by deploying multifaceted conceptions of identity.  It 
does so through an ethnography of the state, in which both governmental bureaucracy and 
civil society are observed in carrying out the work of subject formation in Croatia, the 
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country that is next in line to join the European Union.  However, the participants 
included in the study are not elites, but rather the everyday citizens who comprise the 
agencies and organizations of the state and civil society.  While these individuals were 
often involved in the work of informing the wider public about EU accession and 
membership, they were also themselves negotiating the information and debating 
Croatia’s EUropean future through the lens of identity. 
Through ‘peopling’ Croatia’s accession process, the study finds that beneath the 
perpetual debate about the reliability and completeness of knowledge about the EU, 
citizens are located between the promise of cosmopolitanism and the legacies of 
Balkanism.  In the end, it is this potent binary of identities that comes to the fore in the 
(re)construction of Croatia as an accession society.  In this way, the essay adds to the 
existing literatures on ethnography of the state and Europeanization by tracing the ways 
in which bureaucratic knowledge intersects with historical layers of identity in the latest, 
and dynamic, spaces of Europe’s Eastern enlargement.  It is not so much promises of the 
future that drive the accession process, but specters of a European, or in this case 
specifically Balkan, past. 
 
The State, Governance, and Integration 
The recent focus in both academic and policy spheres on the reorganization of 
geopolitical space, has led to the oft-cited assumption that the nation-state is declining in 
importance, while supra-nationalism and international integration are viewed as 
phenomena that will increasingly characterize relationships between individuals and their 
socio-political collectives in the coming decades (Popescu, 2008; Jönsson, Tägil, and 
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Törnqvist, 2000; Häkli, 2001; Brenner, et al., 2003).  European Union enlargement is 
frequently noted in the literature as the case par excellence of such reorganizations of 
geopolitical space (Beck, 2009).  But just what is happening to the individuals who are 
supposedly undergoing these tectonic shifts in their socio-political collectives?  What, 
fundamentally, mobilizes potential citizens of the EU to identify with—and feel 
connected to—the accession project?  The pursuit of these questions requires a deep 
theorization of the state and of governance in the contemporary experience of 
globalization, supra-nationalism, and cosmopolitanism. 
Political geography, broadly speaking, is presently dominated by the 
constructivist approaches to the state hailing from political sociology.  ‘Stateless’ state 
theories hold that the state arises as a political effect (the ‘state idea’) from institutional 
practices and relations (Abrams, 1988; Mitchell, 1991).  This conceptualization offers a 
non-foundational mode of theorizing state power in social-political phenomena.  State 
power, in this line of thought, derives from the activities of, and linkages between, 
diverse institutions and individuals that align to (re)produce the popular notion that there 
is a state, which stands apart from, and acts upon the sphere of society. The corollary to 
this belief in a separate state sphere is that we tend to imbue it with the trappings of 
personhood or ‘actorness,’ such as an identity, intentionality, and ability to act (Mitchell, 
1991 and 1999; Painter, 2005; Painter, 2006).   
The growing tendency in the literature to disrupt the state/society binary has led to 
anthropological approaches to the study of state power, with a focus on how the state is 
lived and experienced (Megoran, 2006; Sharma and Gupta, 2006; Mountz, 2007; Kuus, 
2011).  These approaches advocate documenting the everyday interactions between 
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ordinary people and the institutions and actors who ostensibly represent a distinct state 
sphere.  With this trend has emerged fresh emphasis on governance over government, in 
ways that aim to examine state power while avoiding reproduction of structuralist, 
foundational, or Westphalian notions of the state (Jessop, 2001; Brenner, et. al, 2003; 
Bialasiewicz, 2008). 
In contemporary EU studies, this increasing focus on governance has led to 
conceptualizations of ‘multi-level governance.’  Political economy investigations of 
multi-level governance consider the ways in which new scalar forms of governance arise 
with the deepening of EU integration. More broadly, the theorization of governance in 
the neo-Marxist tradition, including regulation theory, sees a shift from scalar hierarchies 
of authority to networks as a key historical progression at the heart of the shift from 
government to governance (Jessop, 1998 and 2001; Brenner, 1997; MacLeod and 
Goodwin, 1999; Brenner, et. al, 2003).  This shift is viewed as an actually occurring 
change in the form and function of political-economic structures.  In this perspective, the 
current ‘reality’ of governance is that of heterarchy: “self-organized steering of multiple 
agencies, institutions, and systems which are operationally autonomous from one another 
yet structurally coupled because of their interdependence” (Jessop, 1998: 29).  However, 
as Murphy (2008: 12) notes, the crucial interplay of these new forms of multi-level 
governance with conceptions of identity has so far merited far less attention, a lacuna that 
this essay seeks to address
42
. 
                                                 
42
 See also Wilson (2012) for discussion of the importance of ideology at the national scale to the 
relationship between poly-scalar governances and economic development. 
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Governance is particularly important as a framing concept for this study, as the 
project seeks to break with the notion that European integration is something that states 
‘do’ to societies.  Building upon the dominant conceptualization of the state in 
contemporary international relations and political geography, we can no longer be 
satisfied with viewing the integration process as something that governmental 
bureaucracy, or the ‘state proper,’ enacts.  As the introduction notes, there can be no 
“candidate country” without the successful construction of a society that ostensibly 
desires accession, what I term the “EUro-aspirant society.”  In many cases, as in Croatia, 
the case explored in this essay, that aspiration is manifested in the official instrument of 
the referendum on accession to the EU.  But as recent developments in Croatia show, this 
outcome was the culmination of a long process of informing and persuading Croatian 
citizens about the importance of EU membership.   
As the empirical sections below demonstrate, many diverse actors within a 
particular country carry out the hard work of reconstructing it as a “candidate country,” 
or, more accurately, an “accession society.”  These actors may be located anywhere on 
the spectrum
43
 of state/society space.  Indeed, in democratic systems, policy outcomes are 
achieved because many actors beyond governmental bureaucracy share the vocabularies 
and understandings of policy makers (Sharma and Gupta, 2006).  What emerges from the 
fieldwork is a telling narrative of the debate over what counts as “information,” who is 
                                                 
43
 I wish to emphasize “spectrum” here so as to avoid reproducing the hard binary of state and society.  
While I contend that the delineation of state/society spheres is itself an effect of political power, I do not 
deny that we can point to more or less governmental and nongovernmental arenas, whose boundary is 
unstable and fluid and requires constant maintenance (Abrams, 1988). 
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responsible for “informing,” and how various identities influence where individuals 
locate themselves in this process of information and persuasion.  As the empirics show, 
the identities are largely shaped by the legacies of the distant and recent experiences of 
Croatia and the former Yugoslavia.  Further, these identities provide an object around 
which the practices and relations of governance (a phenomenon riddled with internal 
incoherence and contradiction) can coalesce.  Hence, the dynamic governance process, 
involving heterogeneous actors, leads toward the formation of particular subjectivities 
and beliefs that draw upon existing and emerging identities. 
 
Information and Subject Formation 
This essay synthesizes questions of governance with questions of subject 
formation in a critical examination of the policy process—or more specifically, the aspect 
of the policy process whereby the policy is promoted, debated, and contested amongst 
those who will be affected by it.  In this conceptual schema, multi-level governance is 
examined as the mechanism by which a particular policy outcome (in this case, EU 
accession) is achieved.  A particular strategy of this governance is that of subject 
formation.  In order to construct the properly EUro-aspirant society, citizens must be 
constructed as EUropean subjects who are capable of identifying as citizens of both 
Croatia and the European Union.   
Much like the study of multi-level governance, the bulk of scholarship on policy 
mobilities and transfers has taken a rather instrumental approach, in which producers and 
consumers of policy ideas engage in a process of rationally choosing between clear 
policy choices, with the best option winning out (Peck and Theodore, 2010).  But with a 
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new strain of critical policy studies emerging in political geography and related fields, the 
orthodoxy is ebbing in favor of more anthropological approaches to the study of policy 
making, in which policy makers are seen as complex actors straddling multiple arenas, 
and policy consumers are not passive, but rather active interpreters, negotiators, and 
contributors to policy dialogues themselves (Dunn, 2007; Kuus, 2007; Jeffrey, 2008; 
Larner and Laurie, 2010).  The aspect of the policy process documented in this essay, in 
which the wider public is “informed about”—and persuaded to accept through 
referendum—a particular policy outcome, involves a large degree of contradiction and 
contestation, and ultimately relies upon a degree of consensus.  Documentation and 
analysis of this requires one to venture beyond the “level of programmatic 
announcements, official discourse, and expert interactions” (Peck and Theodore, 2010: 
172). 
Once the façade of official discourse is cracked, what lies beneath is the 
relationship between rationality and power (Flyvbjerg, 1998).  By illuminating the 
power-rationality relationship through empirical work, we can connect the discourses of 
elites with the everyday experience of negotiating these discourses.  Without making 
such connections, this essay would simply report on what the EU delegation to Croatia 
and what Croatian political elites have to say.  But it would not be capable of shedding 
light on the ways in which everyday citizens interpreted and negotiated those elite 
messages and then made choices about their own political behavior.  In other words, what 
is needed is inquiry into the formation of a EUropean subjectivity.   
Subjectivity is a relational mechanism by which individuals are interpellated by 
ideologies and discursive constructions—more specifically, by the powerful discourses of 
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identity that are ever-present in our socio-political lives (Probyn, 2003).  In the context of 
this study, understanding subjectivity entailed a close examination of the practices and 
rhetorics through which Croatian citizens were re-made into EUro-aspirant subjects, the 
building blocks of the EUro-aspirant society.  Just such a process is part and parcel of the 
enterprise of reorganizing geopolitical space, of taking a country and making it an 
“accession country,” and eventually a “member country” of the European Union. 
In the contemporary geopolitical condition, virtually no one is untouched by the 
power of the state, by the doctrine of nationalism and nation-state identity, and finally, by 
the role of ‘citizen,’ which is the key subjectivity that the powerful nation-state 
metageography compels us to accept.  But because the European Union is a wholly new 
political-geographic phenomenon—neither nation-state nor international organization; 
neither entirely intergovernmental nor entirely supra-national—constructing the 
EUropean subjectivity involves encouraging individuals to think of themselves as 
possessing multiple identities, multiple citizenships.  In any accession society, of course, 
this has meant a careful deployment of national identity, in ways that convince citizens 
that EU membership is the natural course for their nation-state, while simultaneously 
reassuring that national identity will thrive in the supra-national political collective.  The 
Croatian case is no different.  However, Croatia provides a unique case through which to 
understand the complex interplay of identities and policy process in European 
enlargement. Its imminent accession (slated for July 1, 2013) represents a key milestone 
in the EU’s external policy objective of absorbing the “troublesome” Western Balkan 
region, which is still in many respects recovering from the recent wars of Yugoslav 
dissolution. 
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The centrality of the discourse of Balkanism (which characterizes the Balkans as 
discordant, backward, corrupt, and violent, possessing an unharmonious and problematic 
mix of cultures and identities) in Europe’s Eastern enlargement has been thoroughly 
investigated (Lindstrom, 2003; Hammond 2005 and 2006; Papadimitriou and Gateva, 
2009; Krajina, 2009).  In the European accession processes of Romania, Bulgaria, and 
Slovenia, Balkanism has been held up as an undesirable identity to be left behind as those 
countries “exited” the geopolitical space of the Balkans and “entered” the geopolitical 
space of the Euro-Atlantic community (Lindstrom, 2003; Papamanditriou and Gateva, 
2009; Obad, 2010).   
Much has been written about the deployment of Balkanist discourse in the Euro-
Atlantic accession process, and I do not aim to reproduce such findings here.  Rather, I 
am building on this work by demonstrating the ways in which the construction and 
consumption of EU-related knowledge was guided by the deployment of identities.  
Specifically, a powerful binary of Balkanism/cosmopolitanism was mapped onto the 
binary of Euro-skeptic/Pro-EU in Croatia in order to construct the EUro-aspirant society 
that ultimately voted in favor of accession in the referendum on EU membership.  In fact, 
I argue, the Balkan/cosmopolitan binary is the chief identity binary under which 
subsidiary identity binaries were mobilized to profoundly shape discussion and debate 
about Croatia’s major foreign policy goal of joining the European Union.  These binaries 
of identity, wielded in the process of EUropean subject formation through the production 
and consumption of knowledge, motivated the desired political behavior.  In a very 
concrete sense, this behavior meant voting ‘yes’ in the referendum on EU accession, but 
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in a less defined way, it also meant espousing a pro-accession stance in one’s everyday 
life. 
Whereas “Balkan” is viewed as synonymous with being backward rather than 
progressive, inward-looking (in a retrograde, nationalist sense) rather than outward-
looking (in a progressive, globalist sense), and emotional rather than rational, 
“cosmopolitan” is held to be the inverse of all of those qualities.  In the earlier 
cosmopolitanism
44
 literature, the term was defined simply by Hannerz (1990) as an 
outlook requiring robust intellect and cognition.  Although current inquiry into 
cosmopolitanism has noted and broken the limitations of this very elite-and Western-
centric conception of the term, those early connotations have stuck, particularly as the 
term is deployed on the ground (for example, amongst EU policy elites) (Rovisco and 
Nowicka, 2011).  For example, Beck (2004) has endeavored to break with the 
dichotomies of East/West, local/global, and internal/external in conceptualizing 
cosmopolitanism.  Yet, as I point out above, cosmopolitanism itself can easily become 
one half of yet another dichotomy: the Balkan/Cosmopolitan binary central to this study.  
Importantly, both policy practitioners and academics alike have tended to reinforce the 
notion that cosmopolitanism = desirable, and Europeanism = EUropeanism = 
cosmopolitanism (Bauböck, 2002; Beck, 2009; Western, 2012).  In this view, 
cosmopolitanism combines the “appreciation of difference and alterity, with efforts to 
conceive of new democratic forms of political rule beyond the nation-state” (Beck, 2009: 
                                                 
44
 The notion of “cosmopolitan” presented here is distinct from that associated with anti-Semitic views, 
historically present in Central and Eastern Europe (see, for example, Ablovatski, 2010). 
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3).  In this sense, the construction of knowledge about what it means to be cosmopolitan 
emphasizes embracing multiple identities and subjectivities simultaneously. 
Moreover, the identification of cosmopolitanism with steadfast commitment to 
Enlightenment ideals such as equality and rationality is held to represent a crucial break 
with Europe’s violent past, constituting another pivotal reason for which ‘cosmopolitan 
Europe’ is equated with a united Europe.  Hence, the notion of a “federation of states” in 
need of defending themselves against supra-national mission creep, or the notion of the 
EU as neo-colonialism by way of economic domination, is set against a peaceful Europe 
of diversity and equality (Beck, 2009).  This narrative of united Europe makes any 
critique or skepticism of the European Union necessarily opposed to what is ‘good’ and 
‘rational.’  But herein lies the problematic of power and rationality:  the problem is not 
the Enlightenment or modernist ideals themselves, but that the ways in which they are 
defined and made dominant in a particular socio-political context can often be 
exclusionary and contentious.  The power—the agency—to define what rationality means 
in a specific context relies upon the ability to determine what constitutes knowledge and 
information (Foucault, 1991; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Huxley, 2007).  However, this power is 
diffuse and partial and the process is fraught with contestation.  As I found in this work, 
this contested process of determining what is information lies at the heart of the accession 
process.  Through fieldwork over an extended period of time, I was able to diverge from 
simple, top-down accounts of the EU leading the candidate country government, and the 
government leading the citizens, through the accession process.  The following section 
briefly details the research design, data and methods used in this work. 
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Inclusive Ethnography of the State 
The choice to explore Croatia’s EU accession process was based upon its unique 
position as the next candidate in line to officially accede to the EU, and also a relatively 
young state still undergoing processes of post-socialist transition, post-conflict 
reconciliation, and the building of civil society (characteristics which purportedly make 
Croatia ‘Balkan’).  While Croatia does provide an exceptional case through which to 
explore the phenomenon of integration, it still offers the possibility for general insights 
into the state and governance because, as it often pointed out in international relations 
literature, regional integration is increasingly viewed as an avenue to stability and 
prosperity in areas of the world undergoing processes of development, democratization, 
and post-conflict reconstruction.  As Kuus (2002: 398) noted of Estonia, the 
simultaneously occurring processes of post-independence re-establishment of the state 
and international integration produced crucial understandings of how geopolitical 
narratives underpin notions of sovereignty in a post-Communist society.  However, I 
aimed to take advantage of the unique moment in the regional developments currently 
underway in order to produce critical insights into the everyday, situated practices and 
social relations of governance.  In other words, there is much more to this story than 
simply geopolitical narratives proliferated by statesmen and cultural elites, and an 
ethnographic study was essential in order to illuminate this. 
However, differently from existing ethnographies of the state in which the 
researcher is located within a specific agency of the state for the duration of the fieldwork 
(see Mountz, 2004 and 2007), I extended the data collection beyond the agencies and 
representatives of the state proper.  Such an “inclusive ethnography of the state”  
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‘Governmental’ Bureaucracy 
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration 
 
 Ministry of Defense 
 
 Ministry of Internal Affairs 
 
 Ministry of Justice 
 
 Ministry of Economy, Labor, and Entrepreneurship  
‘Nongovernmental’ or Civil Society 
 Civic organizations  
 Academic community 
 Minority organizations 
 Veterans’ community 
 Media 
 
                  Figure 1: Groups and sectors included in fieldwork 
 
 
encompasses non-governmental organizations, religious groups, veterans groups, and the 
academic community.  This approach makes the researcher better able to examine 
governance rather than government, tracing the ways in which actors spanning the 
governmental and non-governmental realms played a role in the promotion, discussion, 
and occasionally contestation that are integral to the shaping of policy outcomes. Indeed, 
many of the participants straddled both governmental and non-governmental institutions 
and activities, crucially illustrating the practices and relations of governance.   
The inclusive ethnography of the state may also be described as multi-sited 
ethnography (Gille, 2001), in which the sites are the socio-political locations of 
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‘government’ and ‘civil society.’ This constitutes a particularly suitable type of case 
study method when the researcher wishes to explore situated relations and practices by 
contextualizing them in a wider ‘system’ of macro-constructions (Marcus, 1995).  Rather 
than conceiving of ethnography as taking place in a closed-off or insular site, as in 
classical anthropology, the practitioner of multi-sited ethnography looks for the 
connections to wider processes as well as possible exogenous explanations for the 
phenomena under study (Burawoy, 2000).  Hence, it has been cited as a particularly 
useful case methodology for those interested in processes such as globalization and 
supranational integration (Burawoy, et al., 2000).   
The various methods of data collection were carried out in Zagreb, Croatia’s 
capital city, over ten months, allowing the researcher to experience the various policy 
dialogues and debates similarly to an average Croatian citizen.  In addition to the formal 
interviews and focus groups that I conducted, I also engaged in participant observation at 
various public debates and information sessions regarding EU membership.  I attended 
many of the protests and demonstrations that occurred in Zagreb during that time, 
including some that were not explicitly or directly linked to EU accession, such as 
Zagreb’s “Occupy” protest on Ban Jelačić Square and the Zagreb Pride Parade.  I also 
attended and participated in one graduate and one undergraduate seminar at the Faculty 
of Political Science at the University of Zagreb. The theme of these seminars, each a 
semester in length, was Southeastern European politics and Euro-Atlanticism.  And 
finally, I watched Croatian television programming, engaged friends, colleagues, and 
even new acquaintances in discussions about the European Union, and, as every Croatian 
household did, I received the official mailings about the European Union.  The 
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informational pamphlets, along with various flyers and organizational documents, were 
collected and analyzed in conjunction with the other forms of data. 
Fifty semi-structured interviews were conducted, roughly two-thirds of which 
were completed in the Croatian language (see Figure 1 for the broad categories of groups 
included in the interviews, observations, and documentary data).  The conversations were 
transcribed and translated in consultation with native speakers.  Additionally, two student 
focus groups were conducted, which provided a valuable complement to the interview 
data by combining the methods of interviewing and participant observation.  Thus, the 
unit of analysis in the focus groups was neither the group nor the individual, but rather 
their combination and interaction, which produced an entirely unique dataset for analysis 
(Goss, 1996).  Ultimately, the goal in conducting this ethnography of the state was to 
examine how knowledge is created and consumed, and how some knowledges rise to the 
distinction of ‘rational’ at the expense of other knowledges.  The interplay between 
knowledge production/consumption and identity reveals much about the power-
rationality relationship in contemporary Croatia.  This knowledge interacted with a 
historical layering of geopolitical identity that provided the context of the accession 
debate while also, as we will see, enabling the construction of the “EUro-aspirant 
society.” 
 
Defining and Communicating Rationality 
 Given the central enterprise of this study, to document how subjects are 
constructed, and construct themselves, via the process of informing and acquiring 
knowledge, it was necessary to first uncover the ways in which the European Union itself 
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went about crafting and communicating its self-representations within Croatian society.  
Perhaps the most telling example can be found in a communications strategy document 
obtained from a Zagreb journalist.  This document, from the European Union Delegation 
to Croatia, was distributed to potential local contractors who would aid the EU 
Delegation and the Croatian government in carrying out the public information activities 
relating to European Union membership.  The text has much to say about the sorts of 
Croatian citizens who are deemed necessary to construct the properly EUro-aspirant 
society, and those who stand to threaten this outcome. 
 The language in the document is noteworthy first because it makes the crucial 
equations of being pro-EU with being educated, informed, and rational.  Which is to say, 
to be pro-EU is to be that ideal, cosmopolitan citizen who is well-educated, outward-
looking, and open to the new kind of subjectivity:  identifying with multiple political 
collectives.  The inverse is that the Euro-skeptic or anti-EU citizen can only be the 
opposite; there is no allowance here for the well-informed citizen who has reasoned 
arguments for exhibiting apprehension or skepticism toward EU membership.  As the 
document asserted at the time it was written, Croatia was harboring too many of the 
wrong kind of citizen,
45
 a situation which needed to be mitigated in the years leading up 
to the referendum: 
                                                 
45
 The use of irony here is not dismissive of the fact that there was considerable (if fluctuating) 
“Euroskepticism” in Croatian society throughout the accession process.  A substantial literature on the 
subject of Croatian Euroskepticism notes that levels were particularly high in the last stages of accession 
negotiations and a point of concern for Croatian political elites and EU officials as the referendum on 
accession approached (Balkanalysis, 2011).  On the whole, the literature supports the assertion in this essay 
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Croatian citizens are rather poorly informed about the EU and do not have 
sufficient knowledge about the EU.  They acquire most of the information from 
the mass media.  Their perception of the EU is often based on misinformation.  
The less educated people are, the smaller area they live in, and the lower their 
income is, the less they tend to favor the EU. 
- European Commission Communications  
Strategy Document (2008: 5) 
 
As is clear from this quote, in the EU Delegation’s view, no one could possibly be 
opposed to entry into the EU unless they are ‘poorly informed,’ ‘less educated,’ ‘low-
income,’ and, in essence, provincial. 
 Being provincial, occupying too small an area, is most certainly the antithesis of 
being cosmopolitan, and quite possibly equatable with being Balkan, a mode of 
identification that EU and Croatian government officials alike have openly declared is not 
compatible with being European.  But the document goes on to pinpoint an even greater 
offense:  that of continuing to embrace rightist, nationalistic sentiment, which again 
threatens the construction of the cosmopolitan EUro-aspirant society: 
The most important causes of the existing citizens’ negative perception of the EU 
is derived from several prejudices, powered mostly by lack of proper and accurate 
information on the matter, that obviously creates a kind of convinced ignorance; 
media simplifications, that – instead of clearing certain issues – contribute to 
wrong conclusions and false beliefs and intentional misinterpretation of  specific 
                                                                                                                                                 
regarding Croatian Euroskepticism.  First, there have been heterogeneous factors contributing to Croatian 
Euroskepticism, most of which fall into the categories of “symbolic” (e.g., exclusive nationalism) and 
“utilitarian” (e.g., pragmatic concerns over a lack of transparency in the EU institutions, inequality among 
members, and so on).  Moreover, there has been considerable ambiguity in individuals’ and groups’ 
positions:  Most  (but certainly not all) Croatian ‘Euroskeptics’ are not ‘Eurorejectionists,’ but rather 
‘Eurocritics’ and ‘Europragmatists’ (Štulhofer, 2006; Ashbrook, 2010),  This point relates to the weak 
leftist opposition to the EU noted on pg. 160. 
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features of the EU policy, usually by rightist (nationalist) political parties or 
citizen groups.                                 
 - Ibid 
 
This association of opposition to EU policy with ignorance and rightist/nationalist 
politics has permeated the rhetoric of Croatian political elites, as well as the rest of 
Croatian society (which surfaced time and again during the fieldwork).  Similarly to the 
declarations about misinformation and lack of education, this excerpt demonstrates the 
EU delegation’s view that only backwardness, prejudice, and ignorance could lead to a 
Euro-skeptic stance.  And, just like being provincial, being reactionary and nationalist is 
frequently linked, overtly and implicitly, with a negative Balkanist identity.  Thus, the 
position of EU institutions is clear in this text:  aligning the Euro-skeptic stance with the 
negative legacies of Balkanism (as perceived by many Croatians) was viewed as pivotal 
in bringing about the desired political subjectivity and its accompanying political 
behavior, support for EU accession. 
Observable in the document, as well, is a series of value judgments about the 
Croatian public vis-à-vis previous accession societies, as the text notes that “the current 
low support is a rather unique situation amongst recent EU candidates,” but that with 
“better knowledge and mature reflection,” the majority of Croatian citizens should be 
able to come around to the ‘correct’ point of view:  that completing the accession process 
and becoming a full member of the European Union is the necessary and proper course of 
action for the country (pg. 6).  In the meantime, the information campaign strategy must 
seek to convince immature, “pessimistic,” low-information Croatians that they are wrong 
to harbor any concerns about a decline in standard of living, higher prices, lower salaries, 
and loss of sovereignty (pp 4-5).  In the framing of the argument, the EU’s negative 
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conception of rationality crystallizes:  to be pessimistic or apprehensive about Croatia’s 
economic well-being inside the EU, to worry about a loss of sovereignty or democratic 
deficit within the EU, is held to be based on prejudices and other negative emotions 
rather than on informed deliberation.  In other words, being anti-EU or Euro-skeptic is 
irrational. 
The document moves on from these observations about Croatian society to outline 
the EU Delegation’s plan for combating the ignorance and irrationality believed to be 
holding back many Croatians from the perceived proper, rational, pro-EU perspective: 
The ECD [European Commission Delegation] wishes to approach a number of 
target groups that could play a substantial role in the debate of the EU…The field 
of education (schools, universities, technical schools, etc.) especially at a regional 
level is a “fertile” field for the development of such information activities.  Local 
authorities, where the level of information is very low are called to play a 
significant role in this phase, by creating the appropriate administrative structures 
and information activities for their citizens.  Civil society also has a crucial role to 
play.  Special economic and social groups, such as farmers, youth, women and 
children, professional unions (SMEs, traditional professions etc.) are a further 
focus of attention.”                              
- European Commission Communications  
Strategy Document (2008: 5) 
 
This excerpt demonstrates that in the EU Delegation’s view, the education, civil society, 
and media sectors are not there to provide neutral, balanced, or unbiased information 
about the EU, with which Croatian citizens can weigh pros and cons and come to 
informed decisions.  Rather, they are to be used to convince the Croatian public of a pro-
EU stance.  This puts into practice the policy maxim that being “informed” is 
synonymous with being pro-EU.  The key words of this strategy—“synergy,” 
“coordination,” “collaboration,” and “multipliers of information”—are, in effect, the very 
watchwords of the process of constructing EUropean subjects.   
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Crucially, all forms of organization in Croatian society have a role to play in this 
process, as the crafters of the strategy clearly recognized that in order to be effective, the 
transfer of knowledge and information could not happen in a top-down or authoritarian 
manner.  Hence, the responsibility to be informed about EU accession was taken up by 
relevant elements of the ‘state proper’ and of civil society, while being presented to the 
wider public as a duty of each individual citizen.  In order to be the proper EUro-aspirant 
subject, then, one must take the responsibility for their own informed-ness and 
preparedness.  
 
Responsibility to Inform 
 In the years and months leading up to the referendum on accession to the 
European Union, which took place on January 22, 2012, the Croatian public was certainly 
bombarded with EU-related information in a variety of forms.  The information came 
from various groups and agencies: the EU Delegation to Croatia, the Croatian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and European Integration, public libraries, schools, civil society groups, 
and political parties.  The most noticeable feature of this onslaught of information was 
that the vast majority of it adhered to the vision of the EU Delegation laid out in the 
communications strategy document analyzed above.  Every public library contained a 
small information display with pamphlets and brochures explaining the fundamentals of 
the organization of the EU, the various policy fields in which it possesses competencies, 
and the benefits citizens could expect in areas such as gender equality and youth 
employment opportunities. 
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The major television stations ran numerous advertisements that ostensibly aimed 
to “inform” the public about what membership in the European Union would bring.  
Sometimes, between TV programs, short videos would be played that explained ‘fun 
facts’ about the twenty-seven existing EU member states.  One such video, using 
cartoons, gave basic information about Finnish government and society and pointed out 
the number of saunas per capita in Finland.  Other short video spots explained, in the 
most general terms, what certain EU terminology, such as “Schengen Zone,” means, with 
help from Croatian government officials and academics.  And, perhaps most frustratingly 
for many Croatian citizens, a series of commercial spots featured Croatian celebrities, 
such as popular culture figures and the world-famous champion skier Ivica Kostelić, 
explaining why they were pro-European Union.  The library information displays 
provided information that was similarly basic and general in nature.   
With the variety of informational activities taking place in Zagreb and around the 
country, it would be difficult to claim that the EU Delegation, Croatian government, 
libraries, academe, and other entities had not done their part in attempting to arm the 
Croatian citizenry with knowledge about the European Union.  However, whether these 
activities or materials constituted ‘real’ or quality information, or conveyed “everything 
you wanted to know about the European Union,” as the official information booklet  
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Figure 2:  Public information pamphlets about the European Union (translations by the author)  
 
mailed by the government claimed, was a matter of vociferous debate throughout 
Croatian society.  But the debate was not only about whether the information provided by 
the EU, Croatian government, and civil society sector was sufficiently detailed or 
sophisticated; there was also discussion of whether those entities were responsible to do 
anything more than what they had done in promoting knowledge about the European 
Union.  As illustrated in Figure 2, many of the informational and promotional materials 
were punctuated with phrases such as “inform yourself!” and urged citizens to decide 
“independently.”  Paradoxically, while the notion of being a Croatian citizen who was 
prepared for—or worthy of—becoming an EU citizen was articulated in terms of being 
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eager to absorb knowledge about the EU, many citizens felt that asking probing or critical 
questions was off-limits, as revealed in interview responses below.  What this meant in 
practice was that Croatian citizens were encouraged to deny, or be informed by, past 
layers of knowledge or information that could be a foundation for debate.  To many 
participants, this worked to stem much of the debate, so as to ensure smooth accession to 
a new, rational and cosmopolitan society. 
 
Between Cosmopolitanism and Balkanism:  Negotiating Knowledge about the EU 
As Croatia underwent the final months of accession negotiations and approached 
the date of the referendum—indeed, even after the referendum had been held—Croatians 
positioned in many different sectors of the government and civil society remained 
uncertain about the level of knowledge with which the citizenry had cast their votes in the 
referendum.  This topic almost inevitably came up in the interviews, focus groups, and 
observations.  What became interesting was that so many people who would count 
themselves among the highly-educated and well-informed of Croatian society, the very 
sorts of individuals who, according to the EU communications strategy, should support 
EU membership enthusiastically and with eyes wide open, would admit behind closed 
doors that not only did they not think there was enough knowledge ‘out there,’ but often 
that they did not feel they possessed enough knowledge themselves.  In fact, roughly 
eight in ten participants in the project reported that they did not feel the public had been 
adequately informed about the EU and/or felt that criticism or skepticism (i.e., discussion 
of potential negatives outcome of EU membership) about the EU was not given sufficient 
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space in Croatian society throughout the accession process, especially in the run-up to the 
referendum. 
Regarding the quality of the EU-related information disseminated to Croatian 
society, representatives of some of the very NGOs who participated in the public 
conversation about accession expressed doubts about the level of informed-ness with 
which citizens were making up their minds about EU membership.  And they would often 
count themselves amongst the dubiously-informed.  As someone from a non-violence 
activist organization pointed out, “it is still unclear to us at the moment, you know—that 
agreement with the EU has over 1000 pages.  I still haven’t read it. I cannot know 
whether it will reduce unemployment in Croatia, I cannot know whether Croatia will 
develop evenly” (interviewed February 21, 2012).   
A representative of a well-regarded democratic citizenship NGO expressed a 
similar concern, noting that there were precious few voices publicly asking the difficult 
questions about the decision Croatians were making on the future of their country: 
this rather small percentage of public people, public figures, people who can 
speak publicly, they said, OK, yes, we have to enter the EU.  But, do we have to 
enter right now?  Are we ready?  Or, do we have to enter under these conditions?  
Shutting down our shipyards, for example.  Or, not protecting the Adriatic Sea 
from Italian fishing multinational companies.  Yes, we have to, but do we have to 
go like geese in the fog?  Should we perhaps protect ourselves first, build our 
state, because the state-building process is not finished yet... But, these questions 
were not welcomed in the public sphere.  Whoever started asking such a question, 
it was immediately like, you’re an enemy of the state, you’re a freak, why are you 
questioning this? 
 
- Interviewed March 16, 2012 
 
Similarly to the non-violence activist, this woman represented an organization that was, 
on paper, pro-European Union.  According to some calculus, she had concluded that 
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despite the unknowns or the heavy-handed manner in which Croatia’s accession process 
had been conducted (and, perhaps most importantly, despite the ongoing debt crisis and 
draconian handling of Greece that many respondents had been following closely), it was 
better for Croatia to enter the EU than to remain outside of it.  Thus, of particular note 
here was the weak showing of leftist opposition to the EU.  To be sure, such sentiment 
exists in Croatia, as was illustrated in the anti-EU signage at Zagreb’s anti-capitalism 
protest.  However, in what is a testament to the considerable coalescing power of 
governance, the NGO sector, while employing many individuals who personally harbored 
reservations about the EU, largely fell into step with the government’s accession agenda. 
The more that these sorts of statements were made in interviews, the more 
apparent it became that one did not have to be anti-EU or Euro-skeptic (in the commonly 
understood sense of the term) to harbor these feelings about the information process.  In 
fact, on the whole, the concerns and objections over the public information process did 
not seem to stem from the fact that people feared there was some damning information 
about the EU that was being purposely withheld from them (there was plenty of negative 
press coverage about the ongoing sovereign debt crisis, after all).  Rather, it seemed to 
stem from a sense that the public’s intelligence was being insulted by the very one-sided 
‘information’ campaign.  Further, due to the one-sided-ness of the information and the 
lack of an “honest and open” dialogue about what EU membership would bring, citizens 
felt disempowered and frozen out of a process that, according to the vast majority of 
interview and focus group participants, was already quite distant from everyday citizens.  
As one interviewee said with a sneer,  
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what, the European Union, this land of milk and honey?  There are no problems 
there?!  Everything is perfect, just dandy?!  OK—they put those idiotic, moronic 
commercials on TV…oh my God, I feel sick sometimes, really I do.  But, OK—
you’re doing propaganda for the European Union, but why don’t you set aside 
some time to say OK, there are some problems there, and say it publicly. 
 
- Ministry of Internal Affairs Employee 
(interviewed January 20, 2012) 
 
It was a sentiment repeated frequently.  “What bothers me,” a young tourism worker told 
me,  “is that absolutely anything negative that could come of this process was put off to 
the side, what could or couldn’t happen [with EU accession], it didn’t matter” 
(interviewed on January 24, 2012).  During a focus group, one university student 
declared, “if you start from the premise that it’s a pro-European Union campaign, that it 
is logical for the pro-European campaign to provide only good information about the EU, 
then it’s not called information, it’s called indoctrination.”     
This point was recognized even by interviewees representing the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and European Integration (MFAEI), the very component of the 
government primarily responsible for conducting the public information activities.  As 
one MFAEI recognized during his interview, 
I am sure that there isn't enough information and that the government didn't do 
enough to inform people and what was on TV, etc., that was more propaganda 
and not actually communication with people that would explain to them what the 
advantages are, why Croatia should be in the EU. 
 
- Interviewed February 16, 2012 
 
It would seem, then, that the process of constructing the EUro-aspirant society had 
unfolded in accordance with the vision laid out in the EU Delegation communications 
strategy.  The various government and civil society entities that were meant to spread the 
‘good news’ of European Union membership had done so.  The referendum was 
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‘successful’ in that it ended in a vote in favor of EU accession.  One could conclude then, 
in the conceptual language of the study, that the EUro-aspirant society had been 
successfully constructed.   
And yet, it was abundantly clear from the fieldwork that there was vast awareness 
of the notion that EU membership may, indeed, have its disadvantages.  Perhaps that 
didn’t matter.  As one political science professor noted, after Croatians had witnessed the 
role of the Euro-Atlantic organizations (NATO and the EU) in the Western Balkans from 
the time of the 1990s conflicts, many people seemed to feel that they had no real say in 
the future of the region:  “If [the EU] wants us, they’ll take us.”  This statement illustrates 
the sense that, for better or for worse, Croatia and its neighbors must continue to look to 
the Euro-Atlantic community for geopolitical guidance.  They are not fully ‘Euro-
Atlantic’ enough to go it alone.  And it is this point which strikes at the heart of the 
matter.  The proper EUro-aspirant society may well have been constructed in Croatia not 
because the public, as a whole, was convinced of the information campaign’s message—
that the EU is a prosperous land of saunas and fun academic exchanges—but rather, 
because the process of EUropean subject formation has effectively wielded potent 
binaries of identity that mobilize particular modes of political behavior.  In other words, 
the knowledge was being constructed in a partial way in order to create the cosmopolitan 
EUro-aspirant subject.  The strategy only worked by mobilizing these binaries of identity, 
constructing the specter of Balkanism as the thing to fear in Croatian society, as opposed 
to fearing the unknowns of EU membership.  
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Binaries of Identity 
In January 2012, several days before the referendum on EU accession, the Polish 
Ambassador to Croatia gave a presentation at Croatia’s Pan-European Union offices (a 
civil society group that has branches across Europe) entitled “Poland in the EU: Seven 
Years of Experience.”  The content of the presentation was standard fare for this sort of 
public information event:  numbers on foreign direct investment, tourism, satisfaction 
among farmers, the overall financial balance of EU membership, Poland’s participation 
in decision-making, and the importance of the EU as a mechanism for peace, and a 
collective body to tackle important global challenges.   
It was the question and answer portion of the event where things became more 
revealing with regard to identity and subject formation in Croatia’s European integration 
process.  There were some predictable and superficial questions about the economic crisis 
gripping the EU.  But then the few Euro-skeptics in the audience revealed themselves.  
An older man got up and registered his dissenting viewpoint in an elevated voice, which 
the moderator and ambassador allowed to press on for a surprisingly long time.  A lone 
audience member applauded him.  The commenter proceeded to argue with and talk over 
the Polish ambassador, who did his best to remain patient and cordial.  He responded to 
the man’s concerns calmly:  “Poland has the cheapest food prices in the EU now,” “there 
is growth in salaries…”  The moderator started to look nervous and uncomfortable at this 
point.  Then an unkempt and slightly crazy-looking man in shabby, worn clothing, whom 
I recognized from an earlier debate, got up to ask an extremely aggressive and long-
winded question (which quickly became more of a diatribe); the organizers of the event 
looked embarrassed and other audience members started to visibly show their frustration.  
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The exchanges and group behavior were quite telling, as once again the Euro-skeptics 
emerged as a group of impolite, irritating, and even fanatical people who embarrass the 
decent, rational, educated, and well-behaved pro-EU citizens in the crowd (Participant 
observation, January 18, 2012). 
This scene, which was quite typical of the public information activities at which I 
conducted observations, illustrates the overarching binary of identity that framed public 
engagement over the topic of EU accession.  Despite the prevalent sense, demonstrated in 
the previous section, that there may well be much to be apprehensive about when it 
comes to EU membership, and the associated frustration that any expression of this 
apprehension was squelched in public conversation, at the end of the day, no one wanted 
to be that slightly crazy-looking person expressing fear or dissent around Croatia’s EU 
accession.  This, I contend, was more important to constructing the EUro-aspirant society 
than actually convincing the majority of Croatians that membership in the EU would 
bring unparalleled benefits and well-being to their country.  Ultimately, the EUropean 
subject was someone who accepted certain identity binaries and embraced the “good” 
sides of those binaries while shunning the “bad” sides.  The overarching binary was that 
of cosmopolitan/Balkan, which seemed to provide the foundation on which Croatian 
society was constructed as a proper accession society.  Contained within that 
cosmopolitan/Balkan binary are several constituent binaries that profoundly characterized 
stances regarding the EU.  The EU’s brand of cosmopolitanism was constructed as 
desirable and necessary on the foundation of these intersecting binaries, all of which bear 
a connection to the underlying, fraught relationship that Croatian identity has with 
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negative conceptions of Balkanism.  They also echo the binaries set out in the EU 
communications strategy document. 
 The first of these binaries constructs Euro-skepticism as being irrational, while the 
pro-accession stance is constructed as rational.  The rational/irrational binary was 
reproduced repeatedly by study participants across the categories of people and groups 
interviewed.  It was reflected in the many conversations in which, while many well-
founded reasons for apprehension about the European Union may have been cited, in the 
end, only an irrational individual would actually exhibit Euro-skepticism, let alone cast a 
‘no’ vote in the referendum on accession.  As one student focus group participant 
stridently insisted, 
regarding the Euro-skeptics, I mean, when you say on TV that your biggest fear is 
that you’ll lose your sovereignty or national identity, I mean, it’s insane. What can 
you say to that person who is not pro-EU that they might believe you? 
 
Interestingly, when a respondent was pressed on this common viewpoint, or when 
concrete, observable scenarios were raised, such as the course of action taken with 
Greece and Italy in the sovereign debt crisis, they would often concede that there may, in 
fact, be rational questions to ask about sovereignty.   
Moreover, during this student focus group, what eventually emerged was a vague 
sense that it wasn’t the rational or valid ‘Euro-skeptic’ questions that were given space in 
the public conversation, but rather that incoherent or embarrassing people always seemed 
to represent that viewpoint in public (as happened at the Polish ambassador’s presentation 
at the Pan-European Union).  Why ask the difficult questions about EU membership if 
you will risk being associated with such people?  At the Croatian Journalists’ association 
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debate prior to the referendum, only one panelist, a left/progressive scholar from the 
Humanities Faculty at the University of Zagreb, openly declared that he would vote ‘no’ 
in the referendum.  The remainder of the panelists, even when noting the risks of 
accession, or the inadequacy of information about it, declared that they would vote ‘yes.’  
As the MFAEI representative, Hrvoje Marušić noted, “I will this time decide rationally 
and decide 'for [the EU].'  This is a decision which I think must be made rationally rather 
than emotionally.”  This was powerful rhetoric, indeed.  While political dialogue in any 
society nearly always involves efforts from each side to paint its opponents as behaving 
irrationally and emotionally, this tactic carries particular connotations in Croatian society 
due to the discourse of Balkanism.  Importantly, Western constructions of the Balkans 
have historically painted the image of an emotional, spiritual, and visceral culture in 
contrast to self-conceptions of Western, Enlightenment rationality and reason.  As 
various scholars have noted, these are constructions that have been largely internalized by 
the peoples of the region (Bakić-Hayden, 1995; Todorova, 1997; Obad, 2008).   
 The second constituent binary constructs Euro-skepticism as an uneducated and 
uninformed position, while those who are pro-accession are held to be educated and 
informed.  As if scripted by the EU Delegation’s strategy itself, the majority of 
respondents echoed the notion that being educated or well-informed could only lead to a 
pro-EU stance; and, conversely, Euro-skeptics were necessarily poorly educated or ill-
informed individuals.  And, as the EU’s communications strategy document asserted, 
being poorly educated and ignorant were often associated by interviewees with being 
from a ‘smaller area’:  “all of this rural [population] is very uneducated…maybe it's 
because of that that such a large percentage were against the EU in the referendum…out 
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of that ignorance, they circled 'no’” (Financial security specialist, interviewed May 10, 
2012).   
Interestingly, nearly every person I spoke to, regardless of their level of 
education, their occupation and economic background, or their social location, considered 
themselves amongst the educated and the informed, despite the wide recognition that 
there was incomplete or inaccurate information about the EU available in Croatian 
society.  As one student focus group member asked of her fellow participants,  
do you really think that most of the people in Croatia are as well-informed as we 
are?  They only see what is on TV, and that is European funds, the human rights, 
it’s all so beautiful, it’s all so great.   
 
On the other hand, there was a sense amongst the group that it was possible for a Euro-
skeptic position to be based on educated-ness and informed-ness, but the problem was 
that this was never the side presented in public forums: 
 
I think that the Euro-skeptics didn’t get a lot of space in the media, and even if 
they did get as much space as the Euro-cheerleaders, they were not as educated or 
as informed as the Euro-cheerleaders were, and the Euro-cheerleaders had a lot of 
clever people, and had a lot of professors actually, being pro-European Union, 
and Euro-skeptics had a lot of fools who were brought on TV and radio shows 
and such, that didn’t really say even one thing that was constructive about why 
Croatia should not enter the EU.  And also, I think campaigning is not only led 
through the media.  It is also led through projects you have in all high schools—
the Euro quiz, the EU youth parliament and such, which I think project one 
beautiful side of the European Union, but it isn’t always so.  And also, I think the 
pro-European Union campaign had a lot more financiers than the Euro-skeptics 
did. 
 
These utterances, emerging from interactions between students in a focus group, illustrate 
an important dynamic in Croatian society observable during the fieldwork.  This 
particular part of the conversation had devolved into an argument between two students 
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who demonstrated the central contradiction between acknowledging the partiality of 
knowledge about the EU on the one hand, and their own ultimate identification with the 
informed, pro-EU camp on the other.  When the student quoted immediately above went 
too far in questioning the wisdom of accession, she quickly pulled back after drawing an 
unpleasant response from the group.  After the session, though, and away from the others, 
she admitted to voting ‘no’ in the referendum.  This illustrates the importance of citizen-
to-citizen pressure in constructing the conventional or accepted knowledge about the EU, 
and its relationship to the dichotomous identities bound up with those knowledge 
constructions. 
A third and final constituent binary constructs Euro-skepticism as necessarily 
reactionary, nationalist, and right-wing, while a pro-accession outlook is held to be 
progressive and outward-looking.  This binary proved a particularly potent one in the 
context of pro-EU and Euro-skeptic stances.  Even the rare respondents who were overtly 
Euro-skeptic or anti-accession were quick to distance themselves from what Dr. Anđelko 
Milardović, the writer on Croatian Euro-skepticism, cited during a public debate as “the 
tendency of xenophobia, racism, and Euro-skepticism to intersect.”   
This, of course, is not to say that those identities or leanings never intersect, as 
even a casual familiarity with ultra right-wing political movements in current EU member 
states would indicate that they often do.  However, the power of the equation of Euro-
skepticism with right-wing nationalism was strong enough to diminish the leftist, anti-
neoliberal, and other non-nationalist critiques of EU policy.  The simple narrative that 
emerged was that to harbor any questions at all about the Croatian government’s 
continued ability to look out for the socio-economic well-being of Croatians post-
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accession was necessarily a hopelessly reactionary attachment to old-hat conceptions of 
national territoriality.  That narrative was pervasive.  As the president of one Croatian 
Euro-skeptic political party carefully pointed out at the start of our interview, he had 
attended the anti-EU protest the day prior, but kept his distance from most of it, as “the 
right-wing nationalist stuff is not really my flavor” (interviewed January 25, 2012).    
Another interviewee had noted that he was hesitant to exhibit his apprehensions about EU 
membership amongst, for example, his work colleagues for fear that he would be 
associated with the dominant Euro-skeptic voices heard in public.  He noted, 
As much as I am against entering the European Union as it is right now, I’m 
disgusted, I’m absolutely disgusted with the public opponents of entering the 
European Union.  I’m absolutely disgusted.  Because, their reasons have nothing46 
to do with my reasons.  And they’re only trying to appease the masses, you know?  
And their arguments are childish at best.  You know?  They have nothing to do 
with the real facts.  And, I think those vocal public opponents of the European 
Union are the greatest asset to the pro-European Union side. 
- Ministry of Internal Affairs employee, interviewed 
January 20, 2012 
From the standpoint of someone such as this interviewee, the problem was the lack of 
“real facts,” or of officially sanctioned knowledge, on their side of the public 
conversation about EU membership.  This individual, like many others I spoke with, 
found it important to emphasize that he recognized the ultra-nationalist bent tingeing 
much of the anti-accession crowd.  However, there was very little he could draw upon in 
the public conversation that counted as dispassionate, mature arguments against 
accession.  
 
                                                 
46
 Emphasis apparent in audio recording of interview. 
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“That’s the Thing of Mentality.” 
The three dominant identity binaries demonstrated in this section together support 
the overarching binary of cosmopolitan/Balkan discussed in the conceptual section at the 
outset of the essay.  As noted earlier, the cosmopolitan outlook, equated with 
Europeanism and therefore EUropeanism (Beck, 2009), is characterized by 
progressiveness, by the ability to evolve beyond nation-state territoriality and sovereignty 
concerns, to shun anything capable of resembling xenophobia, and to enthusiastically 
embrace multiple political identities simultaneously: nation-state and supra-national, 
among others.  The dichotomies and characterizations of pro-EU and Euro-skeptic 
stances documented here are not fundamentally different from those identified in current 
EU member states, including Central and East European countries such as Hungary and 
the Czech Republic.  However, the discourse of Balkanism, when set against that of 
cosmopolitanism, provides a particularly potent impetus to fall in line as a ‘good’ 
EUropean subject.   
This is especially effective in light of the legacy of the recent war in Croatia.  In 
the context of the oft-cited threat of ‘renewed violence’ in the former Yugoslavia (a key 
factor undergirding the EU’s enlargement policy toward the Western Balkans), the 
conservative, reactionary, ultra-nationalist mentality is something that needs to be left in 
the past.  These are the sentiments, after all, that lead to political unrest and brutal 
conflict in this corner of Europe in recent memory, and which continue to stymie the 
political process in the region. Perhaps for this reason, the officially sanctioned 
knowledge about accession sought to avoid allowing any credible, non-nationalist 
alternatives to EU membership to un-seat pro-accession as the rational stance. 
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The data show that this power-rationality relationship successfully maintained 
pro-EU knowledge as preeminently credible in Croatian society.  Some respondents 
explicitly drew connections between the need for EUropeanization, on the one hand, and 
on the other, the legacy of the 1990s wars, which have so often been designated “the 
Balkan wars” in U.S. and European media, rather than the wordier, but more specific, 
“wars of Yugoslav dissolution.”  As an employee from a democratic citizenship NGO 
reflected, “politically, rationally, we as a country need to enter the EU, because of the 
war thing.  The [threat of] future wars.  Because of Dayton, Kosovo, you know?”47  In 
this sense, due to unresolved tensions in the region, Croatia’s EU accession is needed in 
order to demonstrate that Croatians have fully evolved past posing their own threats to 
the stable, cosmopolitan European space.  Even younger respondents, with few clear war 
memories of their own, embraced the notion of needing to formally accede into 
EUropean structures in order to exorcise the violent, Balkanist legacies from Croatian 
society.  One student focus group participant reminisced, “the first song which I 
remember in my whole life was ‘Stop the war in Croatia.’  And one of the sentences in 
the song was ‘let Croatia be one of Europe’s stars.’”  In order to be one of Europe’s 
‘stars,’ then (a symbolism that literally invoked the ring of yellow starts on the EU—then 
EEC—flag), a thorough reconstruction of Croatian citizens as EUropean subjects had 
                                                 
47
 It is important to note that Croatians’ views on these issues are profoundly shaped by Croatia’s history 
and ongoing relations with the other former Yugoslav Republics, as well as the role of the Croatian 
diaspora in Bosnia and around the world.  These topics came to light frequently throughout the fieldwork, 
but a full analysis of this aspect of the accession process is beyond the scope of the present essay and will 
be taken up in future work. 
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begun in earnest in the early 1990s.  As the lyrics of this song seem to imply, there was 
no alternative to the post-war aspiration for newly independent Croatia; namely, a change 
of association from Balkan space to Euro-Atlantic space.  
Yet another facet of the Balkan/Cosmopolitan binary implicates the legacies of 
socialism and all of the attendant ‘Balkan’ qualities this system is believed to have 
nurtured in Croatian society.  An idea that frequently surfaced throughout the fieldwork 
was that of the need for Croatian citizens to adopt the “proper” attitudes toward 
capitalism and its logics of marketization and efficiency.  Placing the responsibility for 
obtaining a desirable standard of living with individual citizens, one man remarked 
I think that only unprepared people are living below their expectations.  They 
expected, OK, we’ll get the independent state, now we’ll find all solutions by 
ourselves, in our interests, not in the interests of capital or capitalists.  But you 
know, what’s real life?  You have property, private property, private interests, 
private companies.  You have a market, you have relations, production, trade, 
everything on the market.  YOU are on the market, every one of us is every day 
on the market as well.  And eighty percent of our citizens were not 
prepared…they didn’t prepare themselves to have a proper attitude for all 
challenges of living in capitalism…and that’s the thing of mentality as well.” 
 
- Department of Civil Protection and Rescue employee, 
interviewed April 11, 2012 
 
This quote is revealing of much more than the supposedly straightforward process of 
transition from one economic system to another.  Perhaps Euro-Atlantic technocrats and 
local government officials would have everyday citizens believe that transforming from a 
socialist to a capitalist state is a matter of following the “right” formulas and adopting the 
“best” practices of market economies.  However, the respondent above is representative 
of a large contingent that recognized the deeper reconstruction of subjectivity that was 
apparently needed:  the adoption of the required market mentality, which is the 
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responsibility of each and every citizen.  This was repeatedly portrayed as a Sisyphean 
task, though, in the face of the persistent socialist legacy of depending on the state rather 
than succumbing to a market mentality. 
This would necessitate, as well, the trading in of another apparently ‘Balkan’ 
quality for the desired ‘European’ ones.  The financial security specialist quoted earlier, 
as well as other respondents, articulated this as “the assumption of certain standards, 
norms of behavior in a regulated world.”  “Procedurally,” he noted, “we are a very 
disorderly state, here no one actually knows who drinks, who pays, everyone does 
everything and no one is accountable for anything.  That is the worst combination.”  
Thus, letting go of the old, ‘Balkan’ standards in order to gain the new, ‘European’ 
standards was viewed as a direct link between characteristics of the ‘Balkan’ state and 
characteristics of the ‘Balkan’ society—one in which everyone has a good time, but the 
settlement of the tab is never quite sorted out.  Another respondent also cited this aspect 
of Croatian culture, contrasting it with German and American cultures, where, in her 
view, everyone is concerned about correctly allocating costs down to “every ice cube.”  
Interestingly, these cultural comparisons came across in the interviews as frank 
reflections on how ‘disorder’ and lack of accountability are present in Croatian society 
from café life up to the highest levels of government, rather than social observations as 
metaphors for the inefficient or corrupt Central/East European state.   
While many people appreciate certain of these aspects of Croatian social life, such 
reflections seemed to indicate a sense that these cultural characteristics may indeed be a 
necessary sacrifice in the ongoing construction of the EUro-aspirant society.  In this way, 
skepticism about EU membership, or fear about what accession may bring, co-existed 
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with a deep internalization of negative conceptions of Balkanism, the sense that the 
Balkan legacy in Croatia meant disorder, lack of accountability, and the ever-present 
threat of violence.  For this reason, I argue, the construction of a EUropean subjectivity, 
an accession society populated by properly EUro-aspirant subjects as outlined in the EU 
strategy document, was successful.  Ultimately, the legacies of Balkanism (in this case, 
violence and a nagging socialist mentality) were successfully mobilized to construct EU 
accession as the only choice that would verify the individual as progressive, informed, 
and rational.  The paradox is that despite the wariness and criticism of the information, it 
provided a terrain of institutionalized knowledge, which was difficult for participants to 
reject without identifying themselves as someone resolutely Balkan.  Recognition of the 
partial or biased nature of the knowledge being disseminated ironically still led most of 
the subjects toward the cosmopolitan, EUro-aspirant subjectivity, precisely because it 
was seen as a binary opposite to what they wanted to leave behind.  
 
Conclusions 
The power of the East/West or Balkan/cosmopolitan identity binaries is that they 
create an either/or for the process of subject formation that maps neatly onto the either/or 
of the EU and the Croatian state’s policy objective, which is to say that one can only be 
pro-accession or anti-accession.  However, as the data demonstrate, there are many 
nuanced positions between pro-EU and anti-EU, and Euro-skeptic does not necessarily 
mean anti-accession.  It is important to note that for some, Balkanism can be 
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cosmopolitan
48
, which further highlights the power of either/or conceptions of identity to 
marginalize alternative perspectives.  In the end, these nuances remained largely in 
personal reflections and informal conversations, as the majority of citizens opted to fall 
on the ‘right’ side of the cosmopolitan/Balkan binary.  The process of EUropean subject 
formation succeeded in giving rise to the EUro-aspirant society.   
This occurred despite broad recognition that the interplay between power and 
rationality in Croatian society yielded, at best, incomplete or imperfect knowledge about 
what EU membership means for Croatia.  Most tellingly, both members of the 
governmental bureaucracy and members of the civil society sector—individuals who 
played some role in the public conversation about EU accession—acknowledged the one-
sidedness of the public information campaign.  But in the end, the quality of the 
information, and the completeness of citizens’ knowledge about the EU, came across as 
immaterial when the ‘real’ matter at hand was the need to prove one’s successful 
shedding of Balkanism in favor of European cosmopolitanism. 
On the one hand, the study demonstrates that the EU’s influence in a particular 
society rests on its ability to define what is rational.  But this is a very partial agency:  Far 
from being top-down, it is a contested process, located in multiple centers of power, and 
via considerable pressure exerted citizen-to-citizen, as well as between government 
agencies and citizens, or civil society organizations and citizens.  What the empirical 
findings also demonstrate is that this very diffuse power derived from the legacies of 
                                                 
48
 For example, the left-progressive view that the former Yugoslav countries should opt out of EU 
accession in favor of a new Southeastern European regionalism based on market socialism rather than 
neoliberal capitalism (Grubačić, 2010). 
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identity in Croatia, the associations with discord, disorder, and violence, as much as it did 
from the power of EU and government institutions.  Thus, I conclude, we need a ‘long 
view’ of identity in a particular place in order to understand why certain knowledges win 
out over others as ‘rational.’  The EU’s and Croatian government’s efforts to define 
rationality as a desire to join the EU would not be successful were it not for a prevailing 
notion within society that wanting otherwise is “Balkanist” and therefore backward—and 
this seemed to drive the positive referendum, regardless of the level of informed-ness 
amongst voting citizens.    
What this implies for the multi-level governance of the EU and its Eastern 
Enlargement is that practices and activities are not neatly delineated between levels.  
Rather—as the process of subject formation presented in this essay demonstrates—there 
is a fluid and continuously negotiated sense of how “informing” should happen, who has 
responsibility to inform or transmit knowledge, and what the outcome should be.  Hence, 
the EU’s strategy is not one of authoritarian control over information, but instead one that 
makes use of existing identities, and of anxieties and prejudices about those identities, 
around which there is some sort of consensus within the accession society.  This also 
clearly demonstrates the intertwining of the practices of governance and the (re)shaping 
of identities for which Murphy (2008) has argued increased scrutiny.  In short, the 
process of EUropean subject formation exploits fears amongst citizens about being 
viewed as being in the ‘wrong’ camp.  In this way, the knowledge-power relationship that 
creates cosmopolitanism ironically, but perhaps deliberately, utilizes these binaries of 
identity.  Further, contestations of knowledge and ‘truth’ have the potential to provide 
alternatives to—but also to reinforce—the hegemonic ‘Euro-Atlantic subject.’  Due to the 
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successful deployment of identity binaries, it was the hegemonic Euro-Atlantic subject 
that delivered a positive referendum on EU accession in Croatia, manifesting the goal of 
the EUro-aspirant society.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The preceding empirical essays have each, in their own way, explored the various 
arrangements and processes of multi-level governance in the Euro-Atlantic area.  Taken 
together, the three pieces provide a view into how perceptions of security and identity are 
intimately bound up with the very mechanisms and functions of governance.  Given the 
centrality of security and identity to the arrangements and meanings of the state, it was 
crucial to make the security-identity nexus central to any investigation of newer and 
emerging state spaces, particularly the emergent supranational state space of the 
European Union and the more transnational policy sphere of the Euro-Atlantic arena.  
The larger theoretical concerns with the state, governance, and the security-identity nexus 
intersected with deeper interrogations of power, scale, and subjectivity in the three 
empirical essays, in what I hope has been a useful intervention into the literatures on the 
multi-level governance of Europe and the trans-Atlantic relationship. 
 
Discussion of Findings 
 Chapter Three, with its investigation of security and defense integration in the 
European Union, offers a reconceptualization of what securitization means for a body 
that is both intergovernmental and supranational in nature, adding political-geographic 
insights on the state and securitization to the considerable body of knowledge on this 
topic.  The essay grapples with the overwhelming tendency—both in the academic 
literature and among practitioners—to view the EU’s capacity to act in international 
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affairs in an either/or manner.  This is to say that there has been a tendency to view the 
EU’s maneuverings in its neighborhood and around the globe as wielding either hard 
power or soft power.  While this issue has been thoroughly contended with in 
theorizations of the state and state power, Chapter Three argues that in the arena of EU 
studies, there are further insights to be gained. 
 The task, at its core, was to open up the ‘black box’ of EU governance in the same 
manner that the ‘black box’ of the state has been dismantled in constructivist 
international relations, political geography, and anthropology.  In other words, in order to 
understand the EU as a security actor, I found it necessary to deconstruct the ‘actorness’ 
of the European Union as a central goal of the project.  Of course, given the dense 
institutional landscape of the EU, even an examination of one policy area—in this case, 
security and defense policy—necessitated a choice of empirical focus on a particular 
agency.  But the choice of the European Defense Agency as the major empirical focus 
also had a theoretical motivation:  the EDA, as the most recent institutional manifestation 
of European security and defense integration, is now the primary site of the entanglement 
of multiple rationales for the EU’s very existence.  The agency carries out the twinned 
imperatives of security and prosperity, which always lay at the heart of the EUropean 
project.  The importance of the EDA in the current milieu of Euro-Atlantic relations 
seems to stem from, on the one hand, the conviction that the EU must raise its security 
profile in order to further safeguard its prosperity; and on the other hand, the pervasive 
sense that prosperity can be further ensured with an increasingly neoliberal approach to 
security and defense. 
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 The essay finds that there are, indeed, deeper insights to be gained about the 
securitization of the European Union with a reconceptualization of EU security 
governance.  The hard/soft power binary is problematized anew through a spatial lens 
using the perspective of geoeconomics.  As the empirical analysis demonstrates, the 
securitization of the European Union is not occurring merely through the growth of new 
institutional mechanisms and their assumption of increasing competencies in the policy 
fields of security and defense.  Nor do we achieve a complete picture of the process if we 
focus primarily or exclusively on the aspect of political cohesiveness among the member 
states.  Instead, I argue, the securitization of the EU is best understood in relation to 
broader processes of neoliberal globalization and the recasting of security agendas as 
resolutely supranational, aligned with the constructions of an interdependent, 
supranational sphere of economic well-being and prosperity.  A Luttwakian brand of 
geoeconomic reasoning undergirds both state and nonstate actors’ rhetorics and 
interactions, reconfiguring their notions of sovereignty as increasingly detached from 
nation-state territoriality, much as the metageography of markets has been reconfigured 
from that of the nation-state-bound economy to the single economic area.  The forging of 
a single security area is presented in the policy dialogues as a natural and inevitable 
accompaniment to the EU’s achievement of a single market.  However, the analysis also 
shows how the process is neither natural nor inevitable, but actually riddled with 
contingency and contradiction. 
 The significance of the European Union as a security actor in the broader Euro-
Atlantic security arena is demonstrated in Chapter Four, though the object of analysis is 
not the EU’s policies and actions per se, but rather their operation and negotiation as 
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exercised through the agency of political elites in the candidate country of Croatia.  
Taking the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union together as the 
overarching security regime into which Croatia has integrated over the last several years, 
the essay utilizes a deep theorization of the concept of scale in order to frame the analysis 
of elite political rhetoric regarding Euro-Atlantic integration.   
Several concepts intersect in the investigation of the discursive strategies of 
Croatian political elites.  First, the constructivist orientation of state theory is put into 
practice by making the reproduction of the state via government website content the 
central object of analysis.  Secondly, the research aims to demonstrate the ways in which 
security and identity mutually construct one another, in a pivotal relationship I term the 
security-identity nexus, as a key dynamic in the reproduction of the state.  And finally, 
the essay explores the operation of a scalar metageography in the discursive strategies of 
state elites who are undergoing the Euro-Atlantic integration process.  These analytical 
concepts come together to provide deeper insights into how high-level policy actors 
exercise their partial agency in order to locate their state’s shifting security-identity 
concerns within, on the one hand, a changing global security regime and on the other 
hand, the deep historical legacies of identity and security concerns entrenched in the 
national psyche of the Croatian experience.  Fundamental to Croatia’s integration 
process, then, are the twinned agendas of securitization and neoliberalization that have 
aimed to deliver Croatia from a ‘Balkan’ past that includes socialism, conflict, and an 
outmoded perception of security as tied to territorial defense. 
What has consequently been required of Croatian political elites is a repertoire of 
discursive strategies that respond to the structures of expectations held by diverse 
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consumers of integration policy dialogues.  The specific language mobilized in these 
strategies indicates that political elites undergoing the accession process are responding 
to a spatial imaginary of nested, hierarchical scales, in which messages are tailored and 
packaged for consumption by perceived domestic, regional, and global audiences.  The 
historical legacy of ‘Balkanism’ in Croatian society adds the dimension of a selective use 
of ‘Balkan’ identity in the policy dialogues, with political elites strategically deploying 
both positive and negative aspects of the identity depending on the audience or ‘scale’ to 
which they are speaking.  Hence, the findings demonstrate that no matter how pervasive 
the constructivist view of scale has become in human geography, the fixed, hierarchical 
notion of scale continues to profoundly shape socio-political relations in a world that is, 
in a phenomenological sense, continually reconfigured into ‘levels’ of political authority 
and activity. 
The third and final empirical essay, presented in Chapter Five, departs from the 
analysis of elite policy dialogues in order to highlight the linkages between the discursive 
strategies of EU and Croatian elites and the ‘everyday’ or rank-and-file members of the 
Croatian government and civil society sectors.  The inclusion of both of these sectors was 
essential, in a methodological and a theoretical sense, to elucidating how practices of 
governance bring about the accession process.  The research in this chapter focuses 
principally on the identity side of the security-identity nexus, building upon the insights 
about Balkanism highlighted in Chapter Four.  Whereas Chapter Four takes Croatia’s 
‘accession society’ status as a starting point, showing the interactions between the 
candidate country and its poly-scalar geopolitical audiences, Chapter Five delves more 
deeply into the construction of the accession society.  The term ‘EUro-aspirant subject’ is 
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developed in order to analyze the process by which a society is remade into an ‘accession 
society,’ or a society that collectively aspires to become a member of the European 
Union. 
The additional theoretical concept that comes to the fore in the final empirical 
essay is that of subject formation.  The successful construction of the European accession 
society requires a process of subject formation that successfully (or partially successfully) 
re-creates nation-state citizens into citizens who embrace multiple loyalties and multiple 
modes of belonging simultaneously, a key facet of popular conceptions of cosmopolitan 
identity.  In the case of Croatia, though, cosmopolitanism is set in opposition to the 
legacy of Balkanism.  This identity binary is not entirely new, but it is reified and made 
newly relevant through the mechanisms of governance that work to bring about European 
accession.   
The essay analyzes several instances of these mechanisms of governance.  First, 
emanating from the ‘EU level,’ is a strategy document that outlines the way in which the 
European Delegation to Croatia defines rational subjects and rational political choices in 
Croatian society.  The language is laden with implicit constructions of a problematic 
‘Balkan’ subject who lacks a mature and responsible perspective on Croatia’s future.  
What is needed, the strategy asserts, is a concerted effort from Croatian government and 
civil society in order to bring about the well-informed, forward-looking (read: 
cosmopolitan) subjects who will secure Croatia’s EUropean future.  The analysis then 
turns to the ways in which this rigid identity binary percolated through the relations of 
governance linking the Croatian government and civil society sectors to the broader 
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Croatian public.  Ultimately, the essay concludes, the EUro-aspirant subjectivity 
prevailed, at least insofar as the referendum on EU membership was positive.  
While at first glance, the findings of the three empirical essays may seem to 
illustrate a tidy schema of hierarchical levels of governance, which are relatively fixed 
and interact with one another, I contend that there are more complex and nuanced 
insights to be gained from this body of work.  I turn to these insights in the following 
section as I reflect on the contribution the suite of essays makes to the literature on multi-
level governance. 
 
Implications for Multi-Level Governance 
 The 2008 special issue of GeoJournal (volume 72, no. 1/2) edited by Virginie 
Mamadouh and Herman van der Wusten took stock of the existing work on “Geographies 
of Governance in the European Union” and put forth an agenda for continued geographic 
inquiry into this complex and many-faceted topic.  Murphy’s (2008: 8) contribution to the 
issue urges geographers to advance the literature beyond the “current institutional-cum-
political-economic emphasis” and accord more attention to the significance of Europe as 
a geographical construct that is continuously re-negotiated in everyday spatial 
imaginings.  Elsewhere in the issue, Mamadouh and van der Wusten’s contribution 
beckons geographers away from the tendency to reify the ‘European level’ of EU 
governance, favoring a variable spatial perspective with sensitivity to overlapping scalar 
constructions and policy networks.  More recently, Moisio, et al. (2013) called for deeper 
examination of how the relationship between Europeanization and globalization is 
negotiated by the policy actors of EUropean governance. 
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 The findings of the three research projects presented herein are offered as an 
intervention in the agendas briefly outlined above.  The common theoretical assumption 
weaving the essays together is the idea that the security-identity nexus that is central to 
the reproduction of the state is also pivotal in the geographic reconfigurations of state 
space brought about by Euro-Atlantic integration.  This is supported in the findings in 
several ways, and carries with it implications for how we should ‘rethink’ multi-level 
governance, as the dissertation’s title implies. 
 In the first empirical essay, Chapter Three, the process of securitization in the 
European Union raises fundamental questions about power, sovereignty, and their spatial 
articulations in the security and defense dialogues of the EU.  The analysis brings in the 
element of contingency in order to add fresh insights to the existing, top-down notions of 
EU security governance.  Perhaps what is most interesting about the findings of this 
work, in light of the phenomenon of multi-level governance, is that the rhetoric of policy 
elites indicates powerful mechanisms of governance that are ‘beyond’ the level of the 
EU.  The dominant discourses of the European Defense Agency demonstrate a policy 
community (consisting of both governmental and non-governmental, or industry, actors) 
that very much sees itself as responding to an increasingly global security and defense 
market in which the EU ‘level’ must re-strategize in order to remain competitive, secure, 
and prosperous.  But in order to do so, their language must effectively persuade member 
state officials that the relevant scale of security governance is no longer that tied to 
nation-state territory or sovereignty, but rather to the supranational realm.  Meanwhile, 
ostensible ‘private’ actors, such as national and multi-national firms, as well as particular 
nation-state governments, come together in contingent ways to construct the 
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supranational security and defense arena, with differing motivations.  What, at one level, 
may appear to be contradictory goals and agendas can often, at another level, work as a 
coherent policy course.  Ultimately, though, it may well be the forces of neoliberal 
globalization that contribute most to the construction of a ‘supranational level’ of security 
governance. 
 Chapter Four approaches integration in a different manner, and thus offers 
additional insights about multi-level governance.  Less about the construction of new 
levels of governance than about the reification of seemingly pre-given scales, this essay 
demonstrates that for the countries of the so-called Western Balkans, the significance of 
multi-level security governance is articulated very much in terms of a broad Euro-
Atlantic arena in which citizens are meant to identify closely with NATO and the 
European Union as an expansive space of belonging.  While this is not entirely unique to 
the Western Balkans, it has a particular meaning amongst these countries due to the 
recent conflicts that broke up the former Yugoslavia, and the dominant role that NATO 
and the United States played there.  Keenly aware of this, Croatian political elites have 
endeavored, through their discursive strategies, to emphasize the ‘Euro-Atlantic’ as the 
key level of security governance at which Croatia can be assured a voice in global 
security affairs (as opposed to remaining outside of this arena).  At the same time, the 
security-identity discourses employed by Croatian government officials have 
acknowledged the many relevant constructions of the regional scale in their Euro-Atlantic 
integration process:  the transatlantic, the EUropean, and the enduring notion of the 
Western Balkans, which is at once resisted and embraced as the identity of ‘Croatia as 
regional leader’ continues to shape Croatians’ sense of their role in the world. 
182 
 
 And finally, Chapter Five uses a more grounded, ethnographic approach to the 
state in order to analyze the process of multi-level European governance.  The aim in this 
essay was to demonstrate the crucial links between goals and agendas emanating from 
various centers of authority in the complex web of practices and relations conceived as 
multi-level governance.  While the empirics do, to some degree, highlight activities that 
might readily be pointed to as ‘European,’ ‘national,’ and ‘subnational,’ I wish to 
emphasize the way in which agency at each of these ‘levels’ is exposed as partial and 
incomplete.  While the EU delegation to Croatia and high-level Croatian political 
officials may, in some respects, enjoy a power preponderance in the process of 
knowledge production, the rank-and-file members of government bureaucracies and civil 
society organizations (in other words, ‘everyday’ citizens) still play an important role in 
negotiating and frequently contesting the official knowledge.  The analysis lays bare 
perhaps the most fundamental practice of governance:  the process of subject formation.  
However, the activities and relations of subject formation are not neatly distributed 
between levels, as the findings certainly do not illustrate a straightforward process of 
‘higher’ levels of governance creating subjectivities at ‘lower’ levels.  Rather, deep-
seated and historically layered senses of identity profoundly shape these subjectivities, 
with crucial citizen-to-citizen relations playing a pervasive role in the process. 
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Avenues for Future Research 
 The findings of the empirical essays present several fruitful pathways for 
subsequent research.  Firstly, the study of EU security governance presented in Chapter 
Three should be extended to include an institutional ethnography within the European 
Defense Agency, if possible.  While documentary analysis provides important and telling 
insights about the dominant discursive strategies of EU governance, these are in many 
ways partial and limited.  As with any other documents, the publications of the EDA 
contain carefully crafted language and strategically selected quotes that are intended to 
convey particular messages for particular audiences.  Hence, the conclusions of that 
research must be built upon by observing the institutional practices and behaviors that 
occur within the EDA and between representatives of the agency and those of member 
state governments, multinational defense companies, and so on.  Additionally, as the 
sovereign debt crisis persists in key EU member states, it will be increasingly important 
to investigate securitization while directly engaging with the impacts of austerity upon 
defense budgets. 
 A second pathway identified for subsequent research would address some of the 
more theoretical questions that emerge from the dissertation as a whole.  Future work 
should endeavor to answer these specific questions: To what extent has heterarchy 
supplanted hierarchy in the governance of international relations (if it indeed has) and if 
heterarchy truly rules the day, what of collective intentionality?  And how do collective 
intentionality, identity, and metageography intersect?  Building on my work here, a more 
focused analysis on collective intentionality would provide further insights into processes 
of governance and relations of power.  This would make further connections with the 
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field of political science, which has in its own ways explored collective intentionality.  
However, political geographic ways of thinking about space would make this a more 
theoretically rich endeavor.  Such work would also connect the dissertation’s findings to 
anthropological studies of the post-socialist context and European integration.  New 
geographical insights into the interaction between discursive spaces and material, 
institutional spaces would make a unique contribution on these themes. 
And finally, as the other Western Balkan countries follow their own paths toward 
NATO and EU membership, I hope to expand the fieldwork from Zagreb, Croatia to the 
other former Yugoslav republics, particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia.  The 
goal would be to incorporate these other accession societies in a relational, rather than 
comparative, way.  Given the important relationship between Bosnian Croats and 
Croatian society, as well as the pervasive ties between the Croatian and Serbian societies 
(via diasporas, refugees, familial ties and formal political relationships), a full 
understanding of the creation of Euro-Atlantic space in Croatia can only be gained 
through exploring the ways in which notions of identity, belonging, security, and 
inside/outside are shaped in interaction with these other communities.   This will provide 
a more fully developed view of how the Western Balkans is continuously (re)constructed 
as a region, both by Euro-Atlantic security governance and by the metageographies of 
everyday citizens who undoubtedly still conceive of themselves and of their societies (in 
part) in relation to their regional neighbors. 
 
185 
 
REFERENCES 
Ablovatski, E., 2010.  The 1919 Central European Revolutions and the Judeo-Bolshevik 
Myth.  European Review of History 17(3): 473-489. 
Abrams, P., 1977 – 88.  Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State.  Journal of 
Historical Sociology 1(1): 58 – 89. 
Allen, J., 2003.  The Lost Geographies of Power.  Oxford: Blackwell. 
Anderson, B., 1991.  Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism (Revised Edition).  London: Verso. 
Aralica, T. and Aralica, V., 1996.  Hrvatski Ratnici Kroz Stoljeća.  Zagreb:  Znanje. 
Archick, K. and Gallis, P., 2005.  NATO and the European Union.  CRS Report for 
Congress.  Washington, DC:  Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. 
Ashbrook, J., 2010.  Croatia, Euroskepticism, and the Identity Politics of EU 
Enlargement.  Problems of Post-Communism 57 (3): 23-39. 
 
Bacevich, A., 2005.  The New American Militarism:  How Americans are Seduced by 
War. Oxford:  Oxford University Press. 
 
Bachmann, V. and Sidaway, J., 2009.  Zivilmacht Europa: A Critical Geopolitics of the 
European Union as a Global Power.  Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 
34: 94-109. 
 
Bailes, A., 2006.  National Power and Sovereignty: What is the Significance of the 
European Union’s Example?  American Foreign Policy Interests, 28: 25-36. 
 
Bailes, A., 2008.  The EU and a ‘Better World’: What Role for the European Security and 
Defence Policy?  International Affiairs, 84(1): 115 – 130. 
 
Bakić-Hayden, M., 1995.  Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia.  Slavic 
Review 54(4): 917 – 931. 
Balkanalysis, 2011.  From Zagreb with Love: On the Bounded Rationality of 
Euroskepticism and Europhilia in Croatia.  Available from: 
http://www.balkanalysis.com/croatia/2011/09/12/from-zagreb-with-love-on-the-bounded-
rationality-of-euroskepticism-and-europhilia-in-croatia/.  [Accessed 31 May 2013]. 
 
Baran, Z., 2004.  NATO’s Peaceful Advance.  Journal of Democracy 15(1): 63-76. 
 
186 
 
Barnett, M., 1999.  Peacekeeping, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda.  In J. Weldes, 
M. Laffey, H. Gusterson, and R. Duvall (eds.), Cultures of Insecurity:  States, 
Communities, and the Production of Danger. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, pp. 173 – 202.   
 
Bartlett, W. and Samardžija, V., 2000.  The Reconstruction of South East Europe, The 
Stability Pact and the Role of the EU: An Overview.  MOCT-MOST 2: 245 – 263. 
 
Bauböck, R., 2002.  Political Community Beyond the Sovereign State:  Supranational 
Federalism and Transnational Minorities.  In S. Vertovec and R. Cohen (eds.), 
Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context and Practice.  Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 110-136. 
 
Beck, U., 2004.  Cosmopolitan Realism: On the Distinction Between Cosmopolitanism in 
Philosophy and the Social Sciences.  Global Networks 4(2): 131-156. 
 
Beck, U., 2009.  Understanding the Real Europe: A Cosmopolitan Vision.  In C. Rumford 
(ed.), The Sage Handbook of European Studies.  London: Sage, pp. 602-620. 
 
Bellamy, A., 2003.  The Formation of Croatian National Identity:  A Centuries-Old 
Dream?  Manchester:  Manchester University Press. 
 
Bernazzoli, R. and Flint, C., 2009.  From Militarization to Securitization: Finding a 
Concept that Works.  Political Geography 28(8): 449-450. 
Bernazzoli, R., and Flint, C., 2010.  Embodying the garrison state?  Everyday 
geographies of militarization in American society.  Political Geography, 29(3): 157-166. 
 
Bialasiewicz, L., 2008.  The Uncertain State(s) of Europe?  European Urban and 
Regional Studies 15(1): 71 – 81. 
Bialasiewicz, L., 2009.  Europe as/at the Border: Trieste and the Meaning of Europe.  
Social and Cultural Geography 10(3): 319 – 336. 
Bialasiewicz, L., Campbell, D., Elden, S., Graham, S., Jeffrey, A., and Williams, A., 
2007.  Performing Security: The Imaginative Geographies of Current U.S. Strategy.  
Political Geography 26: 405 – 422. 
Bialasiewicz, L., Dahlman, C., Apuzzo, G., Ciuta, F., Jones, A., Rumford, C., Wodak, R., 
Anderson, J., and Ingram, A, 2009.  Interventions in the New Political Geographies of the 
European Neighborhood.  Political Geography 28: 79 – 89. 
Bockman, J., 2011.  Markets in the Name of Socialism: The Left-Wing Origins of 
Neoliberalism.  Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. 
187 
 
Bremer, T., 2008.  The Catholic Church and its Role in Politics and Society.  In S. Ramet, 
K. Clewing, and R. Lukić (eds.), Croatia Since Independence: War, Politics, Society, 
Foreign Relations.  Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag GmbH, pp. 251-268. 
Brenner, N., 1997.  State Territorial Restructuring and the Production of Spatial Scale.  
Political Geography 16(4): 273 – 306.  
Brenner, N., 1998.  Between Fixity and Motion: Accumulation, Territorial Organization, 
and the Historical Geography of Spatial Scales.  Environment and Planning D: Society 
and Space 16(4): 459–481.   
Brenner, N., Jessop, B., Jones, M., and MacLeod, G. (eds.), 2003.  State/Space: A 
Reader.  Malden: Blackwell Publishing. 
Bryson, V., 1992.  Feminist Political Thought: An Introduction.  Basingstoke: 
MacMillan. 
Burawoy, M., 2000.  Introduction: Reaching for the Global.  In M. Burawoy, J. Blum, S. 
George, Z. Gille, T. Gowan, L. Haney, M. Klawiter, S. Lopez, S. O Riain, and M. Thayer 
(eds.), Global Ethnography: Forces, Connections, and Imaginations in a Postmodern 
World   Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 1 – 40.   
Burchill, G., Gordon, C., and Miller, P., 1991.  The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Buzan, B., Waever, O., and Wilde, J., 1998.  Security: A New Framework for Analysis.  
Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
Campbell, D., 1993.  Politics Without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives 
of the Gulf War.  Boulder: Lynn Rienner. 
Campbell, D., 1998.  Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of 
Identity (Revised Edition).  Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Carter, S., 2005.  The Geopolitics of Diaspora. Area 37(2): 54 – 63. 
Chaterjee, P., 2004.  The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in 
Most of the World.  New York: Columbia University Press. 
Chouinard, V., 2004.  Making Feminist Sense of the State and Citizenship.  In L. 
Staeheli, E. Kofman, and L. Peake (eds.), Mapping Women, Making Politics: Feminist 
Perspectives on Political Geography.  New York: Routledge, pp. 227-243. 
188 
 
Clark, G. and Dear, M., 1984.  State Apparatus: Structures and Language of Legitimacy.  
Boston:  Allen and Unwin, Inc. 
 
Cockburn, C., 1977.  The Local State: Management of Cities and People.  London: Pluto 
Press. 
Cohen, L., 1995.  Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and Balkan Politics in 
Transition.  Boulder: West View Press. 
Coleman, M. and Agnew, J., 2007.  The Problem with Empire.  In J. Crampton and S. 
Elden (eds.), Space, Knowledge and Power : Foucault and Geography.  Burlington: 
Ashgage, pp. 317 – 339.   
Commission on Global Governance, The, 1995.  Our Global Neighborhood.  Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Connolly, W., 1991.  Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox.  
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Corbridge, S., 2008.  State and Society.  In K. Cox, M. Low and J. Robinson (eds.), The 
Sage Handbook of Political Geography.  London: Sage, pp. 107 – 121. 
Cornish, P. and Edwards, G., 2001.  Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy:  The Beginnings 
of a European Strategic Culture.  International Affairs 77(3): 598 – 603. 
Council of the European Union, 2003.  European Security Strategy. Available from:  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf  [Accessed 3 February 
2011]. 
 
Cowen, D., 2010.  A Geography of Logistics: Market Authority and the Security of 
Supply Chains.  Annals of the Association of American Geographers 100(3): 600-620. 
 
Cowen, D. and Smith, N., 2009.  After Geopolitics?  From the Geopolitical Social to 
Geoeconomics.  Antipode, 41(1): 22-48.  
 
Cox, K., 2002.  “Globalization,” the “Regulation Approach,” and the Politics of Scale.  In 
A. Herod and M. Wright (eds.), Geographies of Power: Placing Scale.  Malden: 
Blackwell, pp. 83-114. 
 
Crampton, J. and Elden, S., 2007 (eds.).  Space, Knowledge, and Power: Foucault and 
Geography.  Burlington: Ashgate. 
Dalby, S., 2007.  Regions, Strategies, and Empire in the Global War on Terror.  
Geopolitics, 12(4): 586 – 606. 
 
189 
 
Dalby, S., 2008a.  Imperialism, Domination, Culture:  The Continued Relevance of 
Critical Geopolitics.  Geopolitics 13(3): 413 – 436. 
Dalby, S., 2008b.  Warrior Geopolitics: Gladiator, Black Hawk Down and The Kingdom 
of Heaven.  Political Geography, 27: 439-455. 
 
Dawson, A. and Fawn, R. (eds.), 2002.  The Changing Geopolitics of Eastern Europe.  
London: Frank Cass. 
DeBardeleben, J. and Hurrelman, A. (eds.), 2007.  Democratic Dilemmas of Multilevel 
Governance: Legitimacy, Representation and Accountability in the European Union.  
Houndmills:  Palgrave MacMillan. 
 
De Certeau, M., 1984.  The Practice of Everyday Life.  Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Delaney, D. and Leitner, H., 1997.  The Political Construction of Scale. Political 
Geography 16(2):  93–97.  
Delanty, G., 2007.  Europeanization and Democracy:  the Question of Cultural Identity.   
In J. DeBardeleben and A. Hurrelmann (eds.), Democratic Dilemmas of Multilevel 
Governance: Legitimacy, Representation, and Accountability in the European Union.  
New York:  Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 77 – 93. 
De Nevers, R., 2007.  NATO’s International Security Role in the Terrorist Era.  
International Security 31(4): 34-66. 
Department of Defense and Defense Forces of Ireland, 2008.  Statement of strategy 2008 
– 2010. Available from: 
http://www.defence.ie/WebSite.nsf/fba727373c93a4f080256c53004d976e/a221c63d3721
aa2f802573f400554af9/$FILE/Statement%20of%20Strategy%202008-2010.pdf.  
[Accessed 9 February 2011].  
 
Dijkink, G., 1996.  National Identity and Geopolitical Visions:  Maps of Pride and Pain.  
New York and London:  Routledge. 
Dillon, M. and Reid, J., 2001.  Global Liberal Governance: Biopolitics, Security and 
War.  Millenium Journal of International Studies 30(1): 41-66. 
Dodds, K., 2003.  Licensed to Stereotype: Popular Geopolitics, James Bond and the 
Spectre of Balkanism.  Geopolitics 8(2): 125-156. 
Dodds, K., 2006.  Popular Geopolitics and Audience Dispositions: James Bond and the 
Internet Movie Database (IMDb).  Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 
31(2): 116-130. 
190 
 
Dodds, K. and Sidaway, J., 1994.  Locating Critical Geopolitics.  Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 12(5): 515 – 524. 
Dominick, J., 1999.  Who Do You Think You Are?  Personal Home Pages and Self-
Presentation on the World Wide Web.  Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 
76(4): 646-658. 
Donia, R., and Fine, J., 1994.  Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed.  New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Duijzings, G., 2008.  Commemorating Srebrenica:  Histories of Violence and the Politics 
of Memory in Eastern Bosnia.  In X. Bougarel, E. Helms, and G. Duijzings (eds.), The 
New Bosnian Mosaic:  Identities, Memories and Moral Claims in a Post-war Society.   
Burlington: Ashgate, pp. 141 – 166. 
 
Duke, S., 2009.  Consensus Building in ESDP:  The Lessons of Operation Artemis.  
International Politics, 46(4): 395 – 412. 
 
Dunn, E., 2007.  Of Pufferfish and Ethnography: Plumbing New Depths in Economic 
Geography.  In A. Tickell, E. Sheppard, J. Peck and T. Barnes (eds.), Politics and 
Practice in Economic Geography.  Sage: London, pp. 82-92. 
 
Enloe, C., 2004.  The Curious Feminist:  Searching for Women in a New Age of Empire.  
Berkeley:  University of California Press. 
 
Espeland, W., 1993.  Power, Policy and Paperwork: The Bureaucratic Representation of 
Interests.  Qualitative Sociology, 93(3): 297 – 318. 
 
European Defense Agency, 2005  EDA Bulletin, Issue 1.  Available from:  
http://www.eda.europa.eu/documents.aspx.  [Accessed 4 February 2011]. 
 
European Defense Agency, 2005.  Landmark decision opens way to more competition in 
EU defence procurement, EDA Bulletin, Issue 1.  Available from: 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/documents.aspx.  [Accessed 5 February 2011]. 
 
European Defense Agency, 2006a.  Creating a European market,  EDA Bulletin, Issue 2.  
Available from:  http://www.eda.europa.eu/documents.aspx.  [Accessed 4 February 
2011]. 
 
European Defense Agency, 2006a.  Facing the facts,  EDA Bulletin, Issue 2.  Available 
from:  http://www.eda.europa.eu/documents.aspx.  [Accessed 4 February 2011]. 
 
European Defense Agency, 2006a.  Building cooperation,  EDA Bulletin, Issue 2.  
Available from:  http://www.eda.europa.eu/documents.aspx.  [Accessed 8 February 
2011]. 
191 
 
 
European Defense Agency, 2006c.  An initial long-term vision for European defence 
capability and capacity needs.  Available from: 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?id=146.   
[Accessed 3 February 2011]. 
 
European Defense Agency, 2007a.  Report:  The conference debate, EDA Bulletin, Issue 
4. Available from:  http://www.eda.europa.eu/documents.aspx.  [Accessed 3 February 
2011]. 
 
European Defense Agency, 2007c.  The EDA has started to move the boundaries,  EDA 
Bulletin, Issue 6.  Available from:  http://www.eda.europa.eu/documents.aspx.  [Accessed 
8 February 2011]. 
 
European Defense Agency, 2007c.  Piloting the EDA into orbit,  EDA Bulletin, Issue 6.  
Available from:  http://www.eda.europa.eu/documents.aspx.  [Accessed 4 February 
2011]. 
 
European Defense Agency, 2008b.  The conference in the news, EDA Bulletin, Issue 8.  
Available from:  http://www.eda.europa.eu/documents.aspx.  [Accessed 5 February 
2011]. 
 
European Defense Agency, 2008b.  Options and limits of commercializing, EDA 
Bulletin, Issue 8.  Available from:  http://www.eda.europa.eu/documents.aspx.   
[Accessed 5 February 2011]. 
 
European Defense Agency, 2008c.  Seeking civil-military synergies, EDA Bulletin, Issue 
9.  Available from:  http://www.eda.europa.eu/documents.aspx.  [Accessed 8 February 
2011]. 
 
European Defense Agency, 2009a.  Evaluating JIP proposals,  EDA Bulletin, Issue 10.  
Available from:  http://www.eda.europa.eu/documents.aspx.  [Accessed 8 February 
2011]. 
 
European Defense Agency, 2009b. Keynote Speech,  EDA Bulletin, Issue 11.  Available 
from:  http://www.eda.europa.eu/documents.aspx.  [Accessed 4 February 2011]. 
 
European Defense Agency, 2009b. Panel 2: Solutions,  EDA Bulletin, Issue 11.  
Available from:  http://www.eda.europa.eu/documents.aspx.  [Accessed 5 February 
2011]. 
 
European Defense Agency, 2009c.  Shareholders and stakeholders,  EDA Bulletin, Issue 
12.  Available from:  http://www.eda.europa.eu/documents.aspx.  [Accessed 9 February 
2011]. 
 
192 
 
European Defense Agency, 2010b.  Keynote speech: Alexander Weis,  EDA Bulletin, 
Issue 14.  Available from:  http://www.eda.europa.eu/documents.aspx.  [Accessed 8 
February 2011]. 
 
European Union Institution for Security Studies official website, n.d.  Available from: 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/about-us/.  [Accessed 8 February 2011]. 
 
Finkelstein, L.S., 1995.  What is Global Governance?  Global Governance 1(1): 367 – 
372. 
 
Fink-Hafner, D., 2007.  Factors of Party System Europeanization: A Comparison of 
Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro.  Politics in Central Europe 3: 26-50 
 
Fischer, S., 2009.  The European Union and Security in the Black Sea Region After the 
Georgia Crisis.  Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 9(3): 333 – 349. 
 
Flyvbjerg, B., 1998.  Rationality and Power: Democracy in Practice.  Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Foucault, M., 1991.  Governmentality. In G. Burchill, C. Gordon and P. Miller, (eds.), 
The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality.  London: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, pp. 
87-104. 
 
Gagnon, V.P., 2004.  The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s.  Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press. 
 
Geertz, C., 1973.  The Interpretation of Cultures.  New York: Basic Books. 
Geertz, C., 1979.  From the Native’s Point of View: On the Nature of Anthropological 
Understanding.  In P. Rabinow and W.M. Sullivan (eds.), Interpretive Social Science.  
Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 225-241. 
Gheciu, A., 2008.  Securing Civilization?  The EU, NATO, and the OSCE in the Post-
9/11 World.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gille, Z., 2001.  Critical Ethnography in the Time of Globalization: Toward a New 
Concept of Site.  Cultural Studies  Critical Methodologies 1(3): 319 – 334. 
Glassman, J., 1999.  State Power Beyond the ‘Territorial Trap’: The Internationalization 
of the State.  Political Geography 18(6): 669-696.   
Goldstein, I., 1999.  Croatia:  A History.  London: Hurst and Company. 
Gordon, C., 2009.  The Stabilization and Association Process in the Western Balkans: An 
Effective Instrument of Post-Conflict Management?  Ethnopolitics 8(3-4): 325 – 340. 
193 
 
Gorenflo, R., 2008.  Seizing Layers Within a Multi-Layered Structure: How the EU 
Deals with Security and Where the GCC Could Fit In.  EUI Working Paper RCAS 
2008/03. 
Goss, J., 1996.  Introduction to Focus Groups.  Area 28(2): 113 – 114. 
 
Grubačić, A., 2010.  Don’t Mourn; Balkanize!: Essays After Yugoslavia.  Oakland: PM 
Press. 
 
Gupta, A., 2006.  Blurred Boundaries:  The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of 
Politics, and the Imagined State.  In A. Sharma and A. Gupta (eds.), The Anthropology of 
the State: A Reader.  Malden: Blackwell, pp. 211 – 242. 
 
Häkli, J., 2001.  In the Territory of Knowledge:  State-Centered Discourses and the 
Construction of Society.  Progress in Human Geography 25(3): 403 – 422.   
 
Hammond, A., 2005.  ‘The Danger Zone of Europe’: Balkanism Between the Cold War 
and 9/11.  European Journal of Cultural Studies 8(2): 135-154. 
Hammond, A., 2006.  Balkanism in Political Context: From the Ottoman Empire to the 
EU.  Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 3(3): 6-26. 
Hannah, M., 2000.  Governmentality and the Mastery of Territory in Nineteenth-Century 
America.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hannerz, U., 1990.  The Postnational Constellation – Political Essays.  Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
 
Hardt, M. and Negri, A., 2000.  Empire.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Harvey, D., 1976.  The Marxian Theory of the State.  Antipode 8: 80-98. 
 
Hegel, G., 1977.  Phenomenology of Spirit.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press. 
 
Hendrickson, R., 2006.  Croatia and NATO:  Moving Toward Alliance Membership.  
Comparative Strategy 25(4): 297 – 306. 
 
Hettne, B., and Söderbaum, F., 2005.  Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism?  The EU as a 
Global Actor and the Role of Interregionalism,  European Foreign Affairs Review 10: 
535 – 552. 
 
Howe, K., 1998.  The Interpretive Turn and the New Debate in Education.  Educational 
Researcher 27(8): 13-20.   
 
194 
 
Hughes, J., 2005.  ‘Exit’ in Deeply Divided Societies:  Regimes of Discrimination in 
Estonia and Latvia and the Potential for Russophone Migration.  Journal of Common 
Market Studies 43(4): 739 – 762. 
 
Hughes, J., 2009 (ed.).  Special Issue on EU Conflict Management.  Ethnopolitics 8 (3-4): 
275-420. 
 
Hughes, J., 2009.  Paying for Peace: Comparing the EU’s Role in the Conflicts in 
Northern Ireland and Kosovo.  Ethnopolitics 8(3-4): 287 – 306. 
 
Huxley, M., 2007.  Geographies of Governmentality.  In J. Crampton and S. Elden (eds.), 
Space, Knowledge and Power : Foucault and Geography.  Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 185– 
204. 
 
Hyndman, J., 2004.  The (Geo)Politics of Gendered Mobility.  In L. Staeheli, E. Kofman, 
and L. Peake (eds.), Mapping Women, Making Politics: Feminist Perspectives on 
Geography.  New York and London:  Routledge, pp. 169 – 184. 
 
Hyndman, J., 2007.  Feminist Geopolitics Revisited:  Body Counts in Iraq.  Professional 
Geographer 59(1): 35 – 46.   
 
Ilievski, Z. and Taleski, D., 2009.  Was the EU’s Role in Conflict Management in 
Macedonia a Success?  Ethnopolitics 8(3-4): 355 – 368. 
Innes, A., 2001.  Party Competition in Post-Communist Europe: The Great Electoral 
Lottery.  Center for European Studies Central and Eastern Europe Working Paper Series 
54. 
Jackson, M. and Purcell, D., 1997.  Politics and Media Richness in World Wide Web 
Representations of the Former Yugoslavia.  Geographical Review 87(2): 219-239. 
 
Jeffrey, A., 2008.  Contesting Europe: The Politics of Bosnian Integration into European 
Structures.  Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 26: 428 – 443. 
 
Jeffrey, A., 2011.  The Masks of Europe in Contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina.  In L. 
Bialasiewicz (ed.), Europe in the World: EU Geopolitics and the Making of European 
Space.  Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 85-104. 
 
Jessop, B., 1998.  The Rise of Governance and the Risks of Failure:  The Case of 
Economic Development.  International Social Science Journal 50(155): 29 – 46.   
Jessop, B., 2001.  Bringing the State Back In (Yet Again): Reviews, Revisions, 
Rejections, and Redirections.  International Review of Sociology, 11: 149 – 173. 
 
195 
 
Johnson, C., 2008.  Euro-Politics of Scale: Competing Visions of the Region in Eastern 
Germany.  GeoJournal 72(1-2): 75-89. 
 
Johnston, R., 1982.  Geography and the State.  London:  Macmillan Press Ltd. 
 
Jonas, A., 2006.  Pro Scale: Further Reflections on the ‘Scale Debate’ in Human 
Geography.  Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 31(3): 399-406. 
 
Jones, A., 2011.  Making Regions for EU Action: The EU and the Mediterranean.  In L. 
Bialasiewicz (ed.), Europe in the World: EU Geopolitics and the Making of European 
Space.  Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 41-58. 
 
Jönsson, C.; Tägil, S.; and Törnqvist, G., 2000.  Organizing European Space.  London: 
Sage. 
 
Jutila, M., 2006.  Desecuritizing Minority Rights:  Against Determinism.  Security 
Dialogue 37(2): 167 – 185. 
 
Kaplan, R., 1994.  Balkan Ghosts.  New York: Vintage. 
 
Kelley, J., 2003.  Does Domestic Politics Limit the Influence of External Actors on 
Ethnic Politics?  Human Rights Review, April-June 2003: 34 – 54. 
Kersan-Škabić, I. and Tomić, D., 2009.  Recognizing Euroskepticism in Croatia – Study 
Upon a Student Population.  Economic Research 22(4): 100 – 117. 
Keukeleire, S. and McNaughton, J., 2008.  The Foreign Policy of the European Union.  
Hampshire: Palgrave McMillan. 
Kirchner, E., 2006.  The EU as a Security Actor.  Paper presented at the Annual Meeting 
of the International Studies Association, March 22, 2006, San Diego, CA. 
 
Kirchner, E. and Sperling, J., 2007.  EU Security Governance.  Manchester:  Manchester 
University Press. 
Kolind, T., 2007.  In Search of ‘Decent People’: Resistance to the Ethnicization of 
Everyday Life Among the Muslims of Stolac.  In X. Bougarel, E. Helms, and G. 
Duijzings (eds.), The New Bosnian Mosaic: Identities, Memories and Moral Claims in a 
Post-War Society.  Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 123-138. 
 
Koskenniemi, M., (ed.) 1998.  International law aspects of the European Union.  The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International. 
 
Krajina, Z., 2009.  ‘Mapping’ the ‘Other’ in Television News on International Affairs: 
BBC’s ‘Pre-Accession’ Coverage of EU Membership Candidate Croatia.  Politička 
Misao 46(5): 140-170. 
196 
 
Krause, K. and Williams, M., 1996.  Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics 
and Methods.  Mershon International Studies Review 40(2): 229-254. 
Kristof, L., 1967.  The State-Idea, the National Idea and the Image of the Fatherland.  
Orbis 3(2): 238-255. 
Kundera, M., 1984.  The Tragedy of Central Europe.  New York Review of Books, April 
26
th
, 1984: 33 – 38. 
Kuus, M., 2002.  Sovereignty for Security?  The Discourse of Sovereignty in Estonia.  
Political Geography 21: 393 – 412. 
Kuus, M., 2007a.  Geopolitics Reframed: Security and Identity In Europe’s Eastern 
Enlargement.  New York:  Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kuus, M., 2007b.  “Love, Peace and NATO”: Imperial Subject-Making in Central 
Europe.  Antipode, 39 (2): 269 – 290. 
Kuus, M., 2009.  Cosmopolitan Militarism?  Spaces of NATO Expansion.  Environment 
and Planning A, 41(3): 545 – 562. 
Kuus, M., 2011.  Policy and Geopolitics: Bounding Europe in EUrope.  Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers, 101(5): 1140 - 1155. 
Kuus, M., and Agnew, J., 2008.  Theorizing the State Geographically.  In K. Cox, M. 
Low and J. Robinson (eds.), The Sage Handbook of Political Geography.  London: Sage, 
pp. 95 – 106. 
Kuzio, T., 2008.  Comparative Perspectives on Communist Successor Parties in Central-
Eastern Europe and Eurasia.  Communist and Post-Communist Studies 41: 397 – 419.  
Larner, W. and Laurie, N., 2010.  Traveling Technocrats, Embodied Knowledges: 
Globalizing Privatization in Telecoms and Water.  Geoforum 41(2): 218-226. 
 
Lasswell, H., 1962.  The Garrison-State Hypothesis Today.  In S. Huntington (ed.), 
Changing Patterns of Military Politics.  New York: Free Press, pp. 51-70. 
 
LeDuc, L., 2007.  European Elections and Democratic Accountability:  The 2004 
Elections to the European Parliament.  In J. DeBardeleben and A. Hurrelmann (eds.), 
Democratic dilemmas of multilevel governance: Legitimacy, representation, and 
accountability in the European Union.  New York:  Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 139 – 157. 
 
Lewis, K., and Wigen, M., 1997.  The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography.  
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
197 
 
Lindstrom, N., 2003.  Between Europe and the Balkans: Mapping Slovenia and Croatia’s 
“Return to Europe” in the 1990s.  Dialectical Anthropology 27: 313-329. 
 
Lindstrom, N., 2008.  Boundary-Making in Europe’s Southeastern Margin: 
Balkan/Europe Discourse in Croatia and Slovenia.  In N. Parker (ed.), The Geopolitics of 
Europe’s Identity: Centers, Boundaries, and Margins.  New York: Palgrave, pp. 195-206. 
 
Lipschutz, R. (ed.), 1995.  On Security.  New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Loyd, J., 2010.  “Peace is Our Only Shelter”: Questioning Domesticities of Militarization 
and White Privilege.  Antipode 43(3): 845 – 873. 
 
Lukić, R., 2008.  Croatia’s Relations with the Union of Serbia and Montenegro and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).  In S. Ramet, K. Clewing, and R. Lukić (ed.), 
Croatia Since Independence: War, Politics, Society, Foreign Relations.  Munich: R. 
Oldenbourg Verlag GmbH, pp. 429-446. 
 
Luukkonen, J., 2011.  The Europeanization of Regional Development: Local Strategies 
and European Spatial Visions in Northern Finland.  Geografska Annaler B 93: 253-270. 
 
Luttwak, E., 1990.  From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics:  Logic of Conflict, Grammar of 
Commerce.  The National Interest 20: 17-23. 
 
Lutz, C., 2001.  Homefront:  A Military City and the American Twentieth Century.  
Boston:  Beacon Press. 
 
MacLeavy, J. and Harrison, J., 2010.  New State Spatialities:  Perspectives on State, 
Space, and Scalar Geographies.  Antipode 42(5): 1037 – 1046.  
MacLeod, G. and Goodwin, M., 1999.  Reconstructing an Urban and Regional Political 
Economy: On the State, Politics, Scale, and Explanation.  Political Geography 18(6): 
697-730.   
Mamadouh, V., and van der Wusten, H., 2008.  The European Level in EU Governance: 
Territory, Authority and Trans-Scalar Networks.  GeoJournal 72: 19-31. 
 
Mann, M., 1984.  The Autonomous Power of the State:  Its Origins, Mechanisms, and 
Results.  Archives Europeennes de Sociologie 25: 185 – 213. 
 
Marcus, G., 1995.  Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited 
Ethnography.  Annual Review of Anthropology 24: 95 – 117. 
Marston, S., 2004.  Space, Culture, State:  Uneven Developments in Political Geography.  
Political Geography 23(1): 1-16.   
198 
 
Marston, S., Jones, J., Woodward, K., 2005.  Human Geography Without Scale.  
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 30: 416 – 432. 
Mauss, M., 1985.  A Category of the Human Mind: The Notion of Person; the Notion of 
Self.  In M. Carrithers, S. Collins, and S. Lukes (eds.), The Category of the Person:  
Anthropology, Philosophy, History.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press , pp. 1-25. 
Maxwell, J., 2005.  Qualitative Research Design:  An Interactive Approach.  London and 
New Delhi:  Sage Publications. 
 
Megoran, N., 2006.  For Ethnography in Political Geography: Experiencing and Re-
Imagining Ferghana Valley Boundary Closures.  Political Geography 26 (10): 622-640. 
Mercille, J., 2008.  The Radical Geopolitics of US Foreign Policy: Geopolitical and 
Geoeconomic Logics of Power.  Political Geography 27(5): 570 – 586.   
Meyn, M., 2008.  Economic Partnership Agreements: A “Historic Step” Towards a 
“Partnership of Equals?”  Development Policy Review 26(5): 515 – 528. 
 
Migdal, J., 2001.  State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and 
Constitute One Another.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. 
Mitchell, J., 2007.  A Fourth Critic of the Enlightenment: Michel de Certeau and the 
Ethnography of Subjectivity.  Social Anthropology 15(1): 89 – 106. 
Mitchell, T., 1991.  The Limits of the State:  Beyond Statist Approaches and Their 
Critics.  American Political Science Review 85(1): 77 – 96. 
 
Mitchell, T., 1999.  Society, Economy, and the State Effect.  In G. Steinmetz (ed.) 
State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn.  Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, pp. 76 – 97. 
Moisio, S., 2011.  Geographies of Europeanization: EU’s Spatial Policies as a Politics of 
Scale.  In L. Bialasiewicz (ed.), Europe in the World: EU Geopolitics and the Making of 
European Space.  Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 19-40. 
 
Moisio, S., Bachmann, V., Bialasiewicz, L., dell’Agnese, E., Dittmer, J., and Mamadouh, 
V., 2013.  Mapping the Political Geographies of Europeanization: National Discourses, 
External Perceptions and the Question of Popular Culture.  Progress in Human 
Geography (forthcoming). 
 
Moravcsik, A., 2008.  European integration:  Looking ahead, Great Decisions 2008.  
Available from:  www.greatdecisions.org.  [Accessed 22 January 2011]. 
 
199 
 
Morrissey, J., 2008.  The Geoeconomic Pivot of the Global War on Terror: US Central 
Command and the War in Iraq.  In D. Ryan and P. Kiely (eds.) America and Iraq: Policy-
Making, Intervention and Regional Politics Since 1958.  New York: Routledge, pp. 103-
122. 
 
Morrissey, J., 2010.  Closing the Neoliberal Gap: Risk and Regulation in the Long War 
of Securitization.  Antipode 43(3) 874 – 900.  
Mottola, K., 2005.  The Security Strategies of the European Union and the United States 
as Global Actors: Shifts and Connections in Culture, Function and Power.  The Case of 
the ESDP.  Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies 
Association, March 5, 2005, Honolulu, HA. 
 
Mountz, A., 2003. Human Smuggling, the Transnational Imaginary, and Everyday 
Geographies of the Nation-State. Antipode 35(3): 622-644.   
 
Mountz, A., 2004.  Embodying the Nation-State: Canada’s Response to Human 
Smuggling.  Political Geography 23: 323 – 345. 
 
Mountz, A., 2007. Smoke and Mirrors: An Ethnography of the State. In E. Sheppard, T. 
Barnes, J. Peck, and A. Tickell (eds.), Politics and Practice in Economic Geography.  
Thousand Oaks: Sage, pp. 38 – 48.   
 
Moustakis, F., 2005.  Soft Security Threats in the New Europe: The Case of the Balkan 
Region.  In A. Aldis and G. Herd (eds.), Soft Security Threats and European Security.  
London and New York: Routledge, pp. 139-156. 
Mulaj, K., 2006.  A Recurrent Tragedy: Ethnic Cleansing as a Tool of State Building in 
the Yugoslav Multinational Setting.  Nationalities Papers 34(1): 22 – 50. 
Murphy, A., 2008.  Rethinking Multi-Level Governance in a Changing European Union: 
Why Metageography and Territoriality Matter.  GeoJournal 72: 7-18. 
 
Neumann, I., 1993.  Russia as Central Europe’s Constituting Other.  East European 
Politics and Societies 7(2): 349-369. 
 
Neumann, I., 1994.  A Region-Building Approach to Northern Europe.  Review of 
International Studies 20(1): 53-74. 
 
Neumann, I., 1996.  Self and Other in International Relations.  European Journal of 
International Relations 2(2): 139-174. 
 
Neumann, I., 1999.  Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation.  
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
200 
 
Nwobike, J., 2006.  The Emerging Trade Regime Under the Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement:  Its Human Rights Implications.  Journal of World Trade, 40(2): 291 – 314.  
 
Obad, O., 2008.  The European Union from the Postcolonial Perspective: Can the 
Periphery Ever Approach the Center?  Studia Ethnologica Croatica 20(1): 9-21. 
 
Obad, O., 2010.  The Importance of Being Central European: Traces of Imperial 
Border(s) in Croatian Accession to the EU.  EastBordNet Working Papers No. 98. 
 
Ó Tuathail, G., 1996.  Critical Geopolitics:  The Politics of Writing Global Space.  
Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press and London: Routledge. 
 
Ó Tuathail, G. and Dalby, S. (ed.), 1998.  Rethinking Geopolitics.  London: Routledge. 
Pagoulatos, G., 1999.  European Banking: Five Modes of Governance.  West European 
Politics 22(1): 68 – 94. 
 
Painter, J., 2005.  State/Society.  In P. Cloke and R. Johnston (eds.), Spaces of 
Geographical Thought.  London: Sage Publications, pp. 42-60. 
Painter, J., 2006.  Prosaic Geographies of Stateness.  Political Geography 25: 752 – 774. 
 
Peck, J. and Tickell, A., 1994.  Jungle Law Breaks Out: Neoliberalism and Global-Local 
Disorder.  Area 26: 317 – 326. 
 
Papadimitriou, D. and Gateva, E., 2009.  Between Enlargement-led Europeanism and 
Balkan Exceptionalism: An Appraisal of Bulgaria’s and Romania’s Entry into the 
European Union.  The European Observatory Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece 
and Southeast Europe No. 25. 
Peace and Neutrality Alliance, 2008.  The European Defense Agency:  Arms for War and 
Profit. Available from:  http://www.pana.ie/idn/071108.html.  [Accessed 8 February 
2011]. 
 
Peck, J. and Theodore, N., 2010.  Mobilizing Policy: Models, Methods, and Mutations.  
Geoforum 41: 169-174. 
 
Penrose, J. and Mole, R., 2008.  Nation-States and National Identity.  In K. Cox, M. Low 
and J. Robinson (eds.), The Sage Handbook of Political Geography.  London: Sage, pp. 
271 – 283. 
 
Popescu, G., 2008.  The Conflicting Logics of Cross-Border Reterritorialization: 
Geopolitics of Euroregions in Eastern Europe.  Political Geography 27: 418 – 438. 
201 
 
Posen, B., 2006.  European Union Security and Defense Policy:  Response to 
Unipolarity?,  Security Studies, 2: 149 – 186. 
 
Poulantzas, N., 1980.  Research Note on the State and Society.  International Social 
Science Journal 32(4): 600 – 608. 
 
Probyn, E., 2003.  The Spatial Imperative of Subjectivity.  In: K. Anderson, M. Domosh, 
S. Pile and N. Thrift (eds.) The Handbook of Cultural Geography.  London: Sage, pp. 
290-299. 
 
Putman, R., 1993.  Making Democracy Work.  Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Ramet, S., 2002.  Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito 
to Ethnic War (4
th
 Ed.).  Boulder: Westview Press. 
Rasza, M. and Lindstrom, N., 2004.  Balkan is Beautiful: Balkanism in the Political 
Discourse of Tuđman’s Croatia.  East European Politics and Societies 18(4): 628 – 650. 
Ray, L. and Johnston, G., 2007.  European Anti-Americanism and Choices for a 
European Defense Policy,  PS Political Science & Politics, 40(1), 85 – 91. 
 
Risse-Kappen, T., 1995.  Bringing Transnational Back In.  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press. 
Roe, P., 2004.  Securitization and Minority Rights:  Conditions of Desecuritization.  
Security Dialogue 35(3): 279 – 294. 
Roe, P., 2005.  Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma.  London and New 
York:  Routledge. 
Rosenau, J. and Czempiel, E-O., 1992 (eds.).  Governance and Government: Order and 
Change in World Politics.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rovisco, M. and Nowicka, M., 2011.  Introduction.  In M. Rovisco and M. Nowicka 
(eds.),  The Ashgate Research Companion to Cosmopolitanism.  Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 
1-14. 
Rozov, N.S., 2012.  Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, and Geoculture.  Russian Social Science 
Review, 53(6): 4-26. 
Rupel, D., 2001.  Ten Years of Slovenia’s Foreign Policy, 1991 – 2001.  Slovenian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Retrieved from 
http://www.mzz.gov.si/index.php?id=47&L=2.  Last accessed May 2, 2010. 
Salmon, T., 2005.  The European Security and Defense Policy: Built on Rocks or Sand?  
European Foreign Affairs Review 10(3): 359 – 379. 
202 
 
Salmon, T. and Shepherd, A., 2003.  Toward a European Army: A Military Power in the 
Making?  Boulder:  Lynne Rienner. 
 
Sampson, E., 1989.  The Deconstruction of the Self.  In J. Shotter and K. Gergen (eds.), 
Texts of Identity.  London: Sage, pp. 1-19. 
Sasse, G., 2005.  Securitization or Securing Rights?  Exploring the Conceptual 
Foundations of Policies Towards Minorities and Migrants in Europe.  Journal of 
Common Market Studies 43(4): 673 – 693. 
Scott, J., 1998.  Seeing Like a State.  New Haven:  Yale University Press. 
Scott, J.W., 2009.  Europe of Regions.  In R. Kitchin and N. Thrift (eds.) International 
Encyclopedia of Human Geography, Volume 3. Oxford: Elsevier, pp. 649-657. 
 
Searle, J., 1995.  The Construction of Social Reality.  New York:  Free Press. 
Sebastian, S., 2009.  The Role of the EU in the Reform of Dayton in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  Ethnopolitics 8(3-4): 341 – 354. 
Sharma, A. and Gupta, A., 2006.  The Anthropology of the State: A Reader.  Malden:  
Blackwell. 
Sharma, A., and Gupta, A., 2006.  Introduction: Rethinking Theories of the State in an 
Age of Globalization.  In A. Sharma and A. Gupta (eds.), The Anthropology of the State:  
A Reader.  Malden: Blackwell, pp. 1 – 41. 
 
Sharp, J., 2000.  Condensing the Cold War: Reader’s Digest and American Identity.  
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Sharp, J., Routledge, P., Philo, C., and Paddison, R., (eds.), 2000.  Entanglements of 
Power: Geographies of Domination/Resistance.  London and New York: Routledge. 
Smith, M., 1998. Does the Flag Follow Trade?: ‘Politicization’ and the Emergence of a 
European Foreign Policy.  In J. Peterson, and H. Sjursen (eds.), A Common Foreign 
Policy for Europe?  Competing Visions of the CFSP.  London: Routledge, pp. 79 – 94. 
 
Smouts, M-C., 1998.  The Proper Use of Governance in International Relations.  
International Social Science Journal 50(155): 81 – 89.   
Stojić, M., 2006.  Between Europhobia and Europhilia:  Party and Popular Attitudes 
Towards Membership in the European Union in Serbia and Croatia.  Perspectives on 
European Politics and Society 7(3): 312-335. 
203 
 
Stoker, G., 1998.  Governance as Theory: Five Propositions.  International Social 
Science Journal 50(155): 19 – 28.   
Strong, T., 1992.  Introduction: The Self and the Political Order.  In T. Strong (ed.), The 
Self and the Political Order.  Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 1-21. 
Stulberg, A., 2005.  Moving Beyond the Great Game: The Geoeconomics of Russia’s 
Influence in the Caspian Energy Bonanza.  Geopolitics 10: 1-25. 
Swingedouw, E., 1996.  Reconstructing Citizenship, the Re-Scaling of the State and the 
New Authoritarianism: Closing the Belgian Mines.  Urban Studies 33(8): 1499-1522.   
Swyngedouw E., 2000.  Authoritarian Governance, Power, and the Politics of Rescaling. 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 18(1): 63–76.  
Štulhofer, A., 2006.  Euroskepticism in Croatia: On the Far Side of Rationality?  In K. 
Ott (ed.), Croatian Accession to the European Union Vol. 4: The Challenges of 
Participation.  Zagreb: Institute of Public Finance; Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Kroatien, pp. 
141-160. 
 
Taylor, C., 1994.  The Politics of Recognition.  In A. Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism:  
Examining the Politics of Recognition.  Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 25 – 
74. 
 
Taylor, P., 1995.  Beyond Containers: Internationality, Interstateness, Interterritoriality.  
Progress in Human Geography 19: 1-15. 
 
Tickell, A. and Peck, J., 1995.  Social Regulation after Fordism:  Regulation Theory, 
Neo-Liberalism and the Global-Local Nexus.  Economy and Society 24(3): 357 – 386. 
 
Todorova, M., 1997.  Imagining the Balkans.  New York and Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press. 
Trauner, F., 2009.  Deconstructing the EU’s Routes of Influence in Justice and Home 
Affairs in the Western Balkans.  European Integration 31(1): 65 – 82.  
Trudeau, D., 2008.  Towards a Relational View of the Shadow State.  Political 
Geography 27(6): 669-690.   
Vachudova, M., 2006.  Democratization in Postcommunist Europe:  Illiberal Regimes 
and the Leverage of International Actors.  Center for European Studies Working Paper 
Series No. 139. 
204 
 
Varro, K., 2010.  Re-Politicising the Analysis of “New State Spaces” in Hungary and 
Beyond: Towards an Effective Engagement with “Actually Existing Neoliberalism.”  
Antipode 42(5): 1253 – 1278.   
Verdery, K., 1996a.  Transnationalism, Nationalism, Citizenship, and Property: Eastern 
Europe Since 1989.  American Ethnologist 25(2): 291 – 306. 
Verdery, K., 1996b.  What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?  Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Volčič, Z., 2008.  Former Yugoslavia on the World Wide Web: Commercialization and 
Branding of Nation-States.  International Communication Gazette 70(5): 395-413. 
Wæver, O., 1995a.  Identity, Integration, and Security: Solving the Puzzle in E.U. 
Studies.  Journal of International Affairs 48(2): 389 – 431. 
Wæver, O., 1995b.  Securitization and Desecuritization.  In R. Lipschutz (ed.), On 
Security.  New York:  Columbia University Press, pp. 46 – 86. 
Walker, R.B.J., 1993.  Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory.  
Cambridge; Cambridge University Press. 
 
Wallerstein, I, 1984.  The Politics of the World-Economy. London: Verso. 
 
Way, L. and Levitsky, S., 2007.  Linkage, Leverage, and the Post-Communist Divide.  
East European Politics and Societies, 21(1): 48 – 66. 
Webber, M., Croft, S., Howorth, J., Terriff, T., and Krahmann, E., 2004.  The 
Governance of European Security.  Review of International Studies 30: 3 – 26. 
Wedel, J., 1998.  Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern 
Europe.  New York: Palgrave. 
Weldes, J., Laffey, M., Gusterson, H., and Duvall, R. (eds.), 1999.  Cultures of 
Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger.  Minneapolis:  
University of Minnesota Press. 
Western, J., 2012.  Cosmopolitan Europe:  A Strasbourg Self-Portrait.  Surrey: Ashgate. 
 
White, M., and Norton-Taylor, R., 2000.  Irate Blair savages Thatcher.  The Guardian, 23 
November. 
 
Wilson, D., 2012.  Updating the Global-Local Disorder Concept (Revisiting Peck and 
Tickell).  Area 44(2): 254-257. 
205 
 
Woodward, S., 1993.  Balkan Tragedy.  Washington:  Brookings Institution Press. 
Yack, B., 2001.  Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism.  Political Theory 29(4): 517-36.  
 
Zeigler, D., 2002.  Post-Communist Eastern Europe and the Cartography of 
Independence.  Political Geography 21, 671 – 686.   
 
Zielonka, J., 2006.  Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union.  
Oxford:  Oxford University Press. 
 
Zürn, M. and Leibfriend, S., 2005.  Reconfiguring the national constellation.  In S. 
Leibfried and M. Zürn (eds.), Transformations of the State?  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 1-36. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
